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S H E L L E Y W E LTO N

Neutralizing the Atmosphere
abstract. “Net zero” has rapidly become the new organizing paradigm of climate change

law. In the past few years, thousands of countries, companies, states, and cities have developed
pledges that promise by a set date—typically around 2050—that any carbon they emit will be counterbalanced by capturing an equal amount of carbon out of the atmosphere. Collectively, these
pledges now cover more than 91% of the global economy.
This widespread adoption of scientiﬁcally aligned climate policy appears on its surface like a
cause for celebration. However, concerns are mounting. To date, critiques of net zero have centered
on what this Feature terms “accounting” risks: that is, risks that pledges in action will fail to live
up to pledges on paper. This Feature argues that there are two broader normative and political
risks with net zero that are underdiagnosed but may prove more intractable. First, the net-zero
framework is agnostic regarding the manner in which to neutralize atmospheric emissions, leaving
each participating entity—including both governments and corporations—to determine its own
preferred strategy. But decisions around how to reach net-zero emissions are contested, impactful,
and o�en politically explosive. As net zero has proliferated as a framing paradigm, there has been
a marked shi� in the climate change policy conversation towards recognizing climate as imbricated
with racial and economic justice. These considerations are ignored in the net-zero framing, with
its emphasis on pristine carbon balance sheets. The second risk this Feature identiﬁes is the “collective-achievement challenge”: if the world continues to pursue an atomized approach to net zero,
it is likely that entities will overrely on certain cost-eﬀective strategies—like tree planting—at scales
that cannot be collectively achieved, at least not without substantial collateral social consequences.
Disjunctive eﬀorts toward net zero thus threaten to undermine the legal, political, and physical
foundations of global decarbonization eﬀorts. Understanding these risks counsels for restructuring the private sector’s role away from individualized net-zero targets toward a “reduce and support” approach that would better collectivize and rationalize net-zero policy. For public pledges,
these risks counsel for more attention to net zero’s administering institutions and governance
structures to foster more democratic, holistic decision-making about the shape and content of our
decarbonized future.
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introduction
“The pursuit of a net-zero target is perhaps the most ambitious collective
undertaking in human history.” 1
Almost all of a sudden, “net zero” has become the organizing paradigm of
climate change law. In 2015, signatories to the Paris Climate Agreement committed to “achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the second half of this century.” 2
Scientists widely agree that this global balancing eﬀort will be critical for keeping
planetary warming to noncatastrophic levels. 3 In the ﬁve years since the Paris
Agreement, countries, states, cities, and companies have coalesced around a project of creating their own net-zero commitments. In these commitments, entities
pledge to ensure by a set date—typically around 2050—that any remaining carbon they emit is counterbalanced by capturing an equal amount of carbon out of
the atmosphere. 4 As of September 2022, net-zero commitments covered an impressive 91% of the global economy (as measured by gross domestic product
(GDP)), up from only 16% as recently as 2019. 5
It is stunning how quickly the climate change ﬁeld—which has been rife with
epistemological and methodological disagreement for decades—has accepted net

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.
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Kelly Levin, David Rich, Katie Ross, Taryn Fransen & Cynthia Elliot, Designing and Communicating Net Zero Targets 5 (July 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ﬁles.wri.org
/d8/s3fs-public/designing-communicating-net-zero-targets.pdf [https://perma.cc/XBS8JZHN].
Rep. of the Conf. of the Parties on its Twenty-First Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1,
at 22 (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/FCCC_CP_2015_10_Add.1.pdf [https://perma.cc/REE2K46D] (adopting the Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104).
Summary for Policymakers, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL
WARMING OF 1.5°C, at 1, 12 (Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2018) [hereina�er 2018 Summary for Policymakers] (ﬁnding that to limit warming to 1.5°C, “global net anthropogenic CO2
emissions [must] decline by about 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 . . . [to] reach[] net zero
around 2050” (emphasis omitted)).
As explained infra note 53, many entities focus their pledges on carbon dioxide; others include
additional greenhouse gases (GHGs). “Carbon” here is a shorthand for all GHGs that entities
are looking to address through their pledges.
See NET ZERO TRACKER, https://zerotracker.net [https://perma.cc/H9EW-S3MD]; Taking
Stock: A Global Assessment of Net Zero Targets, THE ENERGY & CLIMATE INTEL. UNIT & OXFORD
NET ZERO 5, 8 (Mar. 2021) [hereina�er Taking Stock], https://ca1-eci.edcdn.com/reports
/ECIU-Oxford_Taking_Stock.pdf [https://perma.cc/E49V-VSY4].
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zero as the central goal of climate policy and the key metric for academic analysis. 6 But scientists’ prescription of a global emissions-netting imperative is critically diﬀerent from the net-zero project described in this Feature, which translates the collective scientiﬁc imperative into disjunctive, atomized pledges. 7 To
be sure, these pledges represent substantial progress in climate change discourse
with their clear framing, certain dates, and obviously widespread appeal. Yet scientiﬁc, political, and social concerns are mounting regarding the risks of framing
our response to the climate crisis through a goal of net zero. 8 To date, critiques
have centered on what this Feature terms “accounting” risks: that is, risks that
pledges in action will fail to live up to pledges on paper, either because countries
and companies are disingenuous in their commitments or because technological
innovations fail to deliver reliable, long-term carbon-removal solutions at the
scale and scope that these entities hope. 9
Accounting risks are real and concerning, but they are not net zero’s biggest
challenge. This Feature diagnoses two deeper and broader normative risks with
the net-zero project. The ﬁrst, which it terms the “neutrality mirage,” stems from
the putative neutrality of the net-zero framework. Orienting climate policy

6.

7.

8.

9.

See, e.g., Eric Larson et al., Net Zero America: Potential Pathways, Infrastructure, and Impacts,
PRINCETON UNIV. 5 (Dec. 2020), https://environmenthalfcentury.princeton.edu/sites/g/ﬁles
/toruqf331/ﬁles/2020-12/Princeton_NZA_Interim_Report_15_Dec_2020_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RY88-2B67]; Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy System,
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (Oct. 2021), https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/deebef5d-0c344539-9d0c-10b13d840027/NetZeroby2050-ARoadmapfortheGlobalEnergySector_CORR
.pdf [https://perma.cc/LHB6-B6Q7]; MAJORITY STAFF OF H. SELECT COMM. ON THE CLIMATE
CRISIS, 116TH CONG., SOLVING THE CLIMATE CRISIS: THE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR A
CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY AND A HEALTHY, RESILIENT, AND JUST AMERICA 3 (Comm. Print
2020) (presenting a plan to get the United States to zero emissions).
Accordingly, throughout the Feature, I use “global emissions-netting imperative” to refer to
the eﬀort to net greenhouse-gas emissions at a planetary scale, whereas “net-zero project” or
“net-zero framework” refer to the current shape of this eﬀort.
See, e.g., James Dyke, Robert Watson & Wolfgang Knorr, Climate Scientists: Concept of Net Zero
Is a Dangerous Trap, CONVERSATION (Apr. 22, 2021, 12:25 AM EDT), https://theconversation
.com/climate-scientists-concept-of-net-zero-is-a-dangerous-trap-157368 [https://perma.cc
/7DAX-YM7B]; Fred Pearce, Net Zero Emissions: Winning Strategy or Destined for Failure?,
YALE ENV’T 360 (May 25, 2021), https://e360.yale.edu/features/net-zero-emissions-winning
-strategy-or-destined-for-failure [https://perma.cc/L5N5-F9LR]; Albert C. Lin, Carbon Dioxide Removal A�er Paris, 45 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 533 (2018); Umair Irfan, Are “Net Zero” Climate
Targets Just Hot Air?, VOX (Oct. 29, 2021, 10:30 AM EDT), https://www.vox.com/22737140
/un-cop26-climate-change-net-zero-emissions-carbon-oﬀsets
[https://perma.cc/AV2VSQ2V]; Ciara Nugent, The World’s Top Carbon Emitters now All Have Net Zero Pledges. Most of
Them Are Too Vague, TIME (Nov. 4, 2021, 11:34 AM EDT), https://time.com/6113845/net-zero
-climate-pledge-impact [https://perma.cc/9M9G-ZQFS].
Three such accounting risks—greenwashing, self-serving optimism, and fungibility—are explored in more detail infra Part II.
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around the overarching goal of neutralizing atmospheric emissions suggests indiﬀerence about the best pathway to net zero. But in reality, the details of how to
net emissions are contested, consequential, and o�en politically explosive. 10 Indeed, at the same time net zero has proliferated as a framing device, policy conversations have shi�ed toward recognizing climate change as imbricated with
racial and economic justice. 11 The net-zero paradigm, with its emphasis on pristine carbon balance sheets, largely ignores these social dimensions, which are
critical for political legitimacy and durability. 12 By linking this challenge to analogous critiques of cost-beneﬁt analysis in legal theory, this Feature illuminates
the risks of a climate program that intentionally sidelines democratic and distributive considerations. 13
The second risk this Feature identiﬁes is what it terms the “collectiveachievement challenge.” Net-zero pledges, as currently structured, have a distinctly libertarian valence: each entity (of various scales—sometimes down to
the individual 14) voluntarily oﬀers to zero out their own universe of carbon
emissions in the way they see ﬁt. 15 But the emissions-netting imperative is
global: to avoid planetary catastrophe, the world collectively must balance all
unavoidable emissions with negative emissions. To achieve this task, climate
models suggest that every feasible emission cut that can be achieved anywhere must
be pursued, even as the world also attempts to recapture carbon from the atmosphere for long-term storage. 16 The libertarian approach to net zero fails to reﬂect
this scientiﬁc reality. Instead, it allows each pledging entity to plan for itself how
it will neutralize its emissions—a strategy which may ultimately result in irreconcilable plans that exacerbate other development challenges while underachieving on a global scale.
10.
11.

12.

13.
14.
15.
16.

176

See infra Section III.A.
See, e.g., SHALANDA BAKER, REVOLUTIONARY POWER: AN ACTIVIST’S GUIDE TO THE ENERGY
TRANSITION 74 (2021) (excoriating “climate change fundamentalism” for its inattention to inequality and social justice); infra notes 204-206 and accompanying text (describing how the
Green New Deal frames these issues as interrelated).
See Accelerating Decarbonization of the U.S. Energy System, NAT’L ACADS. SCIS., ENG’G & MED. 1
(2021), https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/25932/accelerating-decarbonization-ofthe-us-energy-system [https://perma.cc/7B4Z-FSA8] (“[T]he manner in which the U.S.
economy produces and consumes energy impacts a host of other issues that people care deeply
about. . . . Maintaining public support through a three-decade transition to net zero simply
cannot be achieved without the development and maintenance of a strong social contract.”).
See infra Section III.B.
See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1673, 1705 (2007).
Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA, at xi (1974) (making the case for a libertarian “minimal state” that does not require aid to others or prohibit self-harming activities).
See infra Section IV.A.
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By way of illustration, imagine that forty developed countries each plan to
invest substantially in developing-country reforestation as a method of counterbalancing emissions that prove costly to cut from their domestic economies. At
the same time, those developing countries plan domestic reforestation initiatives
to neutralize their own emissions, and hundreds of major corporations plan to
rely on carbon-oﬀset credits generated from reforestation projects to achieve
their net-zero targets. On the whole, there simply may not be enough opportunities for reforestation initiatives to serve all these separate entities. This risk is
not speculative: Shell Oil is already pushing a vision of how to limit warming
that relies on reforesting an area the size of Brazil. 17 Although plausible in theory,
such strategies face political and biophysical limits and are likely to have unintended collateral consequences: for example, overreliance on reforestation may
contribute to food insecurity or plantation-style development at the expense of
community livelihoods. 18
For these reasons, disjunctive eﬀorts toward net zero pose real risks for the
critical global imperative of atmospheric neutralization. This risk is particularly
acute given the legal structure of the Paris Agreement, which is premised upon
country-driven pledges whose ambition is expected to strengthen over time as
global trust is established. Under this legal order, a private marketplace might
displace country-centered ambition, ultimately proving counterproductive to
sustained global progress. 19
Understanding these deeper risks with the net-zero framework does not
wholly undermine its potential, but points to two critical lessons about how to
structure it going forward. 20 The ﬁrst lesson regards the private role in achieving
net zero. Contrary to the predominant current approach of the United Nations
and various other net-zero champions, 21 corporations should not be encouraged
to develop, submit, and pursue net-zero pledges. The immense normative and
political stakes of determining how to net emissions in a coordinated, democratic,
and equitable fashion render this task ill suited for atomized corporate actors.

17.

18.
19.
20.

21.

Josh Gabbatiss, Analysis: Shell Says New ‘Brazil-Sized’ Forest Would Be Needed to Meet 1.5C Climate Goal, CARBONBRIEF (Feb. 12, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysisshell-says-new-brazil-sized-forest-would-be-needed-to-meet-1-5c-climate-goal
[https://
perma.cc/6RHR-8V5F]. In 2021, a Dutch court rebuked this plan. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 219-221 and accompanying text.
See infra Section IV.C.
These suggestions go beyond the predominant solutions in the literature to date, which have
focused on standard setting and target separation. See infra Section V.A. See generally Albert
C. Lin, Making Net Zero Matter, 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 679 (2022) (arguing that net-zero
pledges should incorporate distinct targets for emissions reduction and carbon removal).
See infra Part II.
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Though forceful, this conclusion is not an indictment of corporate action on climate change. To the contrary, this Feature oﬀers a nuanced gloss on private netzero governance, encouraging corporate standard setting with respect to emissions reductions but suggesting alternative means of engaging corporate actors
in carbon removal. 22
The second lesson regards public actors, most notably countries and subjurisdictions such as U.S. states. These democratic actors appropriately shoulder
the normative burden of deciding how to structure their net-zero projects to help
achieve the global emissions-netting imperative. This fact underscores what
should be an obvious conclusion: institutional design is central to the project of
net zero. When a jurisdiction sets the goal of neutralizing the emissions of an
entire economy, the program administrator will have (at least) thousands of
choices to make regarding how to achieve that ultimate balance, both temporally
and substantively—choices with wide societal implications. 23 Yet there has been
limited attention paid to decisions regarding who should hold this authority and
under what oversight mechanisms. This Feature establishes an agenda for exploring institutional design and structural guardrails that could oﬀer more democratic legitimacy and political durability to the net-zero project.
This Feature’s analysis moves beyond the writing to date on net zero’s accounting risks to situate the framework more broadly within the political economy and legal structure of climate change policy. In the process, it puts into conversation the legal literatures on climate change law, climate justice, cost-beneﬁt
analysis, private environmental governance, and corporate social responsibility.
It also incorporates emerging social-science research into the o�en overly technocratic conversation on designing climate regulation. 24 This research is critical
for clarifying how and why climate change mitigation is a normative project with
widely reverberating consequences.
Understanding the implications of the net-zero turn in climate policy is a
high-stakes, pressing endeavor. Countries, states, and corporations are beginning to shi� from dra�ing and wordsmithing broad pledges and policies to determining how to implement them. Netting global emissions in politically and
ecologically sustainable ways is likely to be a central challenge of global and domestic climate policy for the coming decades—and may well prove determinative
of how many degrees of warming the planet will endure. This eﬀort will require

22.

See infra Section V.A.
23. See infra Section II.B.
24. See Wim Carton, Adeniyi Asiyanbi, Silke Beck, Holly J. Buck & Jens F. Lund, Negative Emissions and the Long History of Carbon Removal, 11 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE art. no. e671, at 15
(2020) (noting that social science is “included in the scientiﬁc conversation on climate change
in limited and selective ways” and frequently “depoliticized”).
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thoughtful and creative policy design, advocacy, and, at times, litigation. 25 This
Feature’s contention is that careful, big-picture thinking about the shape of the
net-zero project now—among academics, policymakers, and advocates alike—
might be the diﬀerence between net zero as a constructive organizing principle,
and net zero as a manipulable, destabilizing distraction.
This Feature proceeds in ﬁve Parts. Part I addresses the origins, appeal, and
structure of net zero. Part II outlines the three accounting critiques o�en leveled
at net-zero pledges. Part III develops the deeper normative critique of net zero’s
putative neutrality previewed above, while Part IV focuses on the collectiveachievement challenge. Finally, Part V highlights the central lessons this analysis
oﬀers for climate governance, arguing for a cabined role for private actors and
for centering the importance of public institutional design.
i. the rise of net zero
A. The Origins and Appeal of the Net-Zero Framing
There is a pretty story that places the origins of net zero with a group of
climate “lionesses”—that is, powerful female players in the climate world. In
2013, approximately thirty women, “lawyers, diplomats, ﬁnanciers and activists,”
including Christiana Figueres, then-head of the United Nations climate body,
gathered at a Scottish country estate to talk through goals and strategies for the
upcoming climate negotiations in Paris in 2015. 26 Several women in attendance
credit this meeting with crystallizing the net-zero concept and creating key
champions for its promotion. 27 While this may have been the meeting that cemented the strategic pursuit of net zero in Paris, the policy’s conceptual origins
have a longer lineage in climate-policy history that bears tracing.
Many scholars have suggested that net zero has conceptual underpinnings in
the “Integrated Assessment Models” developed in the 1990s. 28 These models explore ways to address climate change by linking economic sectors, greenhouse25.

See infra notes 141-144 and accompanying text.
See Megan Darby, Net Zero: The Story of the Target that Will Shape Our Future, CLIMATE HOME
NEWS (Sept. 16, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/09/16/netzero-story-target-will-shape-future [https://perma.cc/597M-DKQM].
27. Id.
28. See Silke Beck & Martin Mahony, The Politics of Anticipation: The IPCC and the Negative Emissions Technologies Experience, 1 GLOB. SUSTAINABILITY art. no. e8, at 2 (2018) [hereina�er Beck
& Mahony, Politics of Anticipation]; Silke Beck & Martin Mahony, The IPCC and the New Map
of Science and Politics, 9 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE art. no. e547, at 8 (2018) [hereina�er Beck
& Mahony, Science and Politics]; Duncan P. McLaren, David P. Tyﬁeld, Rebecca Willis,
26.
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gas emissions, and their atmospheric consequences. 29 As these models became
the dominant way of assessing climate-policy options, it became increasingly apparent how “sources” of greenhouse-gas emissions—including industry, electricity generation, and the transportation sector—might be counterbalanced by
allowing countries to count investments in emissions “sinks,” such as forests, in
their overall carbon accounting. 30 Several forest-rich countries—including the
United States—used this analysis to argue for the development of country-level
accounting mechanisms that included both sources and sinks. 31 The United
States also advocated vigorously during early climate negotiations for including
“oﬀsets”—steps taken to reduce emissions in other countries and across economic sectors—as a lower-cost method for countries to meet their greenhousegas-reduction commitments. 32 U.S. support for building oﬀsets and other ﬂexible instruments into the international climate regime followed two decades of
domestic experimentation with more “market-based” environmental regulation—a shi� championed by many conservatives and regulated industries. 33

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.
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Bronislaw Szerszynski & Nils O. Markusson, Beyond “Net-Zero”: A Case for Separate Targets for
Emissions Reduction and Negative Emissions, 1 FRONTIERS CLIMATE art. no. 4, at 2 (2019); Dyke
et al., supra note 8; Charlie Wilson, Elmar Kriegler, Detlef P. van Vuuren, Celine Guivarch,
Dave Frame, Volker Krey, Timothy J. Osborn, Valeria Jana Schwanitz & Erica L. Thompson,
Evaluating Process-Based Integrated Assessment Models of Climate Change Mitigation 1-3 (Int’l
Inst. for Applied Sys. Analysis, Working Paper No. 17-007, 2017), http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id
/eprint/14502/1/WP-17-007.pdf [https://perma.cc/P69M-E25U].
Simon Evans & Zeke Hausfather, Q&A: How ‘Integrated Assessment Models’ Are Used to Study
Climate Change, CARBONBRIEF (Oct. 2, 2018, 4:31 PM), https://www.carbonbrief.org/qa-how
-integrated-assessment-models-are-used-to-study-climate-change [https://perma.cc/3T9EEXJC].
See Beck & Mahony, Politics of Anticipation, supra note 28, at 2; Beck & Mahony, Science and
Politics, supra note 28, at 8-9; McLaren et al., supra note 28, at 2-3. For more on sources and
sinks, see infra Section I.B.
See Carton et al., supra note 24, at 5; Emily Boyd, Esteve Corbera & Manuel Estrada, UNFCCC
Negotiations (Pre-Kyoto to COP-9): What the Process Says About the Politics of CDM-Sinks, 8
INT’L ENV’T AGREEMENTS 95, 96 (2008) (“One of the most contentious issues in the negotiations aimed at operationalizing the Kyoto Protocol was the treatment/inclusion of sinks.”).
See Daniel Bodansky & Lavanya Rajamani, The Evolution and Governance Architecture of the
United Nations Climate Change Regime, in GLOBAL CLIMATE POLICY: ACTORS, CONCEPTS AND
ENDURING CHALLENGES 13, 23 (Urs Luterbacher & Detlef F. Sprinz eds., 2018) (explaining that
in exchange for accepting a stronger target, the United States “succeeded in incorporating
signiﬁcant ﬂexibility into the [Kyoto] Protocol”).
On the politics and history of the domestic emergence of market mechanisms, see Tyler
McNish, Carbon Oﬀsets Are a Bridge Too Far in the Tradable Property Rights Revolution, 36 HARV.
ENV’T L. REV. 387, 398-401 (2012); William Boyd, The Poverty of Theory: Public Problems, Instrument Choice, and the Climate Emergency, 46 COLUM. J. ENV’T. L. 399, 422-67 (2021); and
Hugh S. Gorman & Barry D. Solomon, The Origins and Practice of Emissions Trading, 14 J. POL’Y
HIST. 293, 293-96 (2002).

neutralizing the atmosphere

The United States’s lobbying eﬀorts were ultimately successful: the 1997
Kyoto Protocol, the world’s ﬁrst attempt at imposing concrete emissions-reductions limits on developed countries, included provisions allowing for both sinks
and oﬀsets to count toward countries’ emissions targets. 34 Ironically, a�er intense and successful lobbying on this issue, domestic political constraints caused
the United States to fail to sign the Protocol. 35 Nevertheless, these negotiations
laid the conceptual groundwork for an eventual global coalescence around the
heuristic of netting emissions.
Since these early days of climate change negotiations, scientists have greatly
advanced understandings of both the causes and consequences of climate
change. Established in 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) is the body of scientiﬁc experts charged with providing expert, peer-reviewed scientiﬁc background on climate change to inform international negotiations. 36 In the years since the Kyoto Protocol, the IPCC has published increasingly alarming ﬁndings about the importance of reversing the world’s steadily
increasing emissions trajectory. 37 These ﬁndings contributed to the Paris Agreement’s commitment to hold the increase in the global average temperature “to
well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursu[e] eﬀorts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.” 38 This 2°C number is
widely believed to represent a threshold above which the eﬀects of climate
change will tend toward the catastrophic. 39 But the diﬀerence between 1.5°C and
2°C is also stark: the IPCC has calculated that the 0.5° that separates these targets
might cause 2.6 times as much extreme heat, two to three times as much species

34.

35.

36.
37.

38.
39.

See Carton et al., supra note 24, at 5; McNish, supra note 33, at 399; Eva Lövbrand, Bridging
Political Expectations and Scientiﬁc Limitations in Climate Risk Management—On the Uncertain
Eﬀects of International Carbon Sink Policies, 67 CLIMATIC CHANGE 449, 449-50 (2004); Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3.3, Dec. 11,
1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 (adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 2005).
See Byrd-Hagel Resolution, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (declaring, by a 95-0 vote, that
the United States should not sign any protocol that did not include binding targets for both
developed and developing countries).
See About the IPCC, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://www.ipcc.ch
/about [https://perma.cc/92UF-HL5N].
See, e.g., Summary for Policymakers, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1, 3 (Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds.,
2021) [hereina�er 2021 Summary for Policymakers].
Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2,
Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereina�er Paris Agreement].
See David Titley, Why Is Climate Change’s 2 Degrees Celsius of Warming Limit So Important?,
CONVERSATION (Aug. 22, 2017, 10:04 PM EDT), https://theconversation.com/why-is-climate
-changes-2-degrees-celsius-of-warming-limit-so-important-82058
[https://perma.cc
/UHB2-AYTP].
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loss, 2.3 times as great a reduction in crop yields, and twice the decline in marine
ﬁsheries. 40
As emissions have nevertheless continued to balloon, scientists have faced
pressure to include a broader suite of methods for meeting global-emissions targets within integrated assessment models. 41 Notably, IPCC modeling during the
early 2000s began to include more options for removing emissions from the atmosphere as a core strategy for keeping warming to noncatastrophic levels. 42
Models included these technologies, however, without assessing either their biophysical or political feasibility at scale. 43 Still, the inclusion of large-scale carbon-removal technologies in these models shaped policymakers’ perceptions
about “the ﬁelds of political possibility,” as the models highlighted how carbonremoval technologies might—at least in theory—play a critical role in stabilizing
atmospheric greenhouse-gas concentrations. 44
The coalescence of these forces—collective modeling of sources and sinks,
the inclusion of ﬂexibility mechanisms in early climate regimes, and the mounting diﬃculty of keeping atmospheric carbon concentrations to manageable levels
without signiﬁcant carbon removal—all contributed to the emergence of the netzero framework. It is now clear that all feasible paths to achieving global targets
must embrace some amount of carbon removal in addition to emissions reductions. The IPCC’s August 2021 assessment of climate change suggests that carbon emissions, largely driven by industrialization, have already warmed the

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.
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Kelly Levin, Half a Degree and a World Apart: The Diﬀerence in Climate Impacts Between 1.5°C
and 2°C of Warming, WORLD RES. INST. (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.wri.org/insights/halfdegree-and-world-apart-diﬀerence-climate-impacts-between-15c-and-2c-warming [https://
perma.cc/TN6F-U5RJ].
See Beck & Mahony, Science and Politics, supra note 28, at 6-7; Jan C. Minx, William F. Lamb,
Max W. Callaghan, Lutz Bornmann & Sabine Fuss, Fast Growing Research on Negative Emissions, 12 ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS art. no. 035007, at 1-2 (2017).
See infra Section I.B for more on these technologies. On the history of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) modeling, see Beck & Mahony, Science and Politics, supra
note 28, at 7, which traces how changes in modeling techniques “created the space for more
speculative technological futures to ﬁnd their way into oﬃcially authorized scenarios.”
See McLaren et al., supra note 28, at 2 (“[T]he absolute quantities of negative emissions deployed in the models . . . were much larger than could be practically or sustainably delivered.”); see also infra Section IV.B (highlighting the incompatibility of various carbon-removal
strategies at scale).
Lövbrand, supra note 34, at 456-57 (discussing the “political eﬀect that the primarily positive
scientiﬁc scenarios of terrestrial carbon storage have had in the climate negotiation process”);
Beck & Mahony, Science and Politics, supra note 28, at 2, 8 (emphasizing “the ‘performative’
power of IPCC assessments to shape ﬁelds of political possibility” and showing how integrated assessment models “served to make [negative emissions technologies] politically legible and actionable”).

neutralizing the atmosphere

planet more than one degree Celsius since around 1850. 45 The United Nations
recently calculated that disasters induced by this warming caused two million
deaths over the past ﬁ�y years, not to mention immeasurable suﬀering. 46 This
suﬀering is now guaranteed to persist for some time: the IPCC explains that no
matter what the global response is going forward, surface temperatures will continue to rise through at least the midcentury, and other consequences of climate
change—including sea-level rise and increased natural disasters—will persist for
decades to millennia. 47 The 2021 report thus concludes that the only way to stop
this warming and its consequences is to limit “cumulative CO2 emissions, reaching at least net zero CO2 emissions, along with strong reductions in other greenhouse-gas emissions.” 48
With this background in place, one can see why the net-zero framework has
been labeled both a scientiﬁc imperative and a political maneuver. 49 Science demands global-emissions netting to stabilize atmospheric carbon concentrations
and thus limit warming. But a regime that focuses on encouraging entities to
zero out their individual carbon emissions is not inexorable. Responsibility for
carbon reduction and carbon removal could be parceled out in other ways. Yet
net-zero pledges have emerged as the preferred way to conceptualize and pursue
these two necessary components of climate response. Why?
One way to understand net zero is as a grand attempt at depoliticizing climate mitigation. 50 Net-zero targets can claim a basis in science, given consensus
around the need to net global emissions. At the same time, net-zero targets help
45.

46.

47.
48.

49.

50.

2021 Summary for Policymakers, supra note 37, at 6; id. at 4 n.2, 5 n.9 (explaining that emissions
are measured against the preindustrial period and that early atmospheric data from the period
1850-1900 is used “as an approximation for pre-industrial conditions” to measure warming
against); see also Causes of Climate Change, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov
/climatechange-science/causes-climate-change [https://perma.cc/47YE-6QDF] (“Since the
Industrial Revolution, human activities have released large amounts of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, which has changed the earth’s climate.”).
See Climate and Weather Related Disasters Surge Five-Fold Over 50 Years, but Early Warnings Save
Lives - WMO Report, UN NEWS (Sept. 1, 2021), https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09
/1098662 [https://perma.cc/DJ4B-2FF5].
2021 Summary for Policymakers, supra note 37, at 17, 28, 35.
Id. at 36 (emphasis added); see also H. Damon Matthews & Ken Caldeira, Stabilizing Climate
Requires Near-Zero Emissions, 35 GEOPHYSICAL RSCH. LETTERS art. no. L04705 (2008) (making
an early case that stabilizing GHGs would not adequately address climate change and instead
near-zero emissions would be necessary).
See Carton et al., supra note 24, at 6 (describing how carbon-removal strategies “emerged from
mutual interactions between science and policy, where the demand from policy makers for
policy-relevant solutions has motivated experts to produce pathways consistent with policy
targets” (citations omitted)).
Cf. id. at 15 (discussing ways that social-science research on negative emissions gets “depoliticized” when brought into scientiﬁc conversations).

183

the yale law journal

132:171

2022

to make climate change “governable,” giving the world a new metric by which to
judge individual actors’ progress that is more comprehensible than a collective
target rendered in parts-per-million atmospheric carbon-dioxide concentration
or average global temperature increase. 51 Yet as it concretizes and parcels out the
end goal, net zero maintains maximum ﬂexibility with respect to means, leaving
the choice of how to “net” emissions entirely up to participating countries, subjurisdictions, and companies. The ﬂexibility enabled by this neutrality is central
to net zero’s widespread appeal—even as it brings several downsides explored in
this Feature.
B. A Technical Overview of Netting Emissions
Superﬁcially, the net-zero concept is simple: as of the pledge date, a pledging
entity must ensure that any carbon it emits is counterbalanced by an equal
amount of carbon removed from the atmosphere. But emits from where? And
counterbalanced how? This Section provides an overview of the technical aspects
of net zero.
The phrase “net-zero emissions” implies that for a pledging entity, 52 total
annual GHG emissions will equal total annual GHG removals. 53 It is worth
spending a minute to understand each side of this balance. Sources of emissions
are fairly intuitive: everything that emits carbon is a source. In the United States,
the primary sectoral emitters are transportation (27%), electricity (25%), industry (24%), commercial and residential uses (13%), and agriculture (11%). 54 Often, a ﬁrst step for a net-zero-pledging entity is to determine whether some of
its emissions can be avoided or reduced through, for example, substituting renewable energy for fossil fuels, electrifying transportation, or streamlining industrial processes to make them more eﬃcient. 55 One more controversial

51.
52.
53.

54.

55.
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See Eva Lövbrand & Johannes Stripple, Making Climate Change Governable: Accounting for Carbon as Sinks, Credits and Personal Budgets, 5 CRITICAL POL’Y STUD. 187, 187 (2011).
I use “entity” to include countries, states, provinces, cities, and corporations.
Nugent, supra note 8. Ideally, a net-zero pledge covers all of an entity’s GHG emissions. O�en,
however, “net zero” applies only to carbon emissions. See Taking Stock, supra note 5, at 11. For
ease of explanation—and because it is the largest and most critical source category—I focus
here on carbon emissions; sources of other GHGs diﬀer, but the same conceptual framework
applies.
Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov
/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma.cc/LE8S-MFCH] (sectoral statistics from the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) 2020 inventory).
See Larson et al., supra note 6, at 9 (laying out six “pillar[]” strategies to support net zero).
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method of reducing emissions comes in the form of “Carbon Capture and Storage” (CCS), in which technology is attached to a source to capture emitted carbon and inject it deep underground for storage. 56
Although many entities plan to use CCS as an emissions-reduction strategy,
high costs have impeded widespread deployment to date. 57 Whether these costs
fall rapidly enough to make CCS commercialization a feasible decarbonization
tool remains deeply uncertain and depends upon supportive government policies, public acceptance, and overcoming additional challenges such as carbon
transportation and responsibility for the permanency of storage. 58 Even if these
barriers can be overcome, most researchers agree that CCS deployment should
be concentrated in “hard-to-abate sectors,” including chemicals, cement, iron,
and steel—making its widespread use in net-zero pledges questionable. 59
One further nuance regarding sources of emissions comes in the “scope” of
emissions an entity chooses to take responsibility for. Those in the ﬁeld o�en
characterize an organization’s emissions as falling into three categories: scope 1
emissions, which occur directly on-site; scope 2 emissions, from energy generated oﬀ-site but consumed on-site (e.g., heat and electricity); and scope 3 emissions, a broader category which includes emissions that occur oﬀ-site as a result
of an entity’s activities (“e.g., employee travel, customer energy consumption as
a result of using the company’s products, etc.”). 60 Companies making a pledge
must determine which of these scopes to include. Countries and subjurisdictions

56.

Vincent Gonzales, Alan Krupnick & Lauren Dunlap, Carbon Capture and Storage 101, RES. FOR
FUTURE 1 (2020), https://media.rﬀ.org/documents/CCS_101.pdf [https://perma.cc
/LN43-AMZU].
See, e.g., S. Julio Friedmann, Alex Zapantis, Brad Page, Chris Consoli, Zhiyuan Fan, Ian
Havercro�, Harry Liu, Emeka Ochu, Nabeela Raji, Dominic Rassool, Hadia Sheerazi & Alex
Townsend, Net Zero and Geospheric Return: Actions Today for 2030 and Beyond, COLUM. CTR. ON
GLOB. ENERGY POL’Y 25-26 (Sept. 2020), https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/ﬁles/ﬁle-uploads/NetZero2030_CGEP-Report_092120-5_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/JEQ5-J7EW].
Id. at 34-37; Gonzales et al., supra note 56, at 2-3.
Friedmann et al., supra note 57, at 26-27; see Damien Gayle, Carbon Capture Is Not a Solution
to Net Zero Emissions Plans, Report Says, GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2022, 1:00 PM EDT), https://
www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/sep/01/carbon-capture-is-not-a-solution-to-netzero-emissions-plans-report-says [https://perma.cc/M2NY-VYVA].
Henry Lee & Abigail Mayer, The Future of Carbon Oﬀset Markets: Current Trends and Emerging
Challenges, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFS. 3 (Oct. 2020), https://www.belfercenter.org
/sites/default/ﬁles/ﬁles/publication/The%20Future%20of%20Carbon%20Oﬀset%20Markets.pdf [https://perma.cc/XY8T-CFY2]; see also From Ambition to Impact: How Companies
Are Reducing Emissions at Scale with Science-Based Targets, SCI. BASED TARGETS INITIATIVE 14
(Jan. 2021) [hereina�er From Ambition to Impact], https://sciencebasedtargets.org/resources
/ﬁles/SBTiProgressReport2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ8W-4WM8] (showing the breakdown of companies with approved targets).
THE
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58.
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face an analogous choice: they must decide whether to take responsibility only
for territorial emissions (scope 1 and 2), or also to include consumption-related
emissions embedded in goods and services used within the jurisdiction but produced outside of it (scope 3). 61
The inverse strategy of reducing emissions into the atmosphere is removing
carbon from the atmosphere. 62 Broadly speaking, carbon-removal strategies can
be grouped into nature-based and technology-based solutions. 63 Nature-based
solutions build from the fact that the natural carbon cycle removes some carbon
from the atmosphere: oceans presently absorb almost a quarter of CO2 emissions
and land also absorbs carbon in varying amounts depending on its cover and
management. 64 One carbon-removal strategy, then, is to undertake solutions
that enhance the ability of these natural carbon sinks to absorb carbon from the
atmosphere. Such solutions include planting or preserving trees and restoring
other habitats to enhance their CO2-withdrawal potential. 65 Scientists are also
experimenting with strategies to speed up the carbon-uptake levels of other natural processes, such as through adding biochar (charcoal produced from biomass) to soils or adding nutrients to rocks or the ocean. 66

61.

62.

63.

64.

65.

66.
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Thomas Day et al., Navigating the Nuances of Net-Zero Targets, NEWCLIMATE INST. & DATADRIVEN ENVIROLAB 9 (Oct. 2020), https://newclimate.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10
/NewClimate_NetZeroReport_October2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FS7-62U8].
Carbon removal also might allow for meeting targets, even in the case of emissions “overshoot,” if emissions are inadequately curbed in the short term but ultimately brought back
down through later technological developments. See Massimo Tavoni & Robert Socolow,
Modeling Meets Science and Technology: An Introduction to a Special Issue on Negative Emissions,
118 CLIMATIC CHANGE 1, 2 (2013); Joeri Rogelj, Michiel Schaeﬀer, Malte Meinshausen, Reto
Knutti, Joseph Alcamo, Keywan Riahi & William Hare, Zero Emission Targets as Long-Term
Global Goals for Climate Protection, 10 ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS art. no. 105007, at 7 (2015) [hereina�er Rogelj et al., Zero Emission Targets].
Sara Budinis, Going Carbon Negative: What Are the Technology Options?, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY
(Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.iea.org/commentaries/going-carbon-negative-what-are-thetechnology-options [https://perma.cc/JF6B-FRRX].
See Katie Lebling, Mengpin Ge, Kelly Levin, Richard Waite, Johannes Friedrich, Cynthia Elliott, Christina Chan, Katherine Ross, Fred Stolle & Nancy Harris, State of Climate Action:
Assessing Progress Toward 2030 and 2050, WORLD RES. INST. 25 (2020), https://ﬁles.wri.org/d8
/s3fs-public/2021-09/state_climate_action.pdf [https://perma.cc/PUA8-26L6] (discussing
ocean absorption of carbon dioxide); id. at 16-19 (discussing emissions associated with management of agricultural land and forests).
See Johan Rockström, Tim Beringer, David Hole, Bronson Griscom, Michael B. Mascia, Carl
Folke & Felix Creutzig, Opinion, We Need Biosphere Stewardship that Protects Carbon Sinks and
Builds Resilience, 118 PNAS art. no. e2115218118, at 1 (2021).
Budinis, supra note 63 (describing “enhanced weathering” and “ocean fertilisation” but cautioning that these techniques need further research to understand “their costs, risks and tradeoﬀs.”).
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Technological solutions include both direct air capture (DAC) and bioenergy
with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). 67 DAC technologies use chemical reactions to pull carbon out of the atmosphere for long-term storage—think, for
example, of a mechanical “tree” that might capture carbon from the air and inject
it deep underground. 68 BECCS involves growing organic matter (thus sequestering carbon), converting it into energy, and capturing and storing its waste
carbon permanently. 69 Considerable debate surrounds the potential for these
tools to form a robust part of the global response to climate change for reasons
of both cost and political and social feasibility. 70 Yet IPCC models suggest it will
be exceedingly diﬃcult to keep planetary warming below 1.5°C without a sizeable amount of technological removal of carbon. 71
Many entities also rely on oﬀsetting in their net-zero commitments. When
an entity uses oﬀsets to meet its goal, it pays for emissions reductions or carbon
removal outside the boundaries of its own emissions responsibilities and claims
credit for these reductions or removals by dint of having funded them. 72 Entities
tend to use oﬀsetting when it proves a cheaper way to achieve emissions reductions or removals. 73 When seeking oﬀsets, purchasing entities can either direct
67.
68.

69.

70.

71.

72.
73.

Id.
See Lackner’s Carbon-Capture Technology Moves to Commercialization, ASU NEWS (Apr. 29,
2019),
https://news.asu.edu/20190429-solutions-lackner-carbon-capture-technologymoves-commercialization [https://perma.cc/65NG-3KF8].
Budinis, supra note 63 (“BECCS [bioenergy with carbon capture and storage] enables carbon
removal because biomass absorbs CO2 as it grows, and this CO2 is not re-released when it is
burned. Instead, it is captured and injected into deep geological formations, removing it from
the natural carbon cycle.”).
See Sara Budinis, Direct Air Capture, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (Sept. 2022), https://www.iea.org
/reports/direct-air-capture [https://perma.cc/4YRL-6LYD] (“As the technology has yet to be
demonstrated at large scale, the future cost of DAC is uncertain.”); James H. Williams, Ryan
A. Jones, Ben Haley, Gabe Kwok, Jeremy Hargreaves, Jamil Farbes & Margaret S. Torn, Carbon-Neutral Pathways for the United States, 2 AGU ADVANCES art. no. e2020AV000284, at 17
(2021) (ﬁnding “that the most economic form of BECCS” is in bioreﬁneries); see also infra
Section III.A. (discussing social and political feasibility).
See Joeri Rogelj et al., Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 1.5°C in the Context of Sustainable
Development, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF
1.5°C, supra note 3, at 93, 96-97 [hereina�er 2018 Mitigation Pathways] (discussing the role
and feasibility of diﬀerent carbon-dioxide removal (CDR) technologies in modeled emissions
scenarios); see also Friedmann et al., supra note 57, at 9-10 (emphasizing the importance and
scale of negative emissions technologies to a 1.5°C pathway).
Taking Stock, supra note 5, at 5.
Barbara Haya, Denny Cullenward, Aaron L. Strong, Emily Grubert, Robert Hellmayr, Deborah A. Sivas & Michael Wara, Managing Uncertainty in Carbon Oﬀsets: Insights from California’s
Standardized Approach, 20 CLIMATE POL’Y 1112, 1113 (2020) (“Oﬀsets have been widely used in
cap-and-trade programmes to lower compliance costs and support reductions in regions and
sectors outside of the cap.”).
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funding to selected oﬀset projects or purchase oﬀset credits from various exchanges developed to trade in carbon oﬀsets. 74 In practice, two separate oﬀsetting markets have emerged: a compliance market for entities that use oﬀsets to
comply with a legal requirement; and a voluntary market for corporations that
undertake oﬀsetting as a voluntary business decision. 75
One ﬁnal technical aspect of net-zero pledges is their timing. As noted in the
introduction, most entities choose a date around 2050 as their target for achieving net zero. 76 This date stems in part from climate science: the IPCC has calculated that to have a 66% chance of keeping warming below 2°C, global CO2
emissions must be net zero by around 2065; to keep warming below 1.5°C, the
date is 2050. 77 These dates are not ﬁrm, however—they depend on how quickly
emissions are reduced between now and midcentury. 78 As Joeri Rogelj and his
coauthors explain, “[r]elatively higher emissions in the near term require more
rapid reductions and lower emissions a�erwards,” such that slower progress toward net zero paradoxically implies that it must be reached sooner. 79 Moreover,
because these dates represent timeframes for global achievement of net zero,
many argue that developed countries—as a matter of equity—must achieve these
targets sooner, so as to give developing countries more headroom. 80 But of
course, no entity can know precisely how global progress will play out, making
purely science-based targets impossible. Instead, choosing a target date is a politically infused decision.

74.

75.
76.
77.

78.
79.
80.
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See Derik Broekhoﬀ, Michael Gillenwater, Tani Colbert-Sangree & Patrick Cage, Securing Climate Beneﬁt: A Guide to Using Carbon Oﬀsets, GREENHOUSE GAS MGMT. INST. & STOCKHOLM
ENV’T INST. 7-8 (Nov. 13, 2019), http://www.oﬀsetguide.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03
/Carbon-Oﬀset-Guide_3122020.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z75D-KCFC].
See Keith Hyams & Tina Fawcett, The Ethics of Carbon Oﬀsetting, 4 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE
91, 92 (2013).
Accelerating Decarbonization of the U.S. Energy System, supra note 12, at 4.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF
CLIMATE CHANGE: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT
1-33 (Ottmar Edenhofer et al. eds., 2014).
The IPCC’s 2050 calculations assume an approximate halving of CO2 emissions by 2030. See
2018 Mitigation Pathways, supra note 71, at 95.
Rogelj et al., Zero Emission Targets, supra note 62, at 9.
See Taking Stock, supra note 5, at 16; Emily Pontecorvo, Why Developing Countries Say Net-Zero
Is ‘Against Climate Justice,’ GRIST (Oct. 25, 2021), https://grist.org/cop26/ahead-of-cop26-developing-countries-say-net-zero-is-against-climate-justice
[https://perma.cc/7C9WFKHA].
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C. State of Net-Zero Targets
The landscape of net-zero targets continues to expand and shi� rapidly. Several recent reports catalogue at least a snapshot of the project. As of early 2022,
at least 120 countries as well as the European Union, 1,000 cities, and 5,000 businesses had committed to net zero. 81 Oxford University’s Net Zero Project reports
that, in total, net-zero commitments cover at least 77% of greenhouse-gas emissions, 91% of global GDP, and 80% of the world’s population. 82 These pledges,
however, vary in their legal form, scope, and strategies, as described below.
First and most obviously, net-zero pledges vary in terms of size and type of
pledging entity, with countries being the largest pledging unit. Many countries
committing to net zero have done so through their “Nationally Determined Contributions” (NDCs)—the documents they ﬁle every ﬁve years to demonstrate
their progress and plans toward the global Paris Agreement goals. 83 However,
these NDCs are nonbinding, such that the sincerity of country-level commitments to net zero is better assessed through corresponding domestic legal commitments. As of September 2020, eight countries had enacted net-zero legislation, and many more had legislative eﬀorts underway. 84 Other major emitters
are at earlier stages: China, the world’s largest emitter, is just beginning to ﬂesh
out a plan to comply with its announced net zero by 2060 pledge. 85
In the United States, the Biden Administration has announced its intention
to pursue net zero by 2050 and an interim target of 50% reduction from 2005
levels by 2030. 86 A�er nearly a year of tense legislative negotiations, the United
81.

82.
83.
84.
85.

86.

See Lebling et al., supra note 64, at 28; Race to Zero Campaign, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE
CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/climate-action/race-to-zero-campaign [https://perma.cc/X2ZAQQLH]; Taking Stock, supra note 5, at 10.
NET ZERO TRACKER, supra note 5.
See Paris Agreement, supra note 38, art. 4; see also infra Section IV.C (describing challenges
posed by the structure of the Paris Agreement).
Lebling et al., supra note 64, at 30. The eight countries are Denmark, France, Hungary, Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Id.
Michal Meidan, Unpacking China’s 2060 Carbon Neutrality Pledge, THE OXFORD INST. FOR ENERGY STUD. (Dec. 2020), https://a9w7k6q9.stackpathcdn.com/wpcms/wp-content/uploads
/2020/12/Unpacking-Chinas-carbon-neutrality-pledge.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B8PCMPT7].
See Exec. Order No. 14008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619, 7622 (Feb. 1, 2021) (expressing the intent to
“put the United States on a path to achieve net-zero emissions, economy-wide, by no later
than 2050”); Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: President Biden Sets 2030 Greenhouse
Gas Pollution Reduction Target Aimed at Creating Good-Paying Union Jobs and Securing
U.S. Leadership on Clean Energy Technologies (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov
/brieﬁng-room/statements-releases/2021/04/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-sets-2030greenhouse-gas-pollution-reduction-target-aimed-at-creating-good-paying-union-jobs-and
-securing-u-s-leadership-on-clean-energy-technologies [https://perma.cc/3AYH-NN5B].
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States achieved substantial progress towards this goal with the passage of the
Inﬂation Reduction Act (IRA) in August 2022, which modelers predict will support around 40% national emissions reductions by 2030. 87 The Biden Administration also has numerous regulatory levers that it might use to accelerate progress—although the U.S. Supreme Court recently issued a decision that will
make creative use of administrative capacity to tackle climate change more diﬃcult. 88 At the subnational level in the United States, at least thirteen states have
recently pledged to pursue net zero by midcentury. Seven have done so via legislation. 89 The remainder have executive orders committing to net zero. 90 A
number of additional states have targets that approach net zero but are not
framed in these terms: Colorado, for example, aims to reduce state GHG emissions 90% by 2050. 91
Although a full exploration of various jurisdictions’ net-zero laws is beyond
the scope of this Feature, it may help readers to have a few examples of these
commitments. Sweden is o�en held up as having the strongest country-level
net-zero law, which enshrines a target of net zero by 2045 and “net negative emissions” a�er that date. 92 Sweden sets several “milestone targets” to meet along
87.

88.

89.

90.
91.
92.
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See Inﬂation Reduction Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818 (signed Aug. 16, 2022);
Shannon Osaka, Why the Climate Bill’s Impact Might Not Match What Many Expect, WASH.
POST (Aug. 18, 2022, 7:30 AM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2022/08/18/ira-inﬂation-reduction-act-climate-change
[https://perma.cc/5TFRPV5N] (explaining that 40% is a commonly agreed-upon estimate with results supported
from three independent modeling teams). For further discussion of the Inﬂation Reduction
Act (IRA), see infra notes 212-215 and accompanying text.
See West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022) (holding that EPA overstepped its authority
in aggressively regulating power-plant GHG emissions because Congress did not explicitly
provide EPA adequate authority under the statutory scheme at issue). That said, some commentators have pointed out that the IRA may make climate regulations easier, as “the bill’s
investments will change the baseline for rulemakings across several agencies as it brings down
the cost of clean technologies so agencies can design rules that are both ambitious and legally
durable.” See The Inﬂation Reduction Act’s Implications for Biden’s Climate and Environmental Justice Priorities, HARV. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM BLOG (Aug. 12, 2022), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2022/08/ira-implications-for-climate-ej-priorities
[https://perma.cc/BV7QSHSD].
They are Hawaii (2018), Illinois (2021), Nevada (2019), New York (2019), Vermont (2020),
Virginia (2021), and Washington (2019). See HAW. REV. STAT. § 225P-5 (2018); 20 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 730/5-1 (West 2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 445B.380 (2019); N.Y. ENV’T CONSERV.
LAW § 75-0103(11) (Consol. 2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 592 (West 2020); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 45.2-1706.1 (West 2021); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.405.040 (West 2019).
They are California (2018), Louisiana (2020), Maine (2019), Massachusetts (2020), Michigan
(2020), and Montana (2019). See Larson et al., supra note 6, at 17.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-7-102(2)(g) (West 2022) (using the precatory language “shall
strive”).
Taking Stock, supra note 5, at 7.
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the way to net zero: by 2030, emissions are to be 63% lower than 1990 and by
2040, 75% lower. 93 Sweden’s Climate Act requires the government to publish a
climate-policy action plan every four years that describes how targets will be
met. 94 Uniquely among national laws, Sweden also places an 8% limit on the use
of oﬀsets to meet the 2030 target, and a 2% limit for the 2040 target. 95 A Climate
Policy Council of interdisciplinary experts is tasked with helping to ensure the
country meets its goals through yearly progress reports. 96 Early reports, however, are not rosy: although Sweden met its interim 2020 goal (which was always
expected), the Council’s 2021 report ﬁnds that the country’s “pace of climate
transition remains too slow, and current policy is insuﬃcient for achieving the
climate goals.” 97 Even among climate leaders, then, laws on paper are no guarantee of achieving net zero.
Within the United States, New York has received praise for a strong and equitable net-zero bill. 98 The Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act
(Climate Act), passed in 2019, requires the state to reach 40% emissions reductions below 1990 levels by 2030 and 85% total emissions reductions by 2050. 99
The remaining 15% of reductions can come from oﬀsets, ideally located within
twenty-ﬁve miles of the purchaser to ensure that beneﬁts remain local. 100 And
the Act commits that at least 35% “of the overall beneﬁts of spending on clean
energy and energy eﬃciency” shall go to “disadvantaged communities.” 101

93.

Sweden’s Climate Act and Climate Policy Framework, NATURVÅRDSVERKET [SWEDISH ENVIRONPROTECTION AGENCY], https://www.naturvardsverket.se/en/topics/climate-transition/sveriges-klimatarbete/swedens-climate-act-and-climate-policy-framework
[https://
perma.cc/8F8A-S9LV].
Id.
Id.; see also Taking Stock, supra note 5, at 7 (noting the uniqueness of this feature).
See The Swedish Climate Policy Council, KLIMATPOLITISKA RÅDET [SWEDISH CLIMATE POLICY
COUNCIL], https://www.klimatpolitiskaradet.se/en/summary-in-english [https://perma.cc
/UAT9-4YHM].
2021 Report of the Swedish Climate Policy Council, KLIMATPOLITISKA RÅDET 6 (Mar. 25, 2021),
https://www.klimatpolitiskaradet.se/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/report2021swedishclimatepolicycouncil.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZLN-WKUC].
See, e.g., David Roberts, New York Just Passed the Most Ambitious Climate Target in the Country,
VOX (July 22, 2019, 8:56 AM EDT), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/6
/20/18691058/new-york-green-new-deal-climate-change-cuomo [https://perma.cc/SXN24TKF].
N.Y. ENV’T CONSERV. LAW § 75-0107(1) (Consol. 2019).
Id. § 75-0109(4)(h)(ii) (requiring this “to the extent practicable”). Moreover, electricity generators cannot use oﬀsets—thereby protecting the disadvantaged communities in which they
are frequently located. Id. § 75-0109(4)(f).
Id. § 75-0117.
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New York delegates authority to a Climate Action Council, comprised of various state agency heads and other appointees, to create a “scoping plan” to specify emissions-reduction mechanisms. 102 The Council is assisted by sector-speciﬁc Advisory Councils, a Just Transition Working Group that advises the
Council on labor considerations, 103 and a Climate Justice Working Group that
oﬀers counsel on “incorporating the needs of disadvantaged communities in the
Scoping Plan.” 104 In December 2021, New York released its ﬁrst dra� scoping
plan for public comment. 105 As in the case of Sweden, critics suggest the state’s
pace of action does not yet align with its robust near-term or long-term goals. 106
Many smaller jurisdictions are also taking steps towards net zero. Most notably, the number of cities with net-zero pledges is growing rapidly, although
very few cities have enshrined net-zero commitments in law. 107 Moreover, only
about half of pledging cities specify interim achievement dates, and fewer still
set economy-wide targets. 108 One reason for this is that cities lack authority to
control many aspects of their emissions. For example, cities whose residents are
served by a private, investor-owned utility cannot order that utility to switch
power sources—the state public-utilities commission controls those decisions. 109
Accordingly, many cities choose to focus on those emissions that city government can realistically address. 110
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Climate Action Council, N.Y. STATE, https://climate.ny.gov/Our-Climate-Act/Climate-Action
-Council [https://perma.cc/7V2U-LCVJ].
DEC and NYSERDA Announce Members of “Just Transition” Working Group to Support Implementation of State’s Nation-Leading Climate Law, N.Y. STATE ENERGY RSCH. & DEV. AUTH.
(Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/About/Newsroom/2020-Announcements
/2020-08-25-dec-and-nyserda-announce-members-of-just-transition-working-group-tosupport-implementation-of-states-nation-leading-climate-law
[https://perma.cc/25RKCW2M].
Climate Justice Working Group, N.Y. STATE, https://climate.ny.gov/Our-Climate-Act/Climate
-Justice-Working-Group [https://perma.cc/SWA9-NZTW].
See Climate Action Council Dra� Scoping Plan, N.Y. STATE, https://climate.ny.gov/Our-Climate-Act/Dra�-Scoping-Plan [https://perma.cc/ZX5M-9RRU].
See Lee Harris, 2 Years After Passing a Landmark Climate Law, New York Has No Plan to Fund It, GRIST
(Apr. 30, 2021), https://grist.org/politics/two-years-after-passing-a-landmark-climate-law-newyork-has-no-plan-to-fund-it [https://perma.cc/45MF-VD7S].
See Taking Stock, supra note 5, at 21 (identifying four cities with legal requirements).
See Day et al., supra note 61, at 21.
See Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 314 (2017) (explaining why certain
cities are mounting eﬀorts to reclaim public control of their utilities as a climate-mitigation
strategy).
See Katrina M. Wyman & Danielle Spiegel-Feld, The Urban Environmental Renaissance, 108
CALIF. L. REV. 305, 340-42 (2020) (tracing cities’ focus on the “demand” side of climate
change).
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Finally, there is the proliferation of corporate pledges. Companies committing to net zero range across sectors, with pledges particularly prominent in public-facing companies involved in businesses such as retail, apparel, food, beverage, agriculture, and household and personal products. 111 Utilities, too, have
joined the eﬀort: as of late 2020, a report found that twenty-two out of ﬁ�y-ﬁve
parent investor-owned utilities in the United States have net-zero or carbon-free
electricity targets. 112 The ﬁnancial sector has also played a prominent role in
driving net-zero pledges, both of their own and those of companies seeking ﬁnancing. As Sarah E. Light and Christina P. Skinner document, all six major U.S.
banks not only have internal net-zero targets but have also committed to ensuring that their lending portfolios are net-zero compliant or aid net-zero achievement. 113 Similarly, BlackRock and Vanguard Group, the world’s largest asset
managers, have joined a host of other investment ﬁrms pledging to target netzero emissions across their holdings. 114 Indeed, several large investors have gone
so far as to establish an “expectation that portfolio companies refrain from lobbying against carbon regulation”—a step that goes beyond net zero to address
root political challenges to robust climate regulation. 115 In the face of shareholder activism, even hard-to-decarbonize sectors have at least nominally committed to net zero: for example, the major oil companies Shell and BP announced
net-zero targets in 2020, 116 and the largest U.S. natural gas producer, EQT Corporation, announced a net-zero target in 2021. 117
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117.

See From Ambition to Impact, supra note 60, at 28.
Stanley Porter, Jim Thomson, Marlene Motyka, Christine LaCroix, Kate Hardin & Carolyn
Amon, Utility Decarbonization Strategies: Renew, Reshape, and Refuel to Zero, DELOITTE INSIGHTS 4 (2020), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/6849_Utility
-decarbonization-strategies/DI_Utility-decarbonization-strategies.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/24EK-RZLZ].
Sarah E. Light & Christina P. Skinner, Banks and Climate Governance, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1895,
1896-97 (2021).
See Alastair Marsh & Jess Shankleman, Vanguard, BlackRock Join Investors Pledging to Hit Net
Zero, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 2021, 12:35 PM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-29/vanguard-blackrock-join-investors-pledging-net-zero-emissions [https://
perma.cc/7X92-7CL7]; Nick Robins, The Road to Net-Zero Finance, UK CLIMATE CHANGE
COMM. 3 (Dec. 2020), https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/FinanceAdvisory-Group-Report-The-Road-to-Net-Zero-Finance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/545NJT3H].
Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2020).
Taking Stock, supra note 5, at 18.
Ester Wells, Biggest U.S. Natural Gas Driller Sets 2025 Net-Zero Goal, E&E NEWS (July 2, 2021,
7:16 AM EDT), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2021/07/02/stories/1063736397 [https:
//perma.cc/KW3L-VTQ J].
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A few key trends stand out across net-zero-pledging entities in terms of how
they plan to achieve their goals. As one might imagine, pledges vary widely in
scope, with many taking responsibility for some upstream and downstream
emissions (scopes 2 and 3), but others focusing solely on eliminating emissions
from core operations (scope 1). 118 Net-zero entities also vary in the ambition of
their internal emissions reductions. 119 Some entities prioritize internal reductions by setting interim targets, or separate targets, that specify required emissions reductions. One recent study ﬁnds that 33% of subnational governments
and 8% of companies provide clear interim-reduction targets. 120 Among entities
pursuing internal reductions, common strategies include on-site renewable energy production or contracts to purchase renewable energy, either directly or
through renewable energy credits. 121 Many entities also include negative emissions technologies—BECCS and DAC—in their net-zero plans, although with
no ﬁrm commitment to their deployment. 122
Oﬀsetting is also a common approach across entities—and for some, it is the
main strategy. 123 Costs of credits vary depending on the type of oﬀset project,
with voluntary carbon markets oﬀering oﬀsets priced in 2021 at an average of
$1.71/ton for carbon-reduction projects and $7.98/ton for carbon-removal projects. 124 These low prices are unlikely to induce actors to reduce their own emissions given how cheap it is to outsource these eﬀorts. 125 Recognizing this, some
entities, including Sweden and New York, set limits on the permissible extent of
oﬀset usage as described above. 126 This practice, however, is rare: despite oﬀsets’
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Day et al., supra note 61, at 27 (“It is not necessarily realistic to assume that all actors will be
able to obtain and act upon a complete and exhaustive overview of their scope 3 emission
sources.”); Alberto Carrillo Pineda, Andres Chang & Pedro Faria, Foundations for Science-Based
Net-Zero Target Setting in the Corporate Sector, SCI. BASED TARGETS INITIATIVE 5, 15 (Sept.
2020), https://sciencebasedtargets.org/resources/legacy/2020/09/foundations-for-net-zerofull-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TY8-YB5Z].
Pineda et al., supra note 118, at 13.
Day et al., supra note 61, at 3.
Id. at 35-38.
See discussion infra Section II.B.
Day et al., supra note 61, at 50.
See Stephen Donofrio, Patrick Maguire, Kim Myers, Christopher Daley & Katherine Lin, Markets in Motion: State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2021, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE 15 (2021),
https://www.forest-trends.org/publications/state-of-the-voluntary-carbon-markets-2021
[https://perma.cc/5C93-CVWF].
See id. at 49 (reporting that the carbon-price levels necessary to get us to the Paris Agreement
1.5˚C temperature goal are on the order of $40-80/tCO2e in 2020 and $50-100/CO2e by 2030).
See supra text accompanying notes 95 and 100.
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widespread use, entities are frequently unclear within their net-zero commitments as to the extent of oﬀsets. 127 This opacity helps fuel the challenges with
net zero discussed in the next Part.
ii. the accounting risks
Amidst much celebration of net zero, scholars and policymakers have begun
to express misgivings about the wisdom of centering climate policy around a
take-all-comers net-zero program. To date, most of these concerns have regarded what this Feature calls “accounting risks”—that is, concerns that pledges
on paper will not translate into atmospheric emissions changes in practice. This
Part outlines three such accounting risks. It begins with the most familiar and
obvious: greenwashing. It then describes two more nuanced sets of challenges
that stem from the temporality of net zero and its presumed physical fungibility
of carbon reduction and removal eﬀorts.
A. Greenwashing
When an entity engages in greenwashing, it projects an image of environmental stewardship that is not backed up by actual changes in corporate behavior
or strategy. 128 The practice is common enough that the term was added to the
Concise Oxford English Dictionary in 1999. 129 The greenwashing worry with respect to net-zero pledges is straightforward: companies may make pledges now,
when net zero is a buzzy concept in the media spotlight, with no attempts to
actually change their emissions behavior going forward. Because they are largely
pledging within a legal void, unconstrained by binding reductions requirements,
there is nothing beyond norms and public pressure to hold them to their word.
A scan of the entities pursuing net zero validates greenwashing concerns.
How, for example, is EQT Corporation, a natural-gas company whose entire
purpose is to produce the GHG methane for consumptive use, planning to
achieve this goal? The answer in this case is that the company is not claiming
responsibility for “scope 3” emissions—that is, the emissions that come from
consumers using its product—but rather, is focusing on reducing or oﬀsetting
127.

Day et al., supra note 61, at 21-22, 50-51.
128. Greenwashing, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary
/english/greenwashing [https://perma.cc/65JQ-T98E] (deﬁning greenwashing as “behavior
or activities that make people believe that a company is doing more to protect the environment
than it really is”).
129. Andy Rowell, Greenwash Goes Legit, GUARDIAN (July 20, 1999, 8:17 PM EDT), https://www
.theguardian.com/society/1999/jul/21/guardiansocietysupplement5 [https://perma.cc/LTC5
-RKEE].
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emissions directly associated with production. 130 Similarly, in two analyses of
the U.S. electric-utility sector, researchers determined that most utilities that
have committed to net zero have “signiﬁcant gaps between decarbonization targets and the scheduled fossil-fuel plant retirements, renewable additions, and
ﬂexibility requirements needed to achieve full decarbonization. The math
doesn’t yet add up.” 131 Albert C. Lin identiﬁes yet another strategy for greenwashing that involves a company selling oﬀ its most polluting assets, such that
the company appears to have cut emissions. 132 In fact, however, “emissions may
even increase because the purchasers—o�en private companies not subject to
investor pressure—are more likely to develop the asset and to operate with lower
standards.” 133
In general, it is only possible to scrutinize the reliability of net-zero pledges
through tedious digging or voluntary reporting. In recent years, eﬀorts to police
greenwashing have produced numerous standard-setting organizations that aim
to separate the net-zero wheat from the chaﬀ. For example, the United Nations’s
“Race to Zero” campaign aims to connect governments, businesses, investors,
and higher education institutions committed to net zero. 134 Participating entities
must meet a certain set of “process criteria” to join the initiative. 135 For cities, the
Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance and C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group play
important roles in establishing guidance and best practices. 136 Several organizations also exist to promote best practices for private-sector pledges, including
the Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi) and Carbone 4’s Net Zero Initiative. 137 In the ﬁnancial sector, there is the United Nations-convened “Net Zero
130.
131.
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133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
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Wells, supra note 117.
Porter et al., supra note 112, at 8; see also John Romankiewicz, Cara Bottorﬀ & Leah C. Stokes,
The Dirty Truth About Utility Climate Pledges, SIERRA CLUB 12 (Jan. 2021), https://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/ﬁles/blog/Final%20Greenwashing%20Report%20
%281.22.2021%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZR8-QWDD] (ﬁnding that utility net-zero
pledges “are not leading to meaningful action on the ground this decade”); David Pomerantz
& Matt Kasper, Many U.S. Electric Utilities Plan Slow Decarbonization Over Next Decade, Out of
Sync with Biden Plan, ENERGY & POL’Y INST. (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.energyandpolicy
.org/utilities-carbon-goal-biden-climate-plan [https://perma.cc/X5UG-NNVS] (ﬁnding
most utilities’ plans incompatible with the Biden goal of a zero-emissions electricity sector by
2035).
Lin, supra note 20, at 708-09.
Id. at 708.
Race to Zero Campaign, supra note 81.
Id.
Day et al., supra note 61, at 11.
See César Dugast, Net Zero Initiative—Diving into the Net Zero Initiative Guidelines, CARBONE4,
at 1-28 (Apr. 2020), https://www.carbone4.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Carbone-4-

neutralizing the atmosphere

Asset Owner Alliance,” a group of investors who have pledged to align portfolios
with a 1.5° C scenario. 138 To join these initiatives, an entity must commit to meeting certain established criteria for their net-zero plans—criteria which provide a
check against greenwashing. 139
Government-mandated reporting requirements could strengthen visibility
into companies’ climate pledges. In March 2022, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a proposed rule that would require public
companies to disclose carbon emissions, emissions-reduction plans and progress, and the eﬀects of climate change on their business. 140 If ﬁnalized, such a
rule might help pave the way for more serious legal liability for false representations in corporate net-zero plans. 141 The proposed rule, however, has received
swi� and ﬁerce blowback, including criticisms that the agency is overreaching

138.
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140.

141.

NZI-Guidelines-april-2020-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5UM-5YUG]; Pineda et al., supra note
118, at 4.
See The Net-Zero Asset Owner Alliance: FAQ, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME FIN. INITIATIE 1-8 (2019), https://www.unepﬁ.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/AOA
_FAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9NK-94UA].
See Interpretation Guide: Race to Zero Expert Peer Review Group, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1-3 (Apr. 2021), https://racetozero.unfccc.int/wp-content
/uploads/2021/04/Race-to-Zero-EPRG-Criteria-Interpretation-Guide-2.pdf [https://perma
.cc/6GP3-2562]; Pineda et al., supra note 118, at 10; Taking Stock, supra note 5, at 12.
The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, 87 Fed.
Reg. 21334, 21337 (proposed Apr. 11, 2022); see also Fact Sheet: Enhancement and Standardization
of Climate-Related Disclosures, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 1-3 (Mar. 21, 2022), https://www
.sec.gov/ﬁles/33-11042-fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9DQ-BTXQ] (providing an overview of the proposed rule).
Matthew Ferguson & Ariella Sparr, Greenwashing, Climate Change Disclosures, and Financial
Lines Risks, JD SUPRA (May 26, 2022), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/greenwashingclimate-change-disclosures-7624448 [https://perma.cc/PHR6-RX7C] (“The prospect of
heightened SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission] environmental disclosures and
regulation of sustainability claims may provide additional avenues for greenwashing
claims by shareholders.”). For a discussion of possible litigation against companies engaged in greenwashing, see Amanda Shanor & Sarah E. Light, Greenwashing and the First
Amendment, 122 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4178318
[https://perma.cc/B4QL-EJAD].

197

the yale law journal

132:171

2022

its authority under the newly established Supreme Court precedent in West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency. 142 Thus, if ﬁnalized, the rule is likely to
be locked in litigation for some time to come. 143
Across the world, litigants are already experimenting with using courts to
eliminate greenwashing and force entities into compliance with their pledges.
Such cases have met some early success in the Netherlands: in 2019, the Supreme
Court of the Netherlands upheld lower-court opinions ﬁnding that the Dutch
government had a duty, grounded in human rights and constitutional law, to act
faster to reduce emissions. 144 Building on this decision, in 2021, a lower Dutch
court found Shell Oil’s climate plans to be in violation of human rights and the
standard of due care and ordered it to reduce its emissions more rapidly. 145
Whether additional jurisdictions, including U.S. courts, are likely to follow similar lines of reasoning remains deeply uncertain. For now, only voluntary aﬃliation with a standard-setting organization, public and consumer awareness, the
outside possibility of a lawsuit, and the threat of media scrutiny place potential
bounds on the practice of greenwashing in net-zero pledges. 146

142.

143.

144.

145.
146.

198

142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022); see We Are Not the Securities and Environment Commission - At Least Not
yet, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 21, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/peirce
-climate-disclosure-20220321 [https://perma.cc/24WH-GQCY]; Katanga Johnson, U.S. Supreme Court Emissions Ruling May Stop SEC Drive for Disclosure, REUTERS (July 1, 2022, 12:26
PM EDT), https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/supreme-court-rulingcarbon-emissions-bodes-badly-us-sec-climate-rule-2022-06-30 [https://perma.cc/Q3GQDYSV]. But see Jill E. Fisch, Comment Letter on Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors (S7-10-22) (June 6, 2022), https://www.sec.gov
/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20130354-297375.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8NM-5KFM] (ﬁled
by thirty securities-law professors, arguing that the SEC has authority to undertake the proposed rule).
See Avery Ellfeldt, Why the Supreme Court’s Climate Ruling Matters to the SEC, E&E NEWS (July
7, 2022, 6:55 AM EDT), https://www.eenews.net/articles/why-the-supreme-courts-climateruling-matters-to-the-sec [https://perma.cc/74AJ-UCEB] (sharing predictions that the rule
may be struck down by the Supreme Court).
See HR 20 december 2019, NJ 2020, 41 m.nt. J. Spier (De Staat der Nederlanden/Stichting
Urgenda) [The State of the Netherlands/Urgenda Foundation] (Neth.); see also Naomi Spoelman, Urgenda: A How-to Guide for Enforcing Greenhouse Gas Emission Targets by Protecting
Human Rights, 47 ECOLOGY L.Q. 751, 751 (2020) (“The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation establishes that the European Convention on Human Rights . . . requires the Netherlands to take adequate action to prevent the real and imminent risk of dangerous climate
change.”).
See Rb. Den Haag 26 mei 2021, JOR 2021, 208 m.nt. Biesmans, S.J.M. (Vereniging Milieudefensie/Royal Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.).
Cf. Lin, supra note 20, at 707 (observing that “voluntary environmental programs in the
United States have yielded limited environmental improvements”).
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B. Carbon Temporality and the Risk of Self-Serving Optimism
Another accounting risk of the net-zero framework stems from its temporal
ﬂexibility. To put it simply, 2050 is a long way away. The long-term nature of
net-zero pledges enables entities not egregiously engaged in greenwashing to
nevertheless display a problematic degree of self-serving optimism in their emissions planning. For example, many net-zero plans delay immediate action on the
optimistic assumption that not-yet-commercially-viable technologies will be
available in later decades to help meet neutrality commitments. 147 Self-serving
optimism is thus like the older cousin of greenwashing—the cousin sophisticated enough to at least spin a plausible tale about why they missed curfew.
The easiest way to illustrate the challenge of overoptimism is, again, through
examples. Consider Southern Company, a large utility in the U.S. Southeast.
Southern Company set a goal in 2018 of net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, as
well as “a 50% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030, as compared to 2007 levels.” 148 The company has made rapid progress on this 50%-by-2030 goal predominantly by switching from older coal-ﬁred generation to new gas plants. 149
However, its ability to meet the more ambitious 2050 target—with this new gasgeneration ﬂeet in place—will hinge entirely on the emergence of cost-eﬀective
carbon capture and storage technology. 150 As discussed above, the future of this
technology is far from certain. 151
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See McLaren et al., supra note 28, at 1-2 (describing this strategy as “risky”); see also Dave
Elliott, Net Losses: Why Net Zero Carbon Targets May Backﬁre, PHYSICS WORLD (Oct. 16, 2019),
https://physicsworld.com/a/net-losses-why-net-zero-carbon-targets-may-backﬁre [https://
perma.cc/6JFV-VFX5] (describing self-serving optimism as the reason why net zero may
“backﬁre”); Carton et al., supra note 24, at 6 (“[A] key concern has long been that a focus on
carbon removal will provide the justiﬁcation for business-as-usual and thereby risks undermining ambitious climate action.”).
Implementation and Action Toward Net Zero, S. CO. 3 (Sept. 2020), https://www.southerncompany.com/content/dam/southern-company/pdf/public/Net-zero-report.pdf [https://perma
.cc/E944-QDJ9].
Id. at 10-11.
The company’s plans rely on carbon capture, use, and storage (CCUS); renewable natural
gas; and next-generation nuclear, hydrogen, and “negative carbon concepts, such as natural
solutions, biomass energy with CCUS and direct air capture.” Id. at 7.
See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text; see also Daniel Tait, Southern Company Net-Zero
Implementation Plan Filled with Loopholes for Continued Use of Fossil Fuels, ENERGY & POL’Y INST.
(Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.energyandpolicy.org/southern-company-net [https://perma
.cc/96LT-WWLK] (discussing how Southern Company plans to reach net-zero omissions
but “the plan remains scant on key details”); Lebling et al., supra note 64, at 6 (describing the
risks of pursuing strategies that may “lock-in . . . carbon-intensive infrastructure, technologies, and behavior”).
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A second example highlights how oﬀsets can substitute for ambitious climate-mitigation activity. The Mountain Valley Pipeline—currently under development along 300 miles between West Virginia and Virginia—will carry natural
gas from the fracking-rich Marcellus Shale to customers along the East Coast. 152
In the summer of 2021, its developers announced plans to become one of the ﬁrst
carbon-neutral, natural-gas transmission pipelines in the United States by purchasing more than $150 million in carbon oﬀsets—while announcing no internal
emissions-reduction plans. 153 Given that the IPCC’s latest report states unequivocally that there is no place for new fossil-fuel infrastructure in a 1.5°C world,
Mountain Valley’s plans appear optimistic to the point of absurdity. 154
Additional examples abound. Equinor, Norway’s partly state-owned oil
company, plans to increase oil and gas sales as part of its net-zero strategy, while
relying on oﬀsets, DAC, and CCS to make up the diﬀerence. 155 A 2021 investigation found that Amazon, Apple, Unilever, and United also rely on large
amounts of carbon removal in their net-zero plans. 156 Nor is self-serving optimism limited to companies: at the March 2019 United Nations Conference, U.S.
and Saudi Arabian delegations reportedly “argued that negative emission techniques . . . will and should be an alternative, rather than an addition, to emissions
reductions.” 157 The United Kingdom’s net-zero strategy relies heavily on BECCS
investments. 158 New York State—despite having one of the most aggressive netzero laws in the United States on the books—has no plan for how to ﬁnance this
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Carlos Anchondo, Pipeline Goes CO2 Neutral: Innovative or Green Washing?, E&E NEWS (July
13, 2021, 6:53 AM EDT), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063736995 [https://perma.cc
/FER2-W8SS].
These oﬀsets will cover ten years of emissions from pipeline “operations,” but they do not
account for downstream emissions when consumers burn purchased natural gas. Id.
See Minal Pathak et al., Technical Summary, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, at TS-1, TS-26, TS-46 to
-47 (Priyadarshi R. Shukla et al. eds., 2022) [hereina�er 2022 Technical Summary] (ﬁnding
that existing fossil-fuel infrastructures already will push warming over global targets and that
“[l]imiting warming requires shi�ing energy investments away from fossil-fuels and towards
low-carbon technologies (high conﬁdence)”).
Ketan Joshi, The Nordic Model: How Equinor Is Obscuring Its Fossil Expansion, MEDIUM (July
10, 2021), https://medium.com/lobbywatch/the-nordic-model-how-equinor-is-obscuringits-fossil-expansion-254fcc2b756d [https://perma.cc/ZGH5-QYWC].
James Temple, Carbon Removal Hype Is Becoming a Dangerous Distraction, MIT TECH. REV.
(July 8, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/07/08/1027908/carbon-removalhype-is-a-dangerous-distraction-climate-change [https://perma.cc/RLE9-CB75].
McLaren et al., supra note 28, at 1 (citation omitted).
See Net Zero: The UK’s Contribution to Stopping Global Warming, COMM. ON CLIMATE CHANGE
77 (May 2019), https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Net-Zero-TheUKs-contribution-to-stopping-global-warming.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GQG-BGF6].
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legal commitment. 159 And California has drawn criticism for setting tepid emissions-reductions goals for the power sector through 2030, which climate activists—and, more notably, the state’s grid operator—suggest will not be suﬃcient
to drive change at the rate needed to meet the state’s long-term, net-zero commitment. 160
Among these many entities, Equinor at least deserves credit for the baldness
of its self-serving optimism. In describing its methodology, it explains, “Should
society’s demands and technological innovation not shift in parallel with Equinor’s pursuit of significant greenhouse gas emission reductions, Equinor’s ability
to meet its net zero and net carbon intensity ambitions will be impaired.” 161 There
is the rub of the self-serving optimism risk: full credit now for a net-zero pledge,
and an easy long-term disclaimer if technology does not ultimately “shift” to
make the pledge achievable. Note the relationship between the inherent technological flexibility of net zero, with its indifference as to whether emissions are reduced, removed, or offset, and the ability of entities to heel-drag their way towards eventual compliance. The expectation that easy offsets and removal
technologies will be available in the future causes entities to forego near-term, inhouse planning towards emissions reductions. Ultimately, the dilatory tactics enabled by net zero’s long temporality have doubly pernicious effects: not only does
it make achievement of global net zero challenging, but it also means that “emissions that could have been prevented between now and 2030 will remain in the
atmosphere for hundreds of years,” possibly equating “to extreme heat and sea
level rise for hundreds of millions more people.” 162
Although the problem is pervasive, 163 not all entities rely heavily on delay
coupled with unproven technologies. Many have set appropriate interim targets,
have taken responsibility for a broad scope of emissions, and are pursuing steps

159.
160.

161.

162.
163.

See Harris, supra note 106.
Sammy Roth, Joe Biden Wants 100% Clean Energy. Will California Show that It’s Possible?, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 11, 2021, 2:30 PM PT), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2021-02-09
/joe-biden-wants-100-clean-energy-will-california-show-that-its-possible [https://perma
.cc/VY8G-MLRK].
NET-GHG Emission and Net Carbon Intensity Methodology, EQUINOR 3-4 (Feb. 11, 2020), https:
//www.equinor.com/content/dam/statoil/documents/climate-and-sustainability/net-ghgemissions-net-carbon-intensity-Methodology-november-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/88H9-C8HF].
Pomerantz & Kasper, supra note 131.
See, e.g., Pineda et al., supra note 118, at 113 (stating that some companies have “set targets that
entail modest emissions reductions and heavier reliance on oﬀsetting practices”).
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aligned with their plans. 164 Entities that are part of accountability eﬀorts, such
as SBTi and Race to Zero, 165 appear more likely to have rigorous plans—suggesting a useful role for private governance in this regard. 166
C. Carbon Fungibility and the Risks of Additionality, Permanence, and Leakage
Even if an entity fully intends to meet its carbon pledges and relies entirely
on near-term investments in proven technologies rather than self-serving optimism, there remains yet another set of accounting risks. These risks stem from
the assumed physical fungibility of carbon resources embedded in net zero. This
Section describes how measurement and monitoring challenges related to carbon’s physical properties lead to three additional accounting risks: nonadditionality, impermanence, and leakage.
As noted above, many entities treat carbon removed from the atmosphere as
fungible with carbon emitted into the atmosphere in their net-zero plans. This
assumption forms a core premise of the net-zero strategies of both removal and
oﬀsetting, dependent as they are on swapping physical tons reduced in one place
for physical tons removed in another. Consequently, if carbon removal cannot be
relied upon to actually capture carbon and store it permanently, then much of
the theoretical and practical basis for net zero will be undermined. 167 This challenge is a serious one for net-zero regimes in their current format—as Peter Healey, Robert Scholes, Penehuro Lefale, and Pius Yanda observe, “the ‘net zero’
concept loses much of its meaning and attraction unless there is a large measure

164.

For example, consider Nestlé’s net-zero plan. Nestlé has announced three interim targets: 20%
emissions reduction by 2025, 50% emissions reduction by 2030, and 100% on-site renewable
energy by 2025. Accelerate, Transform, Regenerate: Nestlé’s Net Zero Roadmap, NESTLÉ 3-4 (Feb.
2021), https://www.nestle.com/sites/default/ﬁles/2020-12/nestle-net-zero-roadmap-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8YRX-B6VD]. The Science Based Target initiative (SBTi) has assessed
that Nestlé’s targets are consistent with keeping warming to 1.5°C. See SBTi Target Dashboard,
SCI. BASED TARGETS INITIATIVE, https://sciencebasedtargets.org/companies-taking-action
#why-is-temperature-alignment-given-for-scope-1-and-2-targets-only-not-scope-3 [https:
//perma.cc/S9PP-A46Y]. More broadly, Henry Lee and Abigail Mayer report that “88 percent
of companies who buy oﬀsets have also formally adopted emissions reductions targets,” suggesting at least an awareness that oﬀsets should be paired with signiﬁcant emissions reductions. Lee & Mayer, supra note 60, at 4.
165. See supra notes 134-139 and accompanying text.
166. See Taking Stock, supra note 5, at 23; From Ambition to Impact, supra note 60, at 19 (“[T]he
typical SBTi company has reduced its emissions by 6.4% per year since setting its target.”).
167. See Taking Stock, supra note 5, at 11 (“Crucially, the only form of net zero which stabilises global
temperature is one in which any continued emissions of fossil CO2 are balanced out by permanent removals of CO2.”).
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of substitutability between emissions reductions and [carbon-dioxide removal]
oﬀsets.” 168
The topic of fungibility is a scientiﬁcally and legally complex one. An extensive literature already covers it, within and beyond the climate context. 169 For
present purposes, a summary of the three key carbon-accounting concerns related to fungibility should suﬃce. The ﬁrst is additionality, which refers to ensuring that a project awarded carbon oﬀsets “would not have occurred in the
absence of a market for oﬀset credits.” 170 Additionality is critical to the validity
168.

Peter Healey, Robert Scholes, Penehuro Lefale & Pius Yanda, Governing Net Zero Carbon Removals to Avoid Entrenching Inequities, 3 FRONTIERS CLIMATE art. no. 672357, at 2 (2021).
169. Much of the literature on fungibility focuses on contexts where the unit of measurement
makes physical substitution particularly challenging, as in the case of biodiversity and wetlands oﬀsets, where an acre of land preserved in one place may not have the same ecosystem
services or biodiversity value as the acre destroyed in another. Carbon avoids these challenges,
because “a ton is a ton”—but it presents its own complex set of considerations. Cf. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodiﬁcation of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV.
607, 665 (2000) (referencing the analogous case of sulfur dioxide). On wetlands-mitigation
banking, see, for example, id. at 611-12; Shelley Welton, Michela Biasutti & Michael Gerrard,
Legal & Scientiﬁc Integrity in Advancing a Land-Degradation Neutral World, 40 COLUM. J. ENV’T
L. 39, 62-69 (2015), which collects many critiques; Philip Gibbons & David B. Lindenmayer,
Oﬀsets for Land Clearing: No Net Loss or the Tail Wagging the Dog?, 8 ECOLOGICAL MGMT. &
RESTORATION 26, 28-30 (2007), which notes that poor compliance track records in oﬀsetting
programs extend beyond wetlands-mitigation banking; James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, “No Net
Loss”: Instrument Choice in Wetlands Protection, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION 323, 323-25 (Jody Freedman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., 2007); Philip Womble &
Martin Doyle, The Geography of Trading Ecosystem Services: A Case Study of Wetland and Stream
Compensatory Mitigation Markets, 36 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 230, 245-48 (2012); Morgan M.
Robertson, The Neoliberalization of Ecosystem Services: Wetland Mitigation Banking and Problems
in Environmental Governance, 35 GEOFORUM 361, 362-64 (2004); and Royal C. Gardner, Money
for Nothing? The Rise of Wetland Fee Mitigation, 19 VA. ENV’T L.J. 1, 2-4 (2000). On biodiversity
oﬀsetting programs, see, for example, Susan Walker, Ann L. Brower, R.T. Theo Stephens &
William G. Lee, Why Bartering Biodiversity Fails, 2 CONSERVATION LETTERS 149, 149 (2009),
which concludes that achievement of “no net loss” policies through oﬀset regimes is “administratively improbable and technically unrealistic”; Shelley Burgin, BioBanking: An Environmental Scientist’s View of the Role of Biodiversity Banking Oﬀsets in Conservation, 17 BIODIVERSITY
CONSERVATION 807, 814 (2008), which ﬁnds that the biodiversity oﬀsets “concept is ﬂawed,
and decision making around oﬀsets is largely conducted without an appropriate scientiﬁc underpinning”; Bruce A. McKenney & Joseph M. Kiesecker, Policy Development for Biodiversity
Oﬀsets: A Review of Oﬀset Frameworks, 45 ENV’T MGMT. 165, 165 (2010); and Martine Maron,
Richard J. Hobbs, Atte Moilanen, Jeﬀrey W. Matthews, Kimberly Christie, Toby A. Gardner,
David A. Keith, David B. Lindenmayer & Clive A. McAlpine, Faustian Bargains? Restoration
Realities in the Context of Biodiversity Oﬀset Policies, 155 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 141, 144
(2012), which ﬁnds that restoration projects do not have a high success rate.
170. Broekhoﬀ et al., supra note 74, at 19. The additionality concept also includes “legal additionality,” meaning a project should not be eligible for carbon ﬁnance if it is required by law. Brian
Joseph McFarland, Carbon Reduction Projects and the Concept of Additionality, 11 SUSTAINABLE
DEV. L. & POL’Y 15, 15 (2011).
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of oﬀsets because if an entity uses oﬀsets from a project that would have happened anyway to justify its own continued emissions, it functionally makes climate change worse. Yet despite reams of methodologies developed across various domestic and international oﬀset schemes, reliable veriﬁcation methods for
additionality have proven elusive. 171 In fact, studies have suggested that in the
world’s two largest carbon-oﬀset programs, both administered by the United
Nations as part of the Kyoto Protocol, as many as 60-70% of credits may not
have represented valid GHG reductions. 172

171.

See Broekhoﬀ et al., supra note 74, at 19-20; Jessica Campbella, Irene M. Herremans & Anne
Kleﬀner, Barriers to Achieving Additionality in Carbon Oﬀsets: A Regulatory Risk Perspective, 61
J. ENV’T PLAN. & MGMT. 2570, 2574 (2018) (“Jurisdictions with carbon-oﬀset markets have
faced a signiﬁcant challenge in terms of providing a precise and well-grounded deﬁnition for
additionality.”); Axel Michaelowa, Lukas Hermwille, Wolfgang Obbergassel & Sonja Butzengeiger, Additionality Revisited: Guarding the Integrity of Market Mechanisms Under the Paris
Agreement, 19 CLIMATE POL’Y 1211, 1214 (2019) (“As project developers have an incentive to
game the parameters in order to gain more emission units, testing of ‘project additionality’ is
generally diﬃcult.”).
172. See Broekhoﬀ et al., supra note 74, at 17; see also Haya et al., supra note 73, at 1113 (describing
three potential sources of overcrediting); Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development
Mechanism’s Performance and Potential, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1759, 1764 (2008) (“The CDM is failing as a market because its rules, rather than producing real reductions, have accounting loopholes that allow participants to manufacture GHG credits at little or no cost beyond the payment of consultants necessary to surmount the necessary regulatory hurdles.”). The
additionality concern also encompasses critiques that project “baselines” may inﬂate the carbon savings of projects. For example, California’s net-zero plan allows companies to oﬀset
some of their emissions with the purchase of out-of-state credits paid to landowners who
agree to conserve forests on their property. But critics charge that California’s system for assigning these credits artiﬁcially inﬂates some forests’ carbon beneﬁts by assigning value based
on crude geographic groupings. See Grayson Badgley, Jeremy Freeman, Joseph Hamman, Barbara Haya, Anna Trugman, William R. L. Anderegg & Danny Cullenward, Systematic OverCrediting of Forest Oﬀsets, CARBONPLAN (Apr. 29, 2021), https://carbonplan.org/research/forest-oﬀsets-explainer [https://perma.cc/F5LH-R8DY]; James Temple & Lisa Song, The Climate Solution Actually Adding Millions of Tons of CO2 into the Atmosphere, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr.
29, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/04/29/1017811/california-climate-policy
-carbon-credits-cause-co2-pollution [https://perma.cc/M5RH-45XM] (reporting estimates
that “the state’s program has generated between 20 million and 39 million credits that don’t
achieve real climate beneﬁts . . . equal to the annual emissions of 8.5 million cars at the high
end”); see also Haya et al., supra note 73, at 1113 (describing baseline-setting challenges under
the Kyoto Protocol); David Takacs, Forest Carbon (REDD+), Repairing International Trust, and
Reciprocal Contractual Sovereignty, 37 VT. L. REV. 653, 661-62 (2013) (collecting criticisms of
forest-oﬀsetting programs under international regimes); Rowena Maguire, Opportunities for
Forest Finance: Compliance and Voluntary Markets, 2011 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 100, 109
(describing crediting challenges for forests).
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A second fungibility-related challenge that particularly plagues eﬀorts at carbon removal is that of permanence. We need carbon removed from the atmosphere to stay out of the atmosphere, ideally forever. 173 If carbon removed from
the atmosphere somehow “leaks” back in, then removal is a charade. Yet, ensuring the permanence of carbon removal is challenging, particularly in the case of
nature-based solutions. Trees are susceptible to wildﬁres and human demand for
timber products; 174 soil sequestration only works under continuous management. 175 In contrast, DAC and CCS—both of which anticipate storage of carbon
in underground reservoirs—are generally perceived as less risky from a permanence perspective. But they still present uncertainties and require continuous
monitoring, given that a carbon leak from a reservoir might undo substantial
progress. 176 Various programs are experimenting with ways to boost conﬁdence
in the permanence of removals—from “buﬀer reserves,” 177 to credit bundling
and securitization, 178 to liability regimes 179—but their eﬃcacy remains unclear. 180
Carbon “leakage” presents the third fungibility-related challenge. Leakage
here refers to the fact that when a carbon-removal project occurs, it may have

173.

174.

175.

176.

177.

178.
179.

180.

But see Broekhoﬀ et al., supra note 74, at 26 (“Most of the carbon in a tonne of CO2 emitted
today will—eventually—be removed from the atmosphere. However, around 25% remains in
the atmosphere for hundreds to thousands of years.”).
See Matthew D. Hurteau, Bruce A. Hungate & George W. Koch, Accounting for Risk in Valuing
Forest Carbon Oﬀsets, 4 CARBON BALANCE & MGMT. art. no. 1, at 1-2 (2009) (“[T]he value of
forest carbon declines by as much as 99% when the risk of loss due to wildﬁre is considered.”).
See Tas Thamo & David J. Pannell, Challenges in Developing Eﬀective Policy for Soil Carbon Sequestration: Perspectives on Additionality, Leakage, and Permanence, 16 CLIMATE POL’Y 973, 976
(2016).
See Pineda et al., supra note 118, at 47 (“[E]ven geological carbon storage can be exposed to a
number of physical conditions that could cause some of the carbon to be leaked back into the
atmosphere.”).
Many programs maintain a “buﬀer reserve” where credits are set aside as an insurance mechanism. Purchasers of credits from projects that suﬀer a reversal can then draw from this reserve to compensate for the reversed emissions. See Broekhoﬀ et al., supra note 74, at 26.
See Larry Lohmann, Regulatory Challenges for Financial and Carbon Markets, 3 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 161, 169-70 (2009).
The liability issue is a delicate one: too strict a liability regime might deter the development
of underground storage, while too lenient a regime risks less faith in carbon removal as a
climate strategy. See Friedmann et al., supra note 57, at 43.
See Tracy Hester, Legal Pathways to Negative Emissions Technologies and Direct Air Capture of
Greenhouse Gases, 48 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10413, 10430-32 (2018) (suggesting the
need for new federal legislation revising the current liability and damages regime for removal
technologies); MoonSook Park, The Government’s Multi-Faceted Role in Resolving the Main Legal Issues Regarding Carbon Capture and Sequestration, 94 N.D. L. REV. 481, 494 (2019) (ﬁnding
liability regimes for leakage to be “ambiguous and conﬂicting”).
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indirect eﬀects on carbon emissions both domestically and internationally in
ways that o�en prove hard to discern. 181 As one report explains, “The classic
example is a forest preservation project that avoids the emissions caused by clearing one parcel of forest, but ends up shi�ing the production of timber through
deforestation to other areas.” 182 Leakage amounts vary by project, but Tas
Thamo and David J. Pannell report that some voluntary oﬀset schemes may be
subject to leakage of up to 90% of claimed emissions “savings.” 183 Others suggest
the leakage burden is typically much smaller. 184
These fungibility-based concerns can never be entirely solved, but their risks
can be mitigated through careful project monitoring and veriﬁcation. 185 Of
course, increased scrutiny creates increased transaction costs—none too popular
in the case of entities seeking cheap oﬀsets. 186 The intractability of these challenges has resulted in a long-standing, vociferous debate over the role that oﬀsets should play in the international climate regime. 187 The net-zero framework—at least as implemented to date—clearly embraces oﬀsets, although
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See Andrei Marcu, Christian Egenhofer, Susanna Roth & Wijnand Stoefs, Carbon Leakage: An
Overview, CTR. FOR EUR. POL’Y STUD. 3 (Dec. 2013), https://www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Special%20Report%20No%2079%20Carbon%20Leakage_0.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/XFP6-SX32]. See generally Kevin Anderson, The Inconvenient Truth of Carbon Oﬀsets,
484 NATURE 7 (2012) (discussing the many indirect eﬀects that the purchase of carbon oﬀsets
might have).
See Broekhoﬀ et al., supra note 74, at 23.
Thamo & Pannell, supra note 175, at 974; see also Brian C. Murray, Brent Sohngen & Martin T.
Ross, Economic Consequences of Consideration of Permanence, Leakage and Additionality for Soil
Carbon Sequestration Projects, 80 CLIMACTIC CHANGE 127, 132-33 (2007) (discussing variation
in leakage rates).
See Larry Karp, Reﬂections on Carbon Leakage 2 (Oct. 13, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229054146_Reﬂections_on_Carbon_Leakage
[https://perma.cc/G8R9-93LU] (estimating country-to-country carbon leakage at around
20% in his models).
See Carton et al., supra note 24, at 5 (asserting that these concerns “cannot be resolved by
science”).
See Thamo & Pannell, supra note 175, at 974; McNish, supra note 33, at 419 (“There is a fundamental trade-oﬀ between eﬀective evaluation procedures and administrative eﬃciency, and
to date the eﬃciency goals have been ascendant.”).
See Hyams & Fawcett, supra note 75, at 91 (describing oﬀsets as having “divided the environmental movement”).
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various institutional actors champion their usage to diﬀerent degrees. 188 As entities begin to make good on their pledges, most expect the oﬀset market to balloon, for better or for worse. 189
The accounting risks presented here provoke concerns that the net-zero project—though aligned with the best of climate science on paper—may amount to
little more than a shell game in practice. 190 I share these concerns. But a focus on
these risks in some ways misses the forest for the trees: as explored in the following Parts, it is not just the diﬃculty of ensuring individualized accountability
that presents cause for concern over net zero—it is the overall nature of the enterprise that the regime sets into motion.
iii. the neutrality mirage
It has been repeated frequently enough to almost become a mantra: when it
comes to carbon reductions, “a ton is a ton.” 191 Or in long form: “Because GHGs
mix globally in the atmosphere, it does not matter where exactly they are reduced. From a climate change perspective, the eﬀects are the same if an organization: (a) ceases an emission-causing activity; or (b) enables an equivalent
emission-reducing activity somewhere else in the world.” 192 The notion that a
ton is a ton forms the central premise of net zero. One can embrace net zero’s
complete neutrality about the ways in which carbon is reduced only if those ways
are all equally preferable.
This Part interrogates this mantra. It argues that the idea that all tons are
equal is true only in the narrowest, most technocratic sense—and perhaps, not
even then. 193 The imperative to globally transition to net zero will necessarily
have transformative eﬀects. It will change where we settle; how we live, work,
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See supra notes 123-127 and accompanying text (explaining variations in the degree to which
oﬀsets form a part of various net-zero pledges).
See Lee & Mayer, supra note 60, at 11; Stephen Donofrio, Patrick Maguire, Steve Zwick &
William Merry, Voluntary Carbon and the Post-Pandemic Recovery: A Special Climate Week NYC
2020 Installment of Ecosystem Marketplace’s State of Voluntary Carbon Markets 2020 Report,
FOREST TRENDS 1 (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.forest-trends.org/publications/state-of-voluntary-carbon-markets-2020-voluntary-carbon-and-the-post-pandemic-recovery [https://
perma.cc/N39D-E7RM] (“Corporate carbon-neutral pledges fueled a record transaction volume of at least 104 MtCO2e in 2019 . . . .”).
See, e.g., Dyke et al., supra note 8; McLaren et al., supra note 28, at 3.
See Matthew Paterson & Johannes Stripple, Virtuous Carbon, 21 ENV’T POL. 563, 575 (2012)
(asserting the importance to oﬀsetting regimes of creating assurance that “a tonne is a
tonne”).
Broekhoﬀ et al., supra note 74, at 6.
See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
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play, and travel; how our communities are structured; and how we understand
the role and place of nature and the contours of aﬄuence and want. The net-zero
framing erases these considerations, reducing the project of decarbonizing society to a simple mathematical calculus, applicable at any scale by any entity. In
this way, it embraces a strain of barebones liberalism that refuses to attach any
moral or value judgments to various ways that one might reduce or remove carbon. 194 Purported neutrality may be useful from the standpoint of political economy, 195 but it presents a deep and enduring challenge to the program’s legitimacy and durability. This Part develops a critique of neutrality in two stages,
ﬁrst articulating the myriad reasons we should not be agnostic among climate
solutions, then highlighting the dangers of utilizing a netting framework for
controlling emissions.
A. The Climate-Neutrality Myth
Is any ton of carbon really equal to any other ton? For corporate-compliance
oﬃcers and government accountants, a ton may seem like a ton in the ledger.
But from a wider set of vantage points, one ton of carbon is rarely equal to another.
To begin, a ton may not even be a ton from the perspective of the atmosphere.
The risks of nonadditionality, impermanence, and leakage mean that a ton removed from the atmosphere is never as certain as a ton never released into it. 196
Moreover, new research suggests that there is not scientiﬁc parity between a ton
of carbon emissions avoided and a ton of carbon emissions removed from the
atmosphere because of the way that lands and oceans respond to changes in atmospheric carbon emissions. 197 But even temporarily assuming away these challenges, there are larger social concerns around ton equivalency.

194.

See KATRINA FORRESTER, IN THE SHADOW OF JUSTICE: POSTWAR LIBERALISM AND THE REMAKING OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 17 (2019) (describing the mid-twentieth-century version of

barebones liberalism as centered on an “anti-interventionist commitment to small government”).
195. See supra Section I.A.
196. See supra Section II.C.
197. See Kirsten Zickfeld, Deven Azevedo, Sabine Mathesius & H. Damon Matthews, Asymmetry
in the Climate-Carbon Cycle Response to Positive and Negative CO2 Emissions, 11 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 613, 617 (2021) (“This study demonstrates that an emission of CO2 into the atmosphere is more eﬀective at raising atmospheric CO2 than a CO2 removal is at lowering atmospheric CO2 . . . .”); see also 2021 Summary for Policymakers, supra note 37, at 30 (“The atmospheric CO2 decrease from anthropogenic CO2 removals could be up to 10% less than the
atmospheric CO2 increase from an equal amount of CO2 emissions . . . .”).
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The ﬁrst set of concerns has to do with climate justice and the decarbonization imperative domestically within the United States. Environmental justice research makes clear that communities of color have long borne the brunt of fossilfuel combustion in the United States, with devastating health and community
impacts. 198 These same communities are the least culpable for inducing such
pollution through consumption of goods and services: a 2019 study of ﬁne-particulate-matter air-pollution exposure—“the largest environmental health risk
factor in the United States”—ﬁnds:
On average, non-Hispanic whites experience a “pollution advantage”:
They experience ∼17% less air pollution exposure than is caused by their
consumption. Blacks and Hispanics on average bear a “pollution burden”
of 56% and 63% excess exposure, respectively, relative to the exposure
caused by their consumption. 199
These inequities have created substantial resistance to net-zero policies that rely
heavily on CCS—that is, the retroﬁtting of fossil-fuel combustion or other industrial processes with CO2-capture devices—as a strategy for reducing emissions. Although CCS captures carbon emissions, it does not necessarily reduce
accompanying air emissions with more pernicious, localized impacts; nor does

198.

See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, The Clean Air Act’s Blind Spot: Microclimates and Hotspot Pollution, 65
UCLA L. REV. 1036, 1047 (2018); Shalanda H. Baker, Anti-Resilience: A Roadmap for Transformational Justice Within the Energy System, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6 (2019); Maninder
P.S. Thind, Christopher W. Tessum, Inês L. Azevedo & Julian D. Marshall, Fine Particulate Air
Pollution from Electricity Generation in the US: Health Impacts by Race, Income, and Geography,
53 ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 14010, 14015 (2019); Rachel Morello-Frosch, Miriam Zuk, Michael Jerrett, Bhavna Shamasunder & Amy D. Kyle, Understanding the Cumulative Impacts of Inequalities
in Environmental Health: Implications for Policy, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 879, 881 (2011); Klara Zwickl,
The Demographics of Fracking: A Spatial Analysis for Four U.S. States, 161 ECOLOGICAL ECON.
202, 209 (2019); Bruce Bekkar, Susan Pacheco, Rupa Basu & Nathaniel DeNicola, Association
of Air Pollution and Heat Exposure with Preterm Birth, Low Birth Weight, and Stillbirth in the US:
A Systematic Review, 3 JAMA NETWORK OPEN art. no. e208243, at 5, 8 (2020); Jeremy S. Hoﬀman, Vivek Shandas & Nicholas Pendleton, The Eﬀects of Historical Housing Policies on Resident
Exposure to Intra-Urban Heat: A Study of 108 US Urban Areas, 8 CLIMATE art. no. 12, at 11
(2020); Jennifer Richmond-Bryant, Ihab Mikati, Adam F. Benson, Thomas J. Luben & Jason
D. Sacks, Disparities in Distribution of Particulate Matter Emissions from US Coal-Fired Power
Plants by Race and Poverty Status A�er Accounting for Reductions in Operations Between 2015 and
2017, 110 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 655, 659-61 (2020). For a longer historical lens on these issues,
see Myles Lennon, Decolonizing Energy: Black Lives Matter and Technoscientiﬁc Expertise amid
Solar Transitions, 30 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 18, 24-25 (2017), which compellingly traces the
links between the transatlantic slave trade and fossil-fuel industrialization.
199. Christopher W. Tessum, Joshua S. Apte, Andrew L. Goodkind, Nicholas Z. Muller, Kimberly
A. Mullins, David A. Paolella, Stephen Polasky, Nathaniel P. Springer, Sumil K. Thakrar, Julian D. Marshall & Jason D. Hill, Inequity in Consumption of Goods and Services Adds to RacialEthnic Disparities in Air Pollution Exposure, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 6001, 6001 (2019).
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it eliminate the environmental justice concerns associated with oil and gas extraction. 200 These same objections carry over to any net-zero strategy that relies
heavily on oﬀsets or DAC to the extent that these strategies displace or delay
domestic emissions reductions. 201 For communities suﬀering the additional
health and environmental burdens that accompany domestic carbon emissions,
removing a ton of emissions elsewhere is decidedly not equivalent to emissions
reductions close to home. 202
200.

See Daniel A. Farber, Pollution Markets and Social Equity: Analyzing the Fairness of Cap and
Trade, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 6, 46 (2012) (observing that oﬀsets require “fewer in-system emissions reductions than would otherwise be required and, therefore, result[] in correspondingly
smaller reductions of in-system co-pollutants”); Over 500 Organizations Call on Policymakers
to Reject Carbon Capture and Storage as a False Solution, CTR. FOR INT’L ENV’T L. (2021), https:
//www.ciel.org/organizations-demand-policymakers-reject-carbon-capture-and-storage
[https://perma.cc/A365-H7XS] (“[I]nvesting in carbon capture delays the needed transition
away from fossil fuels and other combustible energy sources. It poses signiﬁcant new environmental, health, and safety risks, particularly to Black, Brown, and Indigenous communities already overburdened by industrial pollution, dispossession, and the impacts of climate
change.”).
201. Rachel Frazin, White House Environmental Justice Advisers Express Opposition to Nuclear, Carbon
Capture Projects, HILL (May 17, 2021, 2:49 PM ET), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/553927-white-house-environmental-justice-advisors-expresses-opposition-to
[https://perma.cc/C8NN-XQ5T] (describing objections of the White House Environmental
Justice Advisory Council to Carbon Capture and Storage and nuclear power).
202. See Letter from Alaska Clean Water Advoc. et al., to Mary D. Nichols, Chair, California Air
Res. Bd. & Gavin McCabe, Compliance Oﬀset Task Force Chair, California Air Res. Bd. (Nov.
6, 2020), https://cal.streetsblog.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2021/02/Reject-OﬀsetsTaskforce-Recs-Letter-11-6-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/WKS8-6Z6G] (calling, “[o]n behalf
of the undersigned environmental justice (EJ), Black, Indigenous, environmental, scientiﬁc
and health organizations,” for the rejection of oﬀsetting programs because “[t]o date, CARB
has allowed 200 million tons of oﬀsets to be used by the biggest polluters in the state, such as
the Chevron oil reﬁnery and Paciﬁc Gas & Electric,” which is “200 million tons of climate
pollution (carbon dioxide with co-pollutants) that was emitted into the atmosphere, polluted
EJ communities, and choked the lungs of mostly Black and brown children living next to those
industries”); Accelerating Decarbonization of the U.S. Energy System, supra note 12, at 4 (noting
that fossil-fuel use “may be responsible for half a million premature deaths or more over the
next decade—public health impacts that fall disproportionately on low-income communities
and communities of color”); Vien Truong, Addressing Poverty and Pollution: California’s SB 535
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 493, 497-505 (2014) (examining
the ways in which climate and air pollution disproportionately impact communities of color
in California and the way that many environmental laws have “bypassed” these communities); Alice Kaswan, Climate Change and Environmental Justice: Lessons from the California Lawsuits, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 1, 2 (2014) (cataloguing California’s experience with
integrating environmental justice into climate policy and arguing for “the importance of a
holistic approach to climate change policy that recognizes and integrates its multiple dimensions, including co-pollutant implications”); The California Environmental Justice Movement’s
Declaration Against the Use of Carbon Trading Schemes to Address Climate Change, https://www
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Choices around carbon reductions and removals also have the potential to
transform communities in broader ways. As the IPCC has made clear, “Pathways
limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot would require
rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and infrastructure (including transport and buildings), and industrial systems.” 203 Because decarbonization requires such pivotal transformations, many activists, politicians, and academics have come to view the challenge as an opportunity to dramatically
reorient the relationship between infrastructure and social structure in the
United States. For example, a resolution calling for a “Green New Deal,” introduced by Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Ed Markey in
the U.S. House and Senate in February 2019, demanded that net-zero strategies
be accompanied by a robust social agenda, pairing decarbonization with community ownership of resources, a federal jobs guarantee, “high-quality health
care,” and “aﬀordable, safe, and adequate housing” for all Americans. 204 In this
way, the Green New Deal expresses an understanding of climate mitigation that
is far from neutral. Instead, these eﬀorts recognize that the road to net zero,
paved as it is with numerous critical social-policy decisions, presents a key juncture for either addressing inequality and structural racism or shunting aside
these concerns for another generation or more. 205 Proponents therefore celebrate
the Green New Deal for reframing climate change away from being a scientiﬁc

.envirorights.org/archives/Climate%20Change/2008-02-15_Climate_Change_Declaration
.pdf [https://perma.cc/33XJ-QUZA] (opposing the use of an oﬀset scheme in California because “it will support and enrich the state’s worst polluters, it will fail to address the existing
and future inequitable burden of pollution, [and] it will deprive communities of the ability to
protect and enhance their communities”).
203. 2018 Summary for Policymakers, supra note 3, at 15.
204. H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019) (calling for a ten-year mobilization to reach net-zero emissions).
205. See Frank W. Geels, Benjamin K. Sovacool, Tim Schwanen & Steve Sorrell, Sociotechnical
Transitions for Deep Decarbonization, 357 SCI. 1242, 1242 (2017) (“Rapid and deep decarbonization requires transformation of sociotechnical systems—the interlinked mix of technologies,
infrastructures, organizations, markets, regulations, and user practices that together deliver
societal functions . . . .”); Dale W. Jamieson & Marcello Di Paola, Political Theory for the Anthropocene, in GLOBAL POLITICAL THEORY 254, 270 (David Held & Pietro Maﬀettone eds., 2016)
(“[C]limate change remains a multidimensional problem that concerns ecology, demography,
development, production, consumption, resource use, trade rules, health, security, urban
planning, mobility, migration, and more.”); Accelerating Decarbonization of the U.S. Energy System, supra note 12, at 1 (“Net-zero policy is about more than non-emitting energy technologies, because the manner in which the U.S. economy produces and consumes energy impacts
a host of other issues that people care deeply about.”).
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problem that must be dealt with, and into an opportunity for real, durable
change for the many Americans losing out in the current economic ordering. 206
The Green New Deal represents just one approach to climate politics. Another related movement—the “just transition” movement—emphasizes the importance of supporting workers and communities le� behind during the cleanenergy transition. 207 Other approaches prioritize biodiversity preservation in the
transition, 208 or emphasize the potential that climate change mitigation has to
reinvigorate domestic manufacturing. 209 Even carbon-tax proponents—who often cast such a tax as the most “neutral” solution to climate change—frequently
design and defend the policy with reference to distributional concerns. 210 Opponents of action on climate change also rarely display neutrality in their opposition, highlighting, for example, the deep threat that climate policy might present to Americans’ hamburger consumption, large automobiles, or the aesthetic
character of the country’s seashores and rolling hills. 211
206.

See, e.g., MATTHEW T. HUBER, CLIMATE CHANGE AS CLASS WAR: BUILDING SOCIALISM ON A
WARMING PLANET 179 (2022) (noting that Rhiana Gunn-Wright has suggested that “a key
strategy of the Green New Deal is to appeal to basic material interests in building popular
support”); cf. Leah C. Stokes & Matto Mildenberger, The Trouble with Carbon Pricing, BOS.
REV. (Sept. 24, 2020), http://bostonreview.net/science-nature-politics/matto-mildenbergerleah-c-stokes-trouble-carbon-pricing [https://perma.cc/Z4D6-D8HE] (explaining that carbon-pricing policies have failed politically because they do not highlight the “the long-term
beneﬁts of addressing climate change—for the environment, public health, and the economy”).
207. See, e.g., Ann M. Eisenberg, Just Transitions, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 273, 275-76 (2019).
208. See, e.g., Discover Half-Earth, HALF-EARTH PROJECT, https://www.half-earthproject.org/discover-half-earth [https://perma.cc/7PYN-787U].
209. See, e.g., Joel Jaeger & Devashree Saha, 12 Reasons Climate Action Is Good for the United States
Economy, WORLD RES. INST. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.wri.org/insights/12-reasons-climate-action-good-united-states-economy [https://perma.cc/ZN32-4DYF].
210. See, e.g., Building Democratic Support for Equitable Carbon Pricing, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK 1-5 (2016), https://scholars.org/sites/scholars/ﬁles/carbon-equity-forum-1.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/8D46-DURD]; Sarah Shemkus, Massachusetts Groups Back Expanded Carbon Tax
with Focus on Equity, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 2, 2021), https://energynews.us/2021/03
/02/massachusetts-groups-back-expanded-carbon-tax-with-focus-on-equity
[https://
perma.cc/Q5PW-UU9T]; Gilbert Metcalf, Can a Carbon Tax Cut Emissions Without Hurting
the Poor?, ECONOFACT (Sept. 10, 2020), https://econofact.org/can-a-carbon-tax-cut-emissions-without-hurting-the-poor [https://perma.cc/62VY-E3ZA].
211. See Emily Atkin, The Potency of Republicans’ Hamburger Lie, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 4, 2019),
https://newrepublic.com/article/153187/potency-republicans-hamburger-lie [https://perma
.cc/HJ63-PS4L] (describing the eﬀectiveness of the hamburger critique); Emma Newburger,
Republican Infrastructure Counteroﬀer Slashes Biden’s Electric Vehicle and Climate Spending,
CNBC (May 27, 2021, 1:24 PM EDT), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/27/republican-infrastructure-oﬀer-slashes-biden-electric-vehicle-spending.html
[https://perma.cc/FP76W37E] (reporting partisan wrangling on electric vehicles); David R. Baker & Millicent Dent,
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In August 2022, the United States passed legislation—the IRA—that many
have lauded as the greatest climate action in its history. 212 The fraught politics
of decarbonization are on full display in the IRA’s structure, starting with the fact
that the Act’s title emphasizes its role in addressing a diﬀerent problem altogether: inﬂation. Almost every position previewed above can point to something
in the IRA to celebrate: the Act dedicates a signiﬁcant amount of funding—an
estimated $60 billion out of $370 billion in total climate-related spending—to
environmental justice initiatives, although it falls short of many of the larger aspirations of the Green New Deal. 213 It imposes numerous labor-related conditions, including tying eligibility for many of its incentives to prevailing wage and
domestic-manufacturing requirements. 214 The Act appeases fans of nuclear
power and carbon capture and storage with separate provisions speciﬁcally devoted to their promotion. 215 And, angering many, the Act also props up the fossil-fuel industry by approving previously stalled drilling projects and creating a
one-for-one leasing requirement that ensures that for every acre of federal land

212.

213.

214.

215.

NIMBYs Shoot Down Green Projects Next Door While Planet Burns, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 17, 2019,
6:00 AM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-09-17/nimbys-shootdown-green-projects-next-door-while-planet-burns [https://perma.cc/CFW5-FFL4] (arguing that “hostility toward clean power is largely driven by aesthetics and property values”).
Inﬂation Reduction Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818; see, e.g., Rebecca Leber,
The US Finally Has a Law to Tackle Climate Change, VOX (Aug. 16, 2022, 4:46 PM EDT), https:
//www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2022/7/28/23281757/whats-in-climate-bill-inﬂation-reduction-act [https://perma.cc/V8DN-VTJF] (quoting President Biden at the bill signing as
saying, “This bill is the biggest step forward on climate ever”).
See Erik Ortiz, Inﬂation Reduction Act Puts $60B Focus on a Biden Priority: Environmental Justice,
NBC NEWS (Aug. 12, 2022, 5:50 PM EDT), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news
/inﬂation-reduction-act-puts-60b-focus-biden-priority-environmental-ju-rcna42891 [https:
//perma.cc/D5GV-H4H4]. But see The Inﬂation Reduction Act Is Not a Climate Justice Bill, CLIMATE JUST. ALL. (Aug. 6, 2022), https://climatejusticealliance.org/the-inﬂation-reduction-act
-is-not-a-climate-justice-bill [https://perma.cc/9SNQ-LJ97] (“A�er careful study of the language of the Inﬂation Reduction Act of 2022, Climate Justice Alliance concludes that the
harms of the bill as it is currently written outweigh its beneﬁts.”).
See, e.g., Inﬂation Reduction Act of 2022 § 13101(f)(7) (enhancing credits for renewable energy produced from certain renewable sources to facilities paying laborers and mechanics
“wages at rates not less than the prevailing rates for construction, alteration, or repair of a
similar character in the locality in which such facility is located”); id. § 13104 (similar requirements for carbon-dioxide sequestration projects); id. § 13105 (similar requirements for nuclear projects); id. § 13101(g) (providing bonus credits for “domestic content” of “steel, iron,
or manufactured product” included in a facility); id. § 13401 (placing domestic requirements
on critical minerals used in clean vehicles eligible for credits).
See id. §§ 13104-13105.
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made available for renewables development, an acre is also made available for oil
and gas drilling. 216
This messy yet historic climate legislation exempliﬁes the fact that there is,
in fact, no neutrality when it comes to climate solutions. 217 One ton is not equivalent to another, when contextualized as part of the broader climate change mitigation eﬀort. Nor should we pretend at neutrality: the solutions to this challenge are complex and worthy of democratic debate and compromise.
A similar set of contests animates debates at the global level. Particularly
when it comes to land-intensive carbon-removal options—including aﬀorestation, soil management, and BECCS—concerns are mounting regarding their effects on land use and associated livelihoods. 218 Early international eﬀorts at afforestation, undertaken predominantly through the United Nations’s “Reduced
Emissions Through Avoided Deforestation and Forest Degradation” (REDD+)
initiative, have highlighted the risks that commoditizing forest carbon presents
to Indigenous communities, especially under conditions of insecure land tenure. 219 Similarly, research on biofuels, reforestation, and aﬀorestation policies

216.

See id. §§ 50264-50265. For reactions against these provisions, see, for example, Manchin Poison Pills Buried in Inﬂation Reduction Act Will Destroy Livable Climate, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY (July 28, 2022), https://biologicaldiversity.org/w/news/press-releases/manchinpoison-pills-buried-in-inﬂation-reduction-act-will-destroy-a-livable-climate-2022-07-28
[https://perma.cc/R2ND-GDPN].
217. Cf. Carton et al., supra note 24, at 13 (“[T]he long history of carbon removal shows that there
are no neutral positions in this conversation.”).
218. See id. at 5 (cataloguing a large history of experimentation and research on negative emissions).
219. See Emma Jane Lord, Displacement, Power and REDD+: A Forest History of Carbonized Exclusion, in GLOBAL FOREST GOVERNANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE: INTERROGATING REPRESENTATION, PARTICIPATION, AND DECENTRALIZATION 115, 118 (Emmanuel O. Nuesiri ed., 2018); Alexander Dunlap & Sian Sullivan, A Faultline in Neoliberal Environmental Governance
Scholarship? Or, Why Accumulation-by-Alienation Matters, 3 NATURE & SPACE 552, 558-60
(2020) (collecting extensive research on the impacts of Reduced Emissions Through Avoided
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) and ﬁnding widespread land grabbing and
expropriation); Robert Fletcher, Wolfram Dressler, Bram Büscher & Zachary R. Anderson,
Questioning REDD+ and the Future of Market-Based Conservation, 30 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
673, 674 (2016); Adeniyi Asiyanbi & Jens Friis Lund, Policy Persistence: REDD+ Between Stabilization and Contestation, 27 J. POL. ECOLOGY 378, 378-80 (2020) (noting “poor outcomes” in
terms of both preventing deforestation and creating promised “co-beneﬁts” for communities).
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has shown that they can create perverse incentives toward plantation-style monocultures, with negative impacts on local communities and biodiversity. 220 Efforts to design governance arrangements to safeguard communities from these
kinds of exploitation have had mixed results, at best. 221
There is a deeper critique of carbon-removal strategies that focuses not on
particularized negative consequences, but on the colonial nature of the project in
general. The Indigenous Environmental Network argues that international oﬀset schemes “continue colonialism by perpetuating the� of Indigenous Peoples’
lands and territories, especially in the global South where Indigenous Peoples
have been protecting lands and forests for thousands of years.” 222 Given that
“most of the lands and territories targeted for greenhouse gas [] mitigation action overlap with areas customarily held by Indigenous Peoples, local communi-

220.

See Nathalie Seddon, Alexandre Chausson, Pam Berry, Cécile A. J. Girardin, Alison Smith &
Beth Turner, Understanding the Value and Limits of Nature-Based Solutions to Climate Change
and Other Global Challenges, 375 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B art. no. 20190120, at 4
(2020) (ﬁnding that “45% of the 350 Mha currently pledged for reforestation is set to become
commercial plantations, usually involving single species (i.e. monocultures)”); Abrahm Lustgarten, Palm Oil Was Supposed to Help Save the Planet. Instead It Unleashed a Catastrophe., N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/magazine/palm-oilborneo-climate-catastrophe.html [https://perma.cc/W5T4-LCKU] (tracing how U.S.-biofuels policy fueled the rise of foreign palm plantations); Juliana Nnoko-Mewanu, “When We
Lost the Forest, We Lost Everything”: Oil Palm Plantations and Rights Violations in Indonesia,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 22, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/09/23/when-we-lost
-forest-we-lost-everything/oil-palm-plantations-and-rights-violations
[https://perma.cc
/R4U6-DYWM].
221. See Asiyanbi & Lund, supra note 219, at 380; Katherine Lo�s, Alain Frechette & Kundan Kumar, Status of Legal Recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-Descendant
Peoples’ Rights to Carbon Stored in Tropical Lands and Forests, RTS. & RES. INITIATIVE 3 (Aug.
2021), https://rightsandresources.org/wp-content/uploads/CarbonRightsReport_v10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X83F-FZ7H] (“While many voluntary carbon certiﬁcation standards include provisions relating to human rights and the recognition of communities’ land tenure
and resource rights, engagement and participation, beneﬁt sharing, and channels for feedback
and grievance redress, they largely fail to provide robust and eﬀective mechanisms for monitoring, reporting, and verifying these elements.”).
222. Carbon Pricing Is a False Solution to Climate Chaos, INDIGENOUS ENV’T NETWORK, https://www
.ienearth.org/carbon-pricing [https://perma.cc/AD9A-SABU]; see also Tamra Gilbertson,
Carbon Pricing: A Critical Perspective for Community Resistance, CLIMATE JUST. ALL. & INDIGENOUS ENV’T NETWORK 35-42 (Oct. 2017), https://www.ienearth.org/wp-content/uploads
/2017/11/Carbon-Pricing-A-Critical-Perspective-for-Community-Resistance-Online-Version
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AE8-NN4S] (arguing that carbon pricing is a faulty solution that
would exacerbate environmental injustice).
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ties, and Afro-descendant Peoples,” a potential future of carbon colonialism concerns many environmental justice groups in the Global South and beyond. 223
More broadly, as Maxine Burkett has argued, the Western approach to climate
diplomacy—which favors “low-hanging fruit” like cheap oﬀsets—perpetuates “a
dangerously cabined view of the environment and a political economy that has
relied on sacriﬁcing land and people in furtherance of myopic understandings of
‘progress.’” 224
There are important solidarities between domestic and international critics
of net-zero strategies. Synthesizing these concerns, research from the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People concludes that “these [netzero] systems can o�en play out as what amounts to sophisticated international
shell games, where little net decline in emissions occurs because the measures
simply serve to transfer pollution from one location or one country to another,
depending on who can aﬀord to pollute.” 225 These solidarities underscore the
key point of this Section: for people on the ground living with the physical consequences of net-zero strategies, a ton is never just a ton.
The fact that every method of reducing or removing emissions has collateral
consequences is not an argument for slowing action. There is widespread agreement that not acting on climate will create far more suﬀering and injustice than
rapid action will. 226 Nor does it mean that strategies with drawbacks should not
be pursued; we will need a wide range of solutions to tackle climate change at
scale, and few of them are perfect. 227 But it is an argument for acknowledging
and shaping institutions around the contested and consequential nature of the
net-zero project, rather than erecting a mirage of neutrality.

223.

224.
225.

226.

227.

216

Lo�s et al., supra note 221, at 2 (footnotes omitted); Indigenous Kichwa Community Take Peruvian State and National Park to Court, FOREST PEOPLES PROGRAMME (July 1, 2021), https://
www.forestpeoples.org/en/press-release/kichwa-take-Peru-state-PNAZ-court
[https://
perma.cc/EN9T-A87Y] (announcing a lawsuit over the creation of a carbon-credits preserve
without Indigenous consent or involvement).
Maxine Burkett, Root and Branch: Climate Catastrophe, Racial Crises, and the History and Future
of Climate Justice, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 326, 326 (2021).
Jacqueline Patterson, Lorah Steichen, Katherine Egland, Saleem Chapman, Mandy Lee & Zoe
Lee-Park, Nuts, Bolts, and Pitfalls of Carbon Pricing: An Equity-Based Primer on Paying to Pollute,
NAACP ENV’T & CLIMATE JUST. PROGRAM 8-9 (July 2021), https://naacp.org/sites/default
/ﬁles/documents/Carbon%20Pricing%20Primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/57V2-B963].
See, e.g., Oriana Tannenbaum & Rushad Nanavatty, Our Climate as an Infrastructure Asset,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://rmi.org/our-climate-as-an-infrastructureasset [https://perma.cc/2P9M-Z94T] (gathering evidence to this eﬀect). For more on this
tension, see infra Section V.B.
See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
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B. The Dangers of Pretending at Neutrality
There are times when the end goal of the law is to promote neutrality. For
example, many antidiscrimination laws aim to have state and private actors treat
all comers alike, whether in public accommodations, net neutrality, or publicutility provisioning. 228 This is not the case with the net-zero framework. The
atmosphere does not actually care whether any particular actor is carbon neutral.
Instead, the carbon neutrality of individual actors is a framing device; the end goal
is to stabilize atmospheric emissions and collectively achieve a livable planet. Yet
we have an overarching global framework, replicated in thousands of subjurisdictional and private pledges, that embraces atomized carbon neutrality as the
central aim.
This Section discusses the dangers of this neutrality mirage. To do so, it turns
to a debate that has become central in U.S. administrative law over the role of
cost-beneﬁt analysis (CBA) in the regulatory state. 229 The contention of this Section is that the robust scholarly conversation about the risks of CBA helps illuminate analogous, underappreciated risks presented by the net-zero framework.
It builds this case by considering two ﬂaws shared by CBA and net zero: 1) their
democratic deﬁcit and 2) their inattention to equity concerns.
1.

The Democratic Deﬁcit

CBA and net zero share a commitment to neutral decision-making that risks
either obscuring or disregarding citizens’ collective values, desires, and demands. As I argue in this Section, however, net zero’s failings in this regard are
far more severe than CBA’s.
CBA seeks to rationalize agency decision-making through a weighing of
costs and beneﬁts. 230 If the costs of a proposed regulation are greater than the
beneﬁts, CBA says do not proceed. If beneﬁts exceed costs, regulate. Since it was

228.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2018) (prohibiting discrimination and segregation in public accommodations); Exec. Order No. 14036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36987, 36987 (July 9, 2021) (calling for the
Federal Communications Commission to restore net-neutrality rules to create a “fair, open,
and competitive marketplace”); 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b) (2018) (prohibiting public utilities from
making or granting “undue preference or advantage”).
229. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2256 (2002) (“Within the
past two decades, cost-beneﬁt analysis (CBA) has become one of the most widely discussed
topics in all of regulatory law.”).
230. See RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 10 (2008) (describing how CBA aims to “maximize the net beneﬁts of regulation” and arguing that CBA
can be a “powerful tool for neutral policy analysis” if done correctly).
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ﬁrst mandated in a Reagan-era executive order, 231 CBA has endured through
numerous administrations to become a central decision-making tool within the
U.S. administrative state—a hoop through which nearly all major regulations
must jump before promulgation. 232
Proponents of CBA champion its capacity to provide a neutral, transparent,
and expert method of determining the value of regulation—a method that overcomes mere interest-group politics. 233 CBA’s critics level numerous charges
against its purported neutrality, ranging from the technical to the fundamental.
One central line of criticism argues that CBA is antidemocratic. These critics
point out how CBA becomes totalizing: although CBA proponents claim it is
only one regulatory tool, its rationalizing calculus overwhelms outside moral or
ethical considerations that might bear on the wisdom of regulation. 234 At the
same time, people acting together as a polity may arrive at diﬀerent goals and
projects than are reﬂected in CBA’s addition exercise, which merely sums agglomerated, individualized interests, as measured largely through willingness to
pay. 235

231.
232.

233.

234.

235.

218

See Exec. Order No. 12291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 473-76
(1988).
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION
19-20 (2002); REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 230, at 11 (“[CBA] has enormous currency in
the federal policy making apparatus.”); Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized
Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1262 (2006) (observing an enduring, cross-partisan embrace of CBA). Only statutes that expressly forbid CBA now escape its
application as a regulation-informing tool. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S.
457, 465 (2001) (reading Section 109 of the Clean Air Act to exclude considerations of cost).
See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 8 (2006) (defending CBA as a “workable proxy for something that is part of the moral
bedrock—overall welfare”); John J. Donohue III, Why We Should Discount the Views of Those
Who Discount Discounting, 108 YALE L.J. 1901, 1903 (1999) (“Requiring agencies to set forth
the relevant costs and beneﬁts carefully helps them to rationalize their regulatory agenda and
enables independent analysts to evaluate the soundness of particular regulations.”).
See DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH
FOR OBJECTIVITY 100-01 (2010); WENDY BROWN, EDGEWORK: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 42 (2006) (“[A] generalized calculation of cost and beneﬁt becomes the measure of all state practices. Political discourse on all matters is framed in entrepreneurial terms . . . .”); Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Beneﬁt
Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1575 (2002) (discussing how CBA
omits “rights and morality principles that are not reducible to monetary terms”). See generally
Alexander Volokh, Rationality of Rationalism? The Positive and Normative Flaws of Cost-Beneﬁt
Analysis, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 79 (2011) (highlighting the shortcomings of the cost-beneﬁt
framework from a libertarian perspective).
See Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 200 (1980); KYSAR, supra
note 234, at 48-49; BROWN, supra note 234, at 44 (describing how this neoliberal approach to
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These critics conclude that CBA suﬀers from a challenge of democratic legitimacy because its results do not appropriately reﬂect citizens’ collective moral
and political commitments. 236 It pretends to be neutral, but it actually vaunts an
economic conception of the good through its focus on willingness-to-pay as a
central measure of preferences. 237 Moreover, CBA has frequently been strategically deployed as a deregulatory tool, only to be abandoned by its previous champions when its economics counsel in favor of regulation. 238
As severe as CBA’s democratic-legitimacy crisis may be, net zero’s is worse.
CBA requires state actors to measure myopically citizen preferences for state action through summed willingness to pay. Net zero, in contrast, frequently fails
to measure citizen preferences at all. It is a project that takes all institutional comers—countries, states, cities, and companies—and oﬀers value-laden decisionmaking authority to each entity that takes up the task.
There is nothing neutral about a decision to allow uncoordinated and in
many instances undemocratic entities to decide the trajectory of climate change
policy. Corporations, for instance, are likely to shape their net-zero policies in
accordance with reputational and proﬁt motives with limited concern for collective social priorities. Most corporate pledges ignore the collateral costs or beneﬁts of particular net-zero strategies. Only careful watchdogging by standard-setting organizations or nonproﬁts—coupled with whatever market-based pressure
activists can bring to bear—might serve to constrain net-zero actions. 239 But because net zero is playing out in the corporate context as an atomized project of

236.

237.
238.

239.

policymaking has the “eﬀect of radically transforming and narrowing the criteria for good
social policy”); Mark Sagoﬀ, Can Environmentalists Be Liberals? Jurisprudential Foundations of
Environmentalism, 16 ENV’T L. 775, 778 (1986); Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 234, at
1557.
See Dworkin, supra note 235, at 200; KYSAR, supra note 234, at 48-49; BROWN, supra note 234,
at 44; Sagoﬀ, supra note 235, at 778; Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 234, at 1557; see also
James Goodwin, A Post-Neoliberal Regulatory Analysis for a Post-Neoliberal World, LPE PROJECT
(Oct. 14, 2021), https://lpeproject.org/blog/a-post-neoliberal-regulatory-analysis-for-a-post
-neoliberal-world [https://perma.cc/FV8Y-HR2N] (pointing out that “recent polling conﬁrms that large majorities of voters across the political spectrum oppose using the goal of
wealth maximization to guide regulatory decision-making”).
See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 234, at 1566-67 (“It is o�en impossible to arrive at a
meaningful social valuation by adding up the willingness to pay expressed by individuals.”).
See Elizabeth Popp Berman, Let’s Politicize Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis, LPE PROJECT (Oct. 5, 2021),
https://lpeproject.org/blog/lets-politicize-cost-beneﬁt-analysis [https://perma.cc/AK6HVF65].
See Karin Bäckstrand, Fariborz Zelli & Philip Schleifer, Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Climate Governance, in GOVERNING CLIMATE CHANGE: POLYCENTRICITY IN ACTION? 338,
346 (Andrew Jordan, Dave Huitema, Harro van Asselt & Johanna Forster eds., 2018) (“In the
transnational realm, private governors are typically self-selected, and there is no demos available to hold them to account.”).
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thousands of bespoke pledges, this kind of private-citizen monitoring is a particularly tall task. I return in Part V to interrogate the implications of this gaping
democratic gap with respect to private actors.
Of course, not all entities pursuing net zero suﬀer equally from this democratic deﬁcit. One way to theorize entities making net-zero pledges is to place
them along a democratic continuum, with those entities most responsive to
democratic pressure being the least dangerous actors to execute the net-zero
agenda from a democratic-legitimacy perspective (see Figure 1).
figu re 1 . a democratic continuum of net-zero pledgers

Publicly held
corporations
Privately held
corporations

Less democratically
accountable

States and
provinces
Cities

Countries

More democratically
accountable

In the case where a democratically elected government pursues a net-zero
target, democratic pressure can act as a shaping force. 240 Moreover, larger democratically constituted jurisdictions—for example, states and countries—have
more emissions which fall within their responsibility and control. This larger
sphere of control creates more possibility for democratic contestation and discussion over the best ways to reach net zero. For this reason, cities fall along the
middle of the democratic continuum, between corporations and larger govern-

240.

220

Democratic contestation can play the same role in the CBA context, as when Congress forbids
CBA in a certain statute. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184-85 (1978) (interpreting the Endangered Species Act); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 47071 (2001) (interpreting Section 109 of the Clean Air Act).
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ments. Although cities’ governments are democratically elected, cities lack control over several major causes of their emissions—including, in most cases, their
electricity grids. 241
Notably absent from the taxonomy above are international institutions, for
the simple reason that none exist that have made or can make credible net-zero
commitments. 242 Our consent-based international legal system has no world
government that can bind its member countries—a fact particularly salient for
climate change diplomacy, where consensus has long ruled as the required
threshold of agreement. 243 Nor have most countries been willing to accede to
binding targets or meaningful enforcement mechanisms within climate accords. 244 These stark facts help explain the United Nations’s embrace of net zero
as a calculated framing device, designed to get a maximum number of countries
to submit serious climate pledges in the absence of any formal repercussions for
nonparticipation. 245
Even within countries, it bears acknowledging that democratic pressure is far
from a panacea for rapid action on climate. It took thirty years from the world’s
ﬁrst major climate treaty for the United States—the world’s largest historic emitter—to pass meaningful domestic climate legislation. 246 Even with the IRA in
place, it remains to be seen whether the United States can maintain a plausible
trajectory toward net zero. The IRA’s projected 40% emissions cuts by 2030 are
a critical ﬁrst step. 247 However, its successful implementation will depend largely
on state cooperation and rapid infrastructure expansion, as well as accelerated
241.

242.
243.

244.

245.
246.

247.

For an overview of cities’ role in climate policy, see Welton, supra note 109, at 285-94 (contrasting municipal ownership models with the typical state public-utility commission model);
Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra note 110, at 325 (describing cities’ modern environmental focus
as “reducing demand for pollution by targeting groups such as land and building owners and
consumers”).
Beyond, of course, pledging to neutralize their own internal organizational emissions, over
which they have control analogous to that of a corporation.
See Antto Vihma, How to Reform the UN Climate Negotiations? Perspectives from the Past, Present
and Neighbour Negotiations 11 (Finnish Inst. of Int’l Aﬀs., Working Paper No. 82, 2014), https:
//www.ﬁles.ethz.ch/isn/184844/wp82.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL6C-SP2Y] (describing the
consensus requirements in climate negotiations, and asserting that “[t]he consensus requirement for 195 countries is problematic” because “[i]t gives undue weight to parties with obstructive tendencies”).
See Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement, 25 REV. EUR. CMTY. & INT’L
ENV’T L. 142, 142 (2016) (“Whether or not the Paris Agreement is legally binding, it lacks
enforcement machinery and is not necessarily justiciable, at least in some countries.”).
See supra Section I.A on the origins of net zero.
The ﬁrst major international agreement on climate change was the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ratiﬁed in 1992. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 29, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 165.
See Osaka, supra note 87.
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progress in transitioning away from fossil fuels post-2030. 248 On this point,
many lament the Act’s signiﬁcant reliance on “carrots” instead of “sticks”—that
is to say, its deployment of numerous clean-energy incentives without hard caps
on the future use of fossil fuels. 249 Yet in its very imperfections and necessary
compromises, the IRA reveals the deeply political nature of real-world decarbonization. Its passage thus reinforces this Part’s key point: there is no neutrality
about how to get to net zero and we should not design a system that pretends
that there is.
If we are not neutral about the pathways to net zero, then it is important to
keep front of mind the question of who is making decisions about the paths we
choose and what the consequences of putting this power in various actors’ hands
are likely to be. Moreover, we must not discount the importance of democratic
politics to building the kind of sustained, deep response to climate change that
science shows is imperative. As I have argued elsewhere, decarbonization is at
root a “social project,” because “[d]iscussions around its trajectory implicate
choices and values that extend far beyond what technologies are available at what
costs.” 250 The kinds of radical emissions cuts necessary will implicate many community-level and household-level decisions and preferences concerning things
like housing size and type, work patterns, modes of individualized or collective
transportation, and diet and food-waste considerations. 251 Of course, helping
248.

See Alexander C. Kaufman, States Will Decide How Much Democrats’ Historic Climate Deal Actually Cuts Emissions, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 13, 2022, 8:00 AM EDT), https://www.huﬀpost.com/entry/ira-climate-states_n_62f54317e4b045e6f6abb444 [https://perma.cc/V5VVCLBN]; Osaka, supra note 87 (observing the diﬃculties of predicting how much the IRA will
cut emissions).
249. See James Goodwin & Alexandra Rogan, With the Inﬂation Reduction Act, the Clean Energy
Revolution Will Be Subsidized, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM BLOG (Aug. 18, 2022), https://
progressivereform.org/cpr-blog/inﬂation-reduction-act-part-i
[https://perma.cc/9LTWGRLE]; Daniel Cohan, Big New Incentives for Clean Energy Aren’t Enough – the Inﬂation Reduction Act Was Just the First Step, Now the Hard Work Begins, CONVERSATION (Aug. 19, 2022, 3:31
AM
EDT),
https://theconversation.com/big-new-incentives-for-clean-energy-arentenough-the-inﬂation-reduction-act-was-just-the-ﬁrst-step-now-the-hard-work-begins188693 [https://perma.cc/Z4UQ-KWWQ].
250. Shelley Welton, Electricity Markets and the Social Project of Decarbonization, 118 COLUM. L. REV.
1067, 1096 (2018); see also Sheila Jasanoﬀ & Sang-Hyun Kim, Sociotechnical Imaginaries and
National Energy Policies, 22 SCI. AS CULTURE 189, 189 (2013) (“[R]adical changes in the fuel
supply are likely to transform social infrastructures, changing established patterns of life and
work and allocating beneﬁts and burdens diﬀerently from before.”).
251. The IPCC’s April 2022 report from Working Group III, focused on climate mitigation, was
the ﬁrst to include a full chapter on the role of demand. See Amy Westervelt, Debunking Demand (IPCC Mitigation Report, Part I), DRILLED NEWS (Apr. 5, 2022), https://www
.drilledpodcast.com/debunking-demand-ipcc-mitigation-report-part-1 [https://perma.cc
/5GSV-DGRT]. That chapter ﬁnds that Avoid-Shi�-Improve options for managing demand
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families to make these shi�s will require considerable structural change, not just
a message of personal responsibility. 252 Moreover, the latest IPCC ﬁndings emphasize that not everyone needs to shi� equally: “Wealthy individuals contribute
disproportionately to higher emissions and have a high potential for emissions
reductions while maintaining decent living standards and well-being . . . .” 253
All these ﬁndings highlight the need for democratic processes that can channel citizen needs and preferences into climate policy, and thereby build sustained
support for the decades-long, experimental, iterative project to come. As one
IPCC cochair of the most recent working-group report observes: “Many governments are struggling with the question whether people would support changes.
This report shows that public acceptability is higher when cost and beneﬁts are
distributed in a fair way.” 254 The next Section turns more pointedly to this challenge: how “fairness” enters—or fails to enter—into the net-zero project.
2. Inattention to Equity Concerns
The democracy critique is not the only one uniting CBA and net zero. A second prominent criticism of CBA focuses on its equity implications. CBA, critics

could contribute to 40-70% reductions by 2050, particularly by shi�ing transportation modalities, switching to plant-based diets, and improving building eﬃciency. See Summary for
Policymakers, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 154, at SPM-44
to -45; see also Dra� Scoping Plan Overview, N.Y. CLIMATE ACTION COUNCIL 12 (Jan. 2022),
https://climate.ny.gov/Our-Climate-Act/Dra�-Scoping-Plan
[https://perma.cc/6ZPUV6V4] (“Consumer and community decision-making is key, and especially important for the
purchase of new passenger vehicles and heating systems for homes and businesses through
the next decade.”).
252.

See JEDEDIAH PURDY, THIS LAND IS OUR LAND: THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW COMMONWEALTH
86-87 (2019) (framing the problem as one of institutions rather than errors in personal preferences); Matthew Huber, Theorizing Energy Geographies, 9 GEOGRAPHY COMPASS 327, 328
(2015) (“[A]ny energy transition toward a low-carbon energy system . . . require[s] . . . new
spatial imaginations.”); Damian Carrington, It’s Over for Fossil Fuels: IPCC Spells Out What’s
Needed to Avert Climate Disaster, GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2022, 11:01 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/apr/04/its-over-for-fossil-fuels-ipcc-spells-out-whats-neededto-avert-climate-disaster [https://perma.cc/C8H7-NVVZ] (quoting IPCC cochair Professor
Priyadarshi Shukla as stating that “[h]aving the right policies, infrastructure and technology
in place to enable changes to our lifestyles and behaviour can result in a 40-70% reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050—signiﬁcant untapped potential”). For an international example, see Lucia A. Reisch, Corinna Fischer, Rainer Grießhammer, Viola Muster, Ulf
Schrader, Christian Thorun & Franziska Wolﬀ, Sustainable Consumption Now! The German
National Programme for Sustainable Consumption on the Test Bed 2 (Sept. 25, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3679773 [https://perma.cc/8DEGUR9V].

253.

2022 Technical Summary, supra note 154, at TS-103.
Carrington, supra note 252 (quoting Linda Steg).

254.
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charge, not only underregulates but unfairly regulates. Because in practice, CBA
is better at pricing costs than valuing beneﬁts, it consistently overstates the costs
of regulation—thus harming regulations’ intended beneﬁciaries. 255 Moreover,
CBA’s methodologies pay no attention to distributional concerns—that is, who
beneﬁts and who is burdened by a regulation—even though these questions are
of central relevance to those aﬀected and implicate citizens’ more general commitments to fairness and justice. 256 The real-world consequences of this sidelining are predictable: recent research conﬁrms that the framework cumulatively
beneﬁts the rich at the expense of the less aﬄuent, given its use of willingnessto-pay as a measure of utility enhancement. 257 In a country with severe wealth
gaps across race, these metrics also have discriminatory eﬀects on Black Americans and other people of color. 258
Net zero’s mechanical means of emissions netting similarly sidelines equity
and racial justice. By relying on entity-driven pledges, net zero eschews any commitment to—or even tracking of—the distributional implications of the program’s eﬀects. At the same time, because these pledges are frequently made in
the context of either overall corporate strategies or tight governmental budgets,
eﬃciency is likely to emerge as the dominant criterion of net-zero strategies. 259
Net zero’s ambivalence to distributional impacts is not only a moral issue; it also
runs counter to equity commitments embedded in global climate policy. The
Paris Agreement, in addition to enshrining the principle of net-zero carbon, offers a clear moral boundary on its implementation: this netting exercise is supposed to occur “on the basis of equity, and in the context of sustainable development and eﬀorts to eradicate poverty.” 260 Yet only 10% of corporate net-zero

255.

See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 234, at 1578; David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Beneﬁt
Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 339-42 (2006) (noting that beneﬁts can be “extraordinarily diﬃcult” to quantify and monetize); Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 37-40 (2004).
256. See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 234, at 1574 (“In our society, concerns about equity
frequently do, and should, enter into debates over public policy.”).
257. See Zachary Liscow, Is Eﬃciency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1649, 1652, 1656 (2018).
258. See Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change, Racial Justice, and Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis, LPE PROJECT
(Sept. 28, 2021), https://lpeproject.org/blog/climate-change-racial-justice-and-cost-beneﬁtanalysis [https://perma.cc/N3WD-YKWU]; Melissa J. Luttrell & Jorge Roman-Romero,
Regulatory (In)Justice: Racism and CBA Review, YALE. J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG
(Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/regulatory-injustice-racism-and-cba-reviewby-melissa-j-luttrell-and-jorge-roman-romero [https://perma.cc/2YPG-8M8H].
259. One can already see how corporations and many governments are prizing eﬃciency through
plans to use oﬀsets and future, noncommercialized technologies. See supra Part II.
260. Paris Agreement, supra note 38, art. 4(1).
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pledge-makers report taking equity into consideration when setting their netzero strategy. 261
This lack of attention to equity within the net-zero framework renders it vulnerable to the same critiques that have dogged CBA. The standard answer to
these CBA critiques has been to dismiss their relevance to the ﬁeld of regulation
by arguing that the tax system can handle any perverse distributive consequences
of eﬃcient regulation. 262 However, more recently, the CBA discourse—if not
practice 263—has matured considerably. Enduring proponents of CBA have reﬁned their analyses to look for ways to improve its proregulatory potential and
to contextualize the exercise. 264 Scholars have also begun to reconsider in earnest
the previously well-accepted conclusion that redistribution is best ignored
within regulatory policy. 265 For example, Zachary Liscow has championed a

261.

See Taking Stock, supra note 5, at 23.
See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Eﬃcient than the Income Tax
in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 674-75 (1994); Richard L. Revesz, Regulation
and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489, 1489 (2018) (analyzing the origins and wisdom of
the widely accepted view that “distributional concerns should be moved out of the regulatory
domain and into Congress’s tax policy portfolio”).
263. See Revesz, supra note 262, at 1491 (noting that although the CBA regime cra�ed by a Clinton
executive order “states that distribution must be taken into account,” it has “never been an
important component of the administration of this order”). Obama Administration updates
that were intended to promote “equity, human dignity, fairness and distributive impacts,”
alongside CBA in regulatory review, similarly “did not change [agency] behavior.” Id. at 154142.
264. See generally REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 230 (discussing ways of debiasing the cost-beneﬁt methodology and better aligning it with proregulatory interests); Cass R. Sunstein, The
Limits of Quantiﬁcation, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1369 (2014) (arguing for “breakeven analysis”
to highlight the beneﬁts of regulation when regulators are not able to monetize them); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 194-97
(1999) (arguing for a cabined use of CBA as a “welfarist decision procedure” alongside other
considerations); Richard L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Beneﬁts, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1423,
1423 (2014) (pushing for quantiﬁcation of more beneﬁts); Amy Sinden, Douglas A. Kysar &
David M. Driesen, Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis: New Foundations on Shi�ing Sand, 3 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 48, 51 (2009) (reviewing ADLER & POSNER, supra note 233, and commending its approach to CBA for being “not imperialistic”).
265. For example, Richard L. Revesz has moved from a conventional dismissal of distributional
issues as better suited for tax-and-transfer regimes to a full-throated embrace of embedding
distributional considerations in regulatory design. Compare REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note
230, at 14 (“It is generally thought that the best way to improve overall well-being is to maximize wealth by managing the economy eﬀectively, and then redistributing wealth through
the tax-and-transfer system.”), with Revesz, supra note 262, at 1489 (“The time has come to
make distributional consequences a core concern of the regulatory state.”). See also Zachary
Liscow, Redistribution for Realists, 107 IOWA L. REV. 495, 495 (2022) (arguing that the ortho262.
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“‘thousand points of equity’ approach” to redistribution throughout the regulatory state as the best way to “make substantial inroads on inequality while doing
the most good at the least cost.” 266 Taking a diﬀerent approach, Richard L.
Revesz argues for creating a new interagency working group to redistribute resources to groups disproportionately burdened by regulatory actions. 267
These advances in CBA are commendable, even if not completely responsive
to critics. 268 However, integrating equity considerations is not even possible in
the atomized world of net-zero pledges. As discussed above, in the current design of the net-zero program, there is simply no one in charge—and thus no one
to pursue a coordinated goal of either eﬃciency or equity. To be sure, there are a
limited number of governmental net-zero pledges that are accompanied by explicit equity requirements. For example, the states of Washington and New York
have committed resources to ensure investment in overburdened communities
and tribal nations. 269 If institutionalized appropriately, these substantive commitments to equity may help ensure a just net-zero strategy. 270
But more o�en, when equity is considered at all within net-zero pledges, it
is commodiﬁed. Net-zero standard-setting organizations have sought to turn
equity and sustainability into monetizable assets. For example, in 2003, a suite
of international nongovernmental organizations, including the World Wildlife

doxy amounts to a “prescription for widespread inequality” because the public prefers redistribution through ﬁeld-speciﬁc policies rather than taxes and transfers); Sunstein, supra note
229, at 2257 (championing distributional analysis for agencies); Liscow, supra note 257, at
1655-57 (drawing attention to the distributional impacts of eﬃcient policies and providing
guidance on how redistribution concerns should factor in); Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H.
McAdams, The Distributive Deﬁcit in Law and Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1085-89
(2016) (discussing distributive entrenchment in policies).
266. Liscow, supra note 265, at 495.
267. Revesz, supra note 262, at 1555-56. This proposal does not address the reverse challenge—
when disadvantaged groups might be inordinately beneﬁtted by a regulation that fails conventional CBA but is nevertheless justiﬁable on distributional grounds—but it is a start.
268. See id.; see also Lisa Heinzerling, Quality Control: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 102 CALIF. L.
REV. 1457, 1459 (2014) (considering the limitations of Sunstein’s breakeven-analysis proposal); Sinden et al., supra note 264, at 53-55 (suggesting that the political economy of CBA is
still likely to lead to the vaunting or abuse of the instrument in practice); Amy Sinden, Cass
Sunstein’s Cost-Beneﬁt Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 191, 200 (2004) (rejecting Sunstein’s attempt to make CBA “palatable”).
269. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70A.65.030 (West 2022) (requiring state climate funding to be
directed to vulnerable populations and overburdened communities); N.Y. ENV’T CONSERV.
LAW § 75-0117 (Consol. 2019) (instructing state agencies to direct resources in a manner such
that “disadvantaged communities [are] to receive forty percent of overall beneﬁts of spending
on clean energy”).
270. See infra Section V.B.
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Fund, established the “Gold Standard” to ensure that “projects that reduced carbon emissions featured the highest levels of environmental integrity and also
contributed to sustainable development.” 271 This project attempts to quantify
and assure the achievement of potential positive impacts from carbon-oﬀset projects beyond simply carbon removal, such as improved health, reduced hunger,
and enhanced gender equality. 272 As corporate or government demand grows for
oﬀsets that meet this standard, these multibeneﬁt oﬀsets—dubbed “Boutique
Carbon” by political scientists Matthew Paterson and Johannes Stripple—can
fetch a higher price than plain-old “Walmart” oﬀsets. 273
The creation of bespoke carbon commodities is a bizarre and disturbing way
to accomplish the aim of an equitable global climate change strategy. It puts critical choices into the hands of myriad oﬀset-project developers, who by design
will base their sustainability and equity initiatives around whatever quantiﬁable
objectives will fetch the highest price from corporate and governmental oﬀset
purchasers. 274 At the same time, it deprives governments and localities of the
funding and the power to establish their own equity-related goals and priorities.
Behind the neutrality mirage, then, lies a giant transfer of political and social
control from the state to the market, with an attendant loss of opportunities for
democratically shaping the outcomes and consequences of net zero. 275
For this reason, anyone troubled by CBA’s distributional and democratic
challenges should be even more disturbed by net zero’s eschewal of responsibility
for its well-catalogued equity implications. This point alone should be enough
to force the kind of reexamination of net zero’s structure advocated for in Part V.
But there is another challenge that must ﬁrst be explored: as the next Part describes, net zero’s corporatized, atomized approach to climate policy may well

271.
272.

273.

274.
275.

GOLD STANDARD, https://www.goldstandard.org/about-us/vision-and-mission [https://
perma.cc/F89T-MSFB].
See Guidance for the Identiﬁcation of Impacts and Indicators for Activity Level SDG Impact Reporting, GOLD STANDARD 12 (Aug. 2019), https://www.goldstandard.org/sites/default/ﬁles/2019
_sdg_tool_guidance_brieﬁng.pdf [https://perma.cc/TYA4-VS6G]; Lee & Mayer, supra note
60, at 7 (describing this emerging category of certiﬁcation groups).
Paterson & Stripple, supra note 191, at 570 (describing Boutique Carbon as attached to “[s]tories told about the beneﬁts (poverty, development, local empowerment, gender) of the particular carbon unit,” whereas Walmart carbon is “[c]arbon as an ‘empty’ unit, detached from
climate mitigation as ethical duty”); see also Donofrio et al., supra note 189, at 6 (noting that
oﬀsets that claim to support sustainability goals o�en fetch “much higher” prices).
See Seddon et al., supra note 220, at 7 (describing the diﬃculty of ﬁnding appropriate metrics
for “social-ecological eﬀectiveness of nature-based interventions”).
Cf. Boyd, supra note 33, at 401 (arguing that a focus on “emissions trading and other forms of
carbon pricing over the last three decades has worked to diminish our understanding of climate change as a broad public problem and has undermined our ability to mobilize the power
of government to respond”).
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impede the ultimate goal of limiting planetary warming to noncatastrophic levels.
iv. the collective-achievement challenge
The previous Part described the limitations of framing climate policy as presumptively neutral. Whereas that critique focused on the moral and political
shortcomings of pursuing atomized net-zero pledges, this Part focuses on the
challenges likely to emerge as these pledges accrete and interact over time. The
net-zero framework presents a multipronged collective-achievement challenge,
in which pledges are likely to underachieve necessary emissions reductions,
overrely on technologies and strategies that cannot be supported globally at the
necessary scale, and create perverse incentives under the legal structure of the
Paris Agreement.
A. Collective Underachievement of Emissions Reductions
There is now scientiﬁc consensus that, at the global level, achieving net-zero
carbon emissions is imperative to stemming the climate crisis. 276 This conclusion
has provoked a range of models seeking to understand potential pathways to
move national economies to net-zero emissions. These models converge on the
following conclusion: “Achieving this goal requires eliminating nearly all sources
of anthropogenic GHG emissions and neutralizing hard-to-abate emissions with
an appropriate amount of CO2 removals.” 277 In other words, every ton of carbon
that can be eliminated, must be eliminated. Carbon-removal technologies should
be reserved for counterbalancing emissions in those essential sectors where reducing emissions is particularly diﬃcult or expensive, including chemicals, steel,
hydrogen production, and aviation. 278
Under the current net-zero framework, as described above, any company or
city that makes a net-zero pledge is free to determine its own balance of emissions reductions and carbon removal (with the latter typically accomplished
through purchasing oﬀsets). This strategy creates a disturbing risk of collective
underachievement: any entity that opts to purchase oﬀsets to cover emissions
that could be eliminated jeopardizes the broader global project. Given early in-

276.

See supra Section I.A.
Pineda et al., supra note 118, at 24; see Williams et al., supra note 70, at 4 (noting widespread
agreement in U.S. models on key pathways to net zero).
278. Of course, which of these sectors is “essential” is a political judgment—for example, much
aviation may be far from essential.
277.
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dications of the number of companies that intend to use oﬀsets—and the magnitude of their use in many cases where viable technical substitutes exist 279—our
present approach to net zero fails to incentivize emissions reductions at the scale
necessary to achieve atmospheric stability over a noncalamitous time frame. 280
In other words, the sanctioning of oﬀsets as an individualized strategy for accomplishing net zero leads to “mitigation deterrence,” where oﬀsets substitute
for needed carbon-emissions actions rather than complement them. 281
Recognizing this challenge, some standard-setting organizations require entities to demonstrate that they are eliminating all emissions deemed feasible. For
example, the SBTi requires participants to reduce emissions at a rate compatible
with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C goal. 282 I return in Part V to consider the prospects for eliminating the collective-underachievement challenge through private-governance initiatives, a�er considering two more facets of the challenge.
B. Incompatible Carbon-Removal Strategies at Scale
The second risk is a corollary to the ﬁrst: if entities are underachieving emissions reductions by overrelying on oﬀsets, we must consider the likely consequences of this overreliance. Researchers project that demand for carbon oﬀsets—particularly for carbon-removal projects—is likely to increase substantially
as entities ramp up their net-zero pledges and seek low-cost ways to achieve
them. 283
An examination of IPCC models might give the impression of enormous potential for carbon-removal oﬀsets. As the IPCC explains, its models demonstrate

279.

For example, the natural-gas industry is ﬁghting vociferously to block attempts to transition
heating and cooking to electricity, even though electricity presents an excellent substitute for
gas in these domains. See Jeﬀ Brady & Dan Charles, As Cities Grapple with Climate Change, Gas
Utilities Fight to Stay in Business, NPR (Feb. 22, 2021, 4:19 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2021
/02/22/967439914/as-cities-grapple-with-climate-change-gas-utilities-ﬁght-to-stay-in-business [https://perma.cc/H83S-6NU6]; Emily Holden, Revealed: How the Gas Industry Is Waging War Against Climate Action, GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2020, 5:00 AM EDT), https://www
.theguardian.com/environment/2020/aug/20/gas-industry-waging-war-against-climate-action [https://perma.cc/676X-H57M].
280. See Lee & Mayer, supra note 60, at 11 (“As caps on carbon emissions tighten, companies will
aggressively search for low-priced oﬀsets, many of which do not result in additional removal
or mitigation.”).
281. Carton et al., supra note 24, at 9; see McLaren et al., supra note 28, at 1 (“[W]e see clear evidence that emissions reductions can be deterred or delayed by eﬀorts and suggestions to use
[negative emissions technologies] to sustain fossil fuel use.”).
282. Pineda et al., supra note 118, at 19-20.
283. See Lee & Mayer, supra note 60, at 11.
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that “[a]ll pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with limited or no overshoot project the use of carbon-dioxide removal (CDR) on the order of 1001000 [gigatons] CO2 over the 21st century.” 284 To understand the enormity of
this enterprise, consider that all the people on earth, combined, weigh approximately half a gigaton. 285
However, it is important to understand that these models essentially back
into their calculation of the amount of carbon removal necessary by beginning
with a given emissions limitation (for example, 1.5°C), subtracting all feasible
emissions reductions, and then assuming that any residual emissions will be
compensated for through carbon removal. 286 In other words, IPCC models
should not be interpreted as a plausible assessment of how much carbon removal
is economically, technologically, or politically feasible. 287 Indeed, the IPCC takes
pains to say as much, explaining that “CDR deployment of several hundreds of
GtCO2 is subject to multiple feasibility and sustainability constraints.” 288
Some of these constraints are economic and technological. DAC, for example, is still considered too immature to include in most models, as are the experimental technologies of enhanced mineral weathering and ocean alkalinization. 289 Of course, assumptions about DAC and these other technologies could
shi� as they mature. Other limits, however, are more intractable: BECCS and
aﬀorestation—the two most mature and frequently modeled technologies—face
the very physical constraint of land. 290 Beyond physical and technological constraints lies the host of concerns, outlined above, about the eﬀects of carbon removal on indigenous communities, economic inequality, and biodiversity. 291
These concerns combine to create at least a moral—but perhaps also a political—

284. 2018

Summary for Policy Makers, supra note 3, at 17.
See Friedmann et al., supra note 57, at 15.
286. See McLaren et al., supra note 28, at 2; see also Andrew Bergman & Anatoly Rinberg, The Case
for Carbon Dioxide Removal: From Science to Justice, in CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL PRIMER, ch.
1 (Jennifer Wilcox, Ben Kolosz & Jeremy Freeman eds., 2021), https://cdrprimer.org/read
/chapter-1 [https://perma.cc/4UDV-5SYR] (“The assumed large scale of potential future
CDR may also reﬂect both unreasonable technological optimism and hubris in our ability to
control complex natural systems.”).
287. See Healey et al., supra note 168, at 2 (describing how these modeled technologies “ﬁll the gap
between overall carbon budgets and what could be achieved in a particular timeframe through
emissions reductions”); Beck & Mahony, Politics of Anticipation, supra note 28, at 2.
288. 2018 Summary for Policymakers, supra note 3, at 17.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See supra notes 221-223, 255-275 and accompanying text.
285.
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constraint on the amount of carbon removal that host countries (predominantly
developing countries) will tolerate. 292
Up against this wall of challenges butts the enormous appetite of net-zero
pledgers for carbon-removal oﬀsets. At present, the system for directing carbon
removal essentially amounts to ﬁrst come, ﬁrst served, with a veneer of sustainability imposed through optional Boutique Carbon oﬀerings. 293 Collectively, it
seems unlikely that the world is even capable of delivering the total amount of
oﬀsets that the net-zero community appears poised to demand. But, if it is capable, this delivery is likely to be accompanied by severe collateral consequences. If
not entirely incompatible in the aggregate, then, net-zero pledgers’ carbon-removal strategies are at least likely to be irresponsible and politically explosive.
To be sure, trade-oﬀs are inevitable. Our models make clear that carbon removal is an essential component of keeping planetary warming within limits that
the international community, guided by science, has deemed acceptable. 294 But,
as Wim Carton and coauthors suggest, “How such trade-oﬀs are negotiated and
addressed will be crucial to the local and global societal legitimacy of negative
emission policies.” 295 The present free-for-all, largely unregulated market for
carbon-removal oﬀsets presents a growing crisis of legitimacy for the project of
net zero. 296 Although small enough in scale at present to avoid signiﬁcant political fallout, a massive market-driven land grab of the type we can expect if we
leave net zero in its current form is precisely the kind of challenge that might
undermine the project in its entirety. 297

292.

See Healey et al., supra note 168, at 1 (describing the tensions likely to arise as big-emitter
countries rely on developing countries for CDR, with attendant pressures on their domestic
food and energy supplies); Revesz, supra note 262, at 1492-98 (observing how distributional
issues have impeded U.S. climate policy and concluding that “[i]gnoring the pleas of communities that disproportionately suﬀer serious harms is likely, in the future, to derail important
welfare-enhancing regulations”).
293. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
294. See James Temple & Casey Crownhart, UN Climate Report: Carbon Removal Is Now “Essential,”
MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 4, 2022), https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/04/04/1048832
/un-climate-report-carbon-removal-is-now-essential [https://perma.cc/79FN-4M99].
295. Carton et al., supra note 24, at 13.
296. See Seddon et al., supra note 220, at 1 (asserting that current regimes do a poor job of accounting for synergies and trade-oﬀs among various sustainability goals).
297. See 2018 Summary for Policymakers, supra note 3, at 16 (“Such large transitions pose profound
challenges for sustainable management of the various demands on land for human settlements, food, livestock feed, ﬁbre, bioenergy, carbon storage, biodiversity and other ecosystem
services . . . .”); Walter V. Reid, Mariam K. Ali & Christopher B. Field, The Future of Bioenergy,
26 GLOB. CHANGE BIOLOGY 274, 274 (2020) (“Land-intensive bioenergy makes a meaningful
contribution to the global energy system only at a spatial scale of hundreds of millions of
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C. Perverse Legal Incentives
A ﬁnal challenge of the net-zero framework stems from its interactions with
the structure of the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement takes a diﬀerent legal
approach than previous climate treaties, which divided the world into developed
and developing countries and only imposed emissions-reductions targets on developed countries. 298 Instead, the Paris Agreement relies on a universal “pledge
and review” process, in which each country submits an NDC every ﬁve years,
committing to a self-determined level of emissions reductions. 299 Although
countries have no legal obligation to achieve these NDC goals, they do commit
to “pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions.” 300 The theory behind the Paris Agreement is that in
cra�ing and executing these NDCs, countries will ratchet up their level of ambition as collective trust builds in the process. 301
The Paris Agreement’s structure was born largely of legal necessity. The
United States knew it could not get a new climate treaty ratiﬁed in the U.S. Senate in 2015, and thus convinced the world to structure the agreement as a subsidiary agreement of the already-ratiﬁed 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 302 Beyond legal constraints, many also viewed
Paris’s novel structure as a constructive way to overcome the developed/developing country divide that had long dominated climate negotiations.
Whatever wisdom may lie in its structure, the Paris Agreement’s NDC system also creates serious incentive challenges for the net-zero project. The main
challenge, in brief, is this: the Paris Agreement relies on country-centered action.
The net-zero framework focuses largely upon inducing private-sector investment based on net-zero commitments. But what is the relationship between
public and private action in a regime based on territorial emissions? 303 When a
hectares or larger, large enough to have signiﬁcant trade-oﬀs with food production and biodiversity conservation.”); Friedmann et al., supra note 57, at 23 (“Land-use changes (LUC)
associated with biomass have led locally to severe environmental damage, aﬀecting biodiversity, water quality, and environmental justice for indigenous peoples.”).
298. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change arts. 23, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 (establishing targets for “Annex 1” countries).
299. See Paris Agreement, supra note 38, art. 4.
300. Id. art. 4.2.
301. See id. art. 4.3 (requiring “progression” and “highest possible ambition” in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)).
302. See Bodansky, supra note 244, at 149-50.
303. See Michaelowa et al., supra note 171, at 1216; Simon Evans & Josh Gabbatiss, In-Depth Q&A:
How ‘Article 6’ Carbon Markets Could ‘Make or Break’ the Paris Agreement, CARBONBRIEF (Nov.
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corporation voluntarily buys an oﬀset from a country, who gets to “count” it or
claim credit for it? The corporation? The host country? Both?
The Paris Agreement’s Article 6 tries to meet this challenge by requiring any
oﬀsets exchanged to “allow for higher ambition” and “promote sustainable development and environmental integrity.” 304 However, the Agreement itself is
vague as to how voluntary carbon markets will interact with the NDC-based
structure of the agreement. 305 Although considerable progress was made on
ﬂeshing out country accounting requirements at the 2021 international climate
negotiations, the topic of how to manage the voluntary market remains a thorny
one. 306 In brief, it remains unclear whether or not a country must make a “corresponding adjustment” in its claimed emissions reductions when credits are
awarded for sale in the voluntary market. 307 Although the answer to this ques-

29, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.carbonbrief.org/in-depth-q-and-a-how-article-6-carbonmarkets-could-make-or-break-the-paris-agreement [https://perma.cc/P9YA-P9DV] (observing the risk that countries “could deliberately exclude parts of their economies from their
NDCs, so as to be able to sell any related emissions reductions on the global market instead”);
Michael W. Wara & David G. Victor, A Realistic Policy on International Carbon Oﬀsets 5-6 (Program on Energy & Sustainable Dev., Working Paper No. 74, 2008) https://law.stanford.edu
/publications/a-realistic-policy-on-international-carbon-oﬀsets
[https://perma.cc/5T63GTXB] (charting similar challenges in earlier climate-oﬀset programs).
304. See Paris Agreement, supra note 38, arts. 6.1, 6.2 & 6.4 (creating two markets for “internationally transferred mitigation outcomes”).
305. See Lee & Mayer, supra note 60, at 7; Andrei Marcu, Governance of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and Lessons Learned from the Kyoto Protocol, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION 1
(May 2017), https://www.cigionline.org/documents/1182/Fixing%20Climate%20Governance%20Paper%20no.4%20WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/83MM-6MZW]; David A. Wirth &
Lisa Benjamin, From Marrakesh to Glasgow: Looking Backward to Move Forward on Emissions
Trading, 11 CLIMATE L. 245, 260 (2021) (“The o�-lauded ﬂexibility of the Paris Agreement . . . has provided rather too much ﬂexibility for reaching agreement on ambitious Article
6 rules around carbon trading.”).
306. See Charles E. Di Leva & Scott Vaughan, The Paris Agreement’s New Article 6 Rules, INT’L INST.
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Dec. 13, 2021), https://www.iisd.org/articles/paris-agreement-article
-6-rules [https://perma.cc/7FY6-UTL5] (“A big question coming out of Glasgow is to
what extent will purely private sector, voluntary carbon markets conform with the
new Article 6 rules.”).
307. See Kasia Klaczynska Lewis & Malwina Burzec, A�er COP26: The Interplay Between Article
6 of the Paris Agreement and the Voluntary Carbon Market, ERNST & YOUNG (Dec. 27, 2021),
https://www.ey.com/en_pl/law/a�er-cop26-the-interplay-between-paris-agreement-andthe-voluntary-carbon-market [https://perma.cc/NN3F-TDHC] (“[I]t has not yet been decided how voluntary use of carbon credits will be accounted for the purpose of a corresponding adjustment in a situation when credits acquired are not used to meet the buyer country’s
Nationally Determined Contributions.”); see also Jonathan Crook & Gilles Dufrasne, FAQ:
Deciphering Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, CARBON MKT. WATCH (Dec. 10, 2021, 10:08 AM),
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tion largely determines the integrity of voluntary oﬀsets, it appears that no conclusive decision is forthcoming. Instead, as one commentator suggests, “Ultimately, governments or courts may start regulating what claims companies can
truthfully make in association to carbon credits that are not backed by corresponding adjustments.” 308
This creates a diﬃcult tension not only for those concerned about the integrity of carbon markets, but also for developing countries, for which the consequences of encouraging private climate investment are unclear. 309 In the long
run, countries engaging heavily with carbon markets may risk ceding many of
the cheapest, easiest cuts within their borders to other countries and companies—potentially making their own eventual pathways to net zero more expensive and complex than they otherwise would have been.
In sum, there are real diﬃculties to combining a self-directed net-zero bonanza with a global climate agreement premised on country-level responsibility
for emissions reductions. These diﬃculties are not insurmountable, but as the
next and ﬁnal Part discusses, they do highlight several important lessons for the
future of the net-zero project.
v. the future of net zero: the private and public role
This Feature has articulated two broad risks of the net-zero project that go
beyond more-o�en-identiﬁed “accounting risks”: the neutrality mirage and the
collective-achievement challenge. Collectively, these risks underscore the importance of carefully governing the project of net zero to ensure it is achieved in
politically, morally, and ecologically sustainable ways. In this ﬁnal Part, the Feature turns to consider the implications of these conclusions for both private- and

https://carbonmarketwatch.org/2021/12/10/faq-deciphering-article-6-of-the-paris-agreement [https://perma.cc/3EJN-M4ZN] (describing how remaining vagueness in the Article 6
rulebook could be exploited).
308. Lambert Schneider, #COP26 in Glasgow Delivered Rules for International Carbon Markets – How
Good or Bad Are They?, BEITRÄGE UND STANDPUNKTE AUS DEM ÖKO-INSTITUT [CONTRIBUTIONS & STANDPOINTS FROM ECO-INST. (Nov. 15, 2021), https://blog.oeko.de/glasgow-delivered-rules-for-international-carbon-markets-how-good-or-bad-are-they-cop26
[https://
perma.cc/XSX7-RXPW]. For more on how potential enforcement of net-zero claims might
function, see Lin, supra note 20, at 719-34.
309. Cf. James Edmonds, Sha Yu, Haewon McJeon, Dirk Forrister, Joseph Aldy, Nathan Hultman,
Ryna Cui, Stephanie Waldhoﬀ, Leon Clarke, Stefano De Clara & Clayton Munnings, How
Much Could Article 6 Enhance Nationally Determined Contribution Ambition Toward Paris Agreement Goals Through Economic Eﬃciency?, 12 CLIMATE CHANGE ECON. art. no. 2150007, at 7
(2021) (reporting that Article 6 trading is likely to shi� emissions mitigation toward “nonOECD”—that is, developing—countries).
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public-sector pursuit of net zero. Although supportive of global-emissions netting and well-designed public net-zero regimes, this Part insists that there are
fairer and more productive ways to harness corporations in the pursuit of these
collective aims.
A. Redesigning the Private Role
In an ideal climate regime, corporations would not set their own targets,
timetables, and strategies for climate action. Instead, governments would legislatively establish appropriate binding targets and accompanying policy goals (be
those equity-, labor-, or innovation-focused) and would dictate the roles of various sectors in helping to achieve those targets through emissions reductions.
Instruments deployed might include carbon pricing or cap-and-trade mechanisms, mandatory (“command and control”) limits, or green industrial policy.
These details would be open for democratic debate and iterative experimentation. 310
Needless to say, this is not the world we live in. The United States has failed
to produce binding economy-wide targets for over thirty years, and even sectorspeciﬁc progress has been halting. 311 Across the world, corporations’ transnational reach and economic and political power allow them to deﬁne and o�en
defy national eﬀorts to regulate climate change. 312 Accordingly, there has been
an explosion of interest in the private sector’s own ability to address climate
change in recent years. 313 Legal academic circles are abuzz with debates about

310.

There is growing scholarly recognition that carbon-pricing mechanisms are unlikely to drive
the structural change necessary for deep and rapid decarbonization on their own—but that is
not to say that they might not play a role in well-designed climate policy. See Boyd, supra note
33, at 402-03 & nn.4-5 (gathering literature on this point). See generally DANNY CULLENWARD
& DAVID G. VICTOR, MAKING CLIMATE POLICY WORK (2020) (arguing that we must look beyond market mechanisms to regulations and industrial policy to achieve the scope and scale
of the necessary transition).
311. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022) (rejecting one form of EPA’s ability to
regulate greenhouse-gas emissions from power plants under the Clean Air Act).
312. See Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform and the Sustainability Imperative, 131
YALE L.J. 1217, 1251 (2022) (arguing that corporations likely cannot be regulated fully into
compliance given “the extraordinary inﬂuence that major corporations exert upon the political
processes generating the regulations purportedly constraining them”).
313. See Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 139
(2019) (asserting that “[t]he corporation is ascendant” as an actor in environmental law).
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corporate purpose and the best ways to structure and enforce burgeoning corporate “environmental, social, and governance” (ESG) initiatives. 314 As these
scholars document, the private sector is approaching climate change mitigation
with a newfound zeal that combines beneﬁcence and opportunism. For example,
one investment ﬁrm proclaims that net zero creates a “historic investment opportunity.” 315 Similarly, Larry Fink, chief executive oﬃcer of the behemoth,
ESG-focused investment ﬁrm BlackRock, has predicted that “[o]ne of the biggest opportunities of this generation will be helping our clients navigate the transition to a net-zero economy.” 316
For these mixed reasons, net-zero pledges and attendant voluntary carbon
markets are poised for a meteoric rise in the coming decade. 317 Particularly given
the challenges that have plagued attempts to raise public funds for international

314.

See, e.g., Light & Skinner, supra note 113, at 1895 (arguing that banks will be at the center of
the transition to a low-carbon economy); Susan S. Kuo & Benjamin Means, Climate Change
Compliance, 107 IOWA L. REV. 2135, 2138 (2022) (arguing that climate change should be viewed
as a matter of corporate compliance); Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoﬀ Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, 99 TEX. L. REV. 1309, 1309 (2021) (arguing that corporate purpose is
best conceptualized as a precommitment device “to facilitate the goals of corporate participants”); Lynn M. LoPucki, Repurposing the Corporation Through Stakeholder Markets, 55 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1445, 1448 (2022) (asserting the importance of “credible, publicly available ESG
[environmental, social, and governance] information” for potential stakeholders); MICHAEL
P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE
RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 145-47 (2017).
315. Jean-Pierre Durante & Malik Zetchi, The Global Journey to Net-Zero Could Create a Historic
Investment Opportunity, PICTET WEALTH MGMT. (Apr. 23, 2021), https://perspectives.group
.pictet/sustainability/the-global-journey-to-net-zero-could-create-a-historic-investmen
[https://perma.cc/HL97-Q22A].
316. BlackRock’s Sustainable Investment Funds Surge to $509B, E&E NEWS (Jan. 18, 2022, 7:58 AM
EST), https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/eenews/2022/01/18/blackrocks-sustainable
-investment-funds-surge-to-509b-285263 [https://perma.cc/9W89-DF9D].
317. See Chloé Farand, Mark Carney Oversees Blueprint for Scaling Up Carbon Market as Oﬀset Demand Soars, CLIMATE HOME NEWS (Oct. 11, 2020, 6:05 PM), https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/11/10/mark-carney-oversees-blueprint-scaling-carbon-market-oﬀset-demand-soars [https://perma.cc/5SZX-8XHG] (observing a doubling of the volume of claimed
emissions reduction between 2017 and 2020 and noting that “[i]t is expected to continue to
soar in the near future as companies look for ways to meet their newly set goals”); Press Release, Ecosystem Marketplace, Voluntary Carbon Markets Rocket in 2021, on Track to Break
$1B for First Time (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/articles/pressrelease-voluntary-carbon-markets-rocket-in-2021-on-track-to-break-1b-for-ﬁrst-time
[https://perma.cc/W33V-TNVZ] (reporting record value for voluntary carbon markets).
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climate eﬀorts, private capital has an obvious role to play in both mitigating corporate emissions and funding carbon-removal eﬀorts and innovations. 318 Even
for skeptics of corporate climate commitments, it would be diﬃcult to leave this
money on the table. But as catalogued in this Feature, a massive and uncoordinated deployment of private capital toward individualized net-zero targets presents real risks.
Two solutions to these risks predominate the literature to date. Both focus
on increasing the transparency and integrity of entities’ net-zero pledges. The
ﬁrst approach is to enhance net-zero standard setting. 319 As discussed in Part I,
several standard-setting organizations already attempt to assure the environmental integrity of both net-zero pledges and the oﬀsets used to achieve them. 320
In fall 2021, the “Taskforce on Scaling Voluntary Carbon Markets” announced
the creation of a new governance body to improve these oversight mechanisms
in order to build conﬁdence in carbon markets. 321 At the same time, banks’ and
private-equity ﬁrms’ steps to police their portfolios for net-zero compliance also
render them net-zero standard-setting organizations of sorts, and they too are

318.

See Operationalising Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV.
12 (May 2017), https://www.ieta.org/resources/International_WG/Article6/Portal/operationalising-article-6-of-the-paris-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TV8-PB42] (“The current levels of public funding committed under the Paris Agreement are far from suﬃcient to
reach its objective. Achievement of the 2°C target will only be possible if signiﬁcant levels of
private ﬁnance can be leveraged.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)); 2022 Technical
Summary, supra note 154, at TS-122 (“Progress on the alignment of ﬁnancial ﬂows with low
GHG emissions pathways remains slow. There is a climate ﬁnancing gap which reﬂects a persistent misallocation of global capital . . . .”).
319. See Lee & Mayer, supra note 60, at 11; Expert Peer Review Group, RACE TO ZERO, https://cli[https://perma.cc/X4FR-CUHL];
matechampions.unfccc.int/expert-peer-review-group
Patrick Bolton, Stefan Reichelstein, Marcin Kacperczyk, Christian Leuz, Gaizka Ormazabal &
Dirk Schoenmaker, Mandatory Corporate Carbon Disclosures and the Path to Net Zero, CTR. FOR
ECON. POL’Y RSCH. 2 (Oct. 2021), https://cepr.org/system/ﬁles/2022-08/PolicyInsight111.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C46V-FWML] (outlining the important role of carbon disclosure in net
zero); Lin, supra note 20, at 683.
320. See supra Part I. “The Oxford Principles for Net Zero Aligned Carbon Oﬀsetting suggests that oﬀsetting . . . should be restricted to the use of high quality credits with a low-risk of non-additionality, and only a�er prioritising the reduction of one’s own emissions and the scaling up
of removals.” Day et al., supra note 61, at 49.
321. New Governing Body Formed to Oversee Voluntary Carbon Markets, EDIE (Sept. 21, 2021), https:
//www.edie.net/news/9/New-governing-body-formed-to-oversee-voluntary-carbon-markets [https://perma.cc/3TPH-X5AX]; see also Farand, supra note 317 (“With more and more
businesses setting net zero emissions targets, the voluntary carbon market needs stronger
quality control to scale up . . . .”).
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taking steps to improve their track records in complying with their commitments. 322 Whether such standard setting occurs via ﬁnancial institutions or
through net-zero-focused certiﬁcation schemes, the basic idea is the same: enhanced monitoring should help ensure high-quality net-zero pledges. 323
The SEC’s ongoing initiative to enhance climate-related disclosures might
add legal teeth to such schemes. 324 The chief of the SEC enforcement division,
Gurbir Grewal, has explained that if its proposed rule is ﬁnalized, it would enhance the agency’s antifraud enforcement by putting climate disclosures “in a
consistent, comparable format that would allow [the SEC] to more easily further
[its] investigations.” 325 Such disclosures might similarly assist private litigants
pursuing climate-related fraud, tort, or human-rights claims against corporations. Nevertheless, company-by-company litigation will prove a piecemeal, expensive, and cumbersome way to monitor net-zero pledges—causing some to
advocate for a more dramatic shi�.
The second approach is to restructure the nature of net-zero pledges themselves. Most prominently, several academics have called for splitting net-zero
pledges into two components—one focused on internal emissions reductions
and the other on oﬀsets and removals. 326 Others have suggested that pledges
should also be temporally separated, with an emphasis on near-term reductions
over long-term promises. 327 Proponents of these strategies hope that the trans-

322.

323.

324.
325.

326.

327.
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See Light & Skinner, supra note 113, at 1898 (describing these trends as “signiﬁcant new forms
of private environmental governance”); see also Rory Van Loo, The New Gatekeepers: Private
Firms as Public Enforcers, 106 VA. L. REV. 467, 496, 499-502 (2020) (noting that ﬁrms have
increasingly assumed a rulemaking role).
A full exploration of the reasons why banks and private-equity ﬁrms are playing this standardsetting role is beyond the scope of this Feature. For more, see Light & Skinner, supra note 113,
at 1912; and Condon, supra note 115, at 4, which traces and explains “the growing trend of
institutional investor activism related to climate change.”
For discussion of the proposed rule, see supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
Avery Ellfeldt, ‘Greenwashing Is Occurring,’ SEC Oﬃcial Tells House Panel, E&E NEWS (July 20,
2022, 7:10 AM EDT), https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/eenews/2022/07/20/greenwashing-is-occurring-sec-oﬃcial-tells-house-panel-00046649
[https://perma.cc/AYQ9YCS3].
See, e.g., Myles Allen, Kaya Axelsson, Ben Caldecott, Thomas Hale, Cameron Hepburn, Conor
Hickey, Eli Mitchell-Larson, Yadvinder Malhi, Friederike Otto, Nathalie Seddon & Steve
Smith, The Oxford Principles for Net Zero Aligned Carbon Oﬀsetting, UNIV. OF OXFORD 1 (Sept.
2020), https://ocm.iccrom.org/documents/oxford-principles-net-zero-aligned-carbon-oﬀsetting [https://perma.cc/RLQ7-RU26]; Lin, supra note 20, at 758-59; McLaren et al., supra
note 28, at 1.
See, e.g., Sam Fankhauser et al., The Meaning of Net Zero and How to Get It Right, 12 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 15, 17 (2022); Rahul Tongia, Net Zero Carbon Pledges Have Good Intentions.

neutralizing the atmosphere

parency of bifurcated pledges might discipline entities’ net-zero strategies, creating a greater focus on rapid emissions reductions and less emphasis on oﬀsets
and removals. 328
These strategies can function in tandem, as standard-setting organizations
can (and in some cases do) require split reduction/removal pledges. 329 If wellimplemented and adopted at scale, these reforms might make real inroads into
policing abuses of the net-zero format. That said, some critics reasonably doubt
the ability of standard-setting organizations to accomplish this task, which
would “entail a radical transformation of the oﬀsetting market.” 330 The central
concern is that greenwashing and self-serving optimism may be features, not
bugs, of net zero. For example, Wim Carton and coauthors suggest that “the use
of sinks to substitute for more near-term mitigation actions is not incidental to
the removal discussion, but a key reason for why carbon removal was put on the
political agenda in the ﬁrst place.” 331 If so, it will be diﬃcult for voluntary certiﬁcation schemes—or even investor pressure—to penetrate large, hard-to-decarbonize sectors such as fossil-fuel production. 332

328.

329.

330.

331.
332.

But They Are Not Enough, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 25, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog
/planetpolicy/2021/10/25/net-zero-carbon-pledges-have-good-intentions-but-they-are-notenough [https://perma.cc/QN6M-CGLQ] (suggesting a focus on the “area under the curve”
of net-zero trajectories).
See Day et al., supra note 61, at 4 (“Given the ambiguity of net-zero claims, separate targets
can provide actors pursuing ambitious emission reduction targets with the opportunity to
stand out and better demonstrate the depth of their ambition.”); Stephen Treloar & Lars Erik
Taraldsen, Mark Carney Says Carbon Oﬀsets Must Be Limited to Residual Emissions, FIN. POST
(Nov. 23, 2021), https://ﬁnancialpost.com/commodities/energy/oil-gas/mark-carney-sayscarbon-oﬀsets-must-be-limited-to-residual-emissions [https://perma.cc/4JZV-2YXG] (describing Global Financial Alliance for Net Zero cochair Mark Carney’s view that the “use of
carbon oﬀsets should be a last resort to cover only a small fraction of emissions”).
See, e.g., Interpretation Guide: Race to Zero Expert Peer Review Group, supra note 139, at 6 (explaining that an entity would not meet the “Race to Zero leadership practice” in cases
“[w]here sinks or credits are relied on in lieu of decarbonization”).
Day et al., supra note 61, at 49; see also Lee & Mayer, supra note 60, at 2 (suggesting that
achieving a high-quality oﬀset market will be “very diﬃcult”); cf. Bruner, supra note 312, at
1228 (expressing skepticism about the eﬃcacy of disclosure regimes in driving change).
Carton et al., supra note 24, at 9.
See Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy System, supra note 6, at 21 (ﬁnding “no
need for investment in new fossil fuel supply in our net zero pathway”); Simon Dietz, Dan
Gardiner, Valentin Jahn & Jolien Noels, How Ambitious Are Oil and Gas Companies’ Climate
Goals?, 374 SCI. 405, 405 (describing the incompatibility of oil and gas net-zero pledges with
planetary reality); Marsh & Shankleman, supra note 114 (noting controversy over Brookﬁeld
Asset Management describing itself as net zero while continuing to invest in fossil fuels); cf.
Brett McDonnell, Hari M. Osofsky, Jacqueline Peel & Anita Foerster, Green Boardrooms?, 53
CONN. L. REV. 335, 339 (2021) (“[C]orporate and ﬁnancial law initiatives have not yet had a
signiﬁcant impact on underlying corporate behavior in ways that substantively aﬀect the allocation of resources and capital to address climate change.”).
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Beyond these well-articulated concerns, however, lies the core of this Feature’s argument. Although standard-setting organizations, litigation, and target
separation might alleviate many of the accounting risks discussed in Part II, they
are unlikely to address the larger risks that form the focus of this Feature. Standardizing disclosures to make it easier to sue ﬁrms not in compliance with their
professed net-zero commitments may help tackle greenwashing. Requiring robust internal reductions as a component of standard setting is likely to help avoid
greenwashing and self-serving optimism by limiting the extent to which compliant companies can lean on unproven technologies or overemploy oﬀsets. Similarly, carefully vetting claimed oﬀsets’ validity will reduce—though never eliminate—fungibility-related concerns about whether purchased removals are real
and permanent. But these checks provide no coordinating function regarding the
cumulative impacts of oﬀsets purchased by net-zero pledgers. 333 In other words,
these reforms still treat approved oﬀsets as neutral, fungible tokens—with no
eﬀort to understand or control their collective impacts. Nor do these programs
induce companies to buy anything other than the cheapest oﬀset that complies
with the standards they have pledged to follow. 334 These reforms thus fall short
of the eﬀorts needed to advance carbon-removal technologies while controlling
for their negative social and ecological eﬀects. 335
Thus, we arrive at the crux of the private-sector challenge that this Feature’s
analysis exposes: how might corporate action on climate mitigation be achieved
under real-world political constraints without acquiescing to the risks that a
marketized net-zero project presents? I contend that the answer is for global
leaders in corporate standard setting to stop celebrating the private-netting side
of net zero, which is poised to do much harm and questionable good. Instead,
an understanding of the larger risks of atomized climate policy lends substantial
credence and exigency to proposals to shi� private climate action to a “reduce
333.

Cumulative-impacts analysis is a mainstay of U.S. environmental law, required of all major
federal actions that signiﬁcantly aﬀect the environment by the National Environmental Policy
Act. See 32 C.F.R. § 651.16 (2021). Environmental justice scholars have also highlighted how
cumulative-impacts analysis brings to light a community’s total pollution burden and vulnerability. See, e.g., Charles Lee, Another Game Changer in the Making? Lessons from States Advancing Environmental Justice Through Mapping and Cumulative Impact Strategies, 51 ENV’T L. REP.
10676, 10677 (2021); Morello-Frosch et al., supra note 198, at 879.
334. Cf. Asiyanbi & Lund, supra note 219, at 391 (noting the tension between cost-eﬀective oﬀset
programs and ones that deliver on multiple goals).
335. See Holly Jean Buck, How to Decolonize the Atmosphere, PROGRESSIVE INT’L (June 22, 2020),
https://progressive.international/blueprint/46253391-5b3d-4e68-bd3f-d53dc54180fd-holly-jean
-buck-how-to-decolonize-the-atmosphere [https://perma.cc/X9WZ-DZZJ] (arguing for the
need for more coordinated investment into developing carbon-removal technologies); Healey
et al., supra note 168, at 3 (“[I]t is asking []too much of voluntary codes such as these to create
a consistent, fair, and widely observed set of standards to be applied to processes and outcomes.”).
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and support” strategy, or fund-based model. 336 Under such a model, private corporations would not promise to “net” their emissions, but instead would commit
to (1) establish and obtain an emissions-reduction goal; (2) declare any residual
emissions; and (3) contribute to a global fund at a level commensurate with
nonabateable emissions.
The beneﬁt of this proposal is that it parses largely laudable corporate behavior from socially risky behavior. There is limited risk to companies aiming to
reduce their internal emissions, provided they use a reasonable timescale and
reasonable technological assumptions. Indeed, companies likely have signiﬁcant
expertise to contribute to internal reduction eﬀorts that might allow them to
pursue eﬃcient, tailored reduction strategies. 337 To be sure, there may still be
certain collateral consequences to these choices—for example, a company might
choose to reduce its scope 2 emissions by supporting either nuclear or solar
power, with signiﬁcantly diﬀerent attendant social and ecological risks. 338 But
these consequences can at least be partially managed through related federal or
state policies, such as incentives for particular clean-energy sources. 339 And the
beneﬁts of encouraging private emissions reductions are clear and straightforward: any reductions that companies accomplish help bring down country-level
emissions, ultimately helping countries achieve and ratchet up their NDCs toward collective achievement of the global emissions-netting target.
Conversely, as this Feature has demonstrated, there are signiﬁcant risks to a
global corporate dash for carbon-removal oﬀsets—risks that are not mitigated
by merely having companies separate their reduction and removal goals or avoid
purchasing fraudulent oﬀsets. Instead, these risks counsel for more coordinated
eﬀorts to achieve the scale of carbon removal necessary to neutralize the atmos-

336.

My proposal draws substantially from Day et al., supra note 61, at 48, which describes a “contribution claim” model in which companies and subnational actors contribute to progress
elsewhere, without claiming to themselves net emissions. McNish, supra note 33, at 391, 43334; Dugast, supra note 137. Michael Wara also proposed replacing an earlier carbon-oﬀsetting
model with a global fund, albeit one that “invest[ed] in projects with the lowest marginal
abatement cost until its resources were exhausted”—a cost-only strategy that runs counter to
my aims. Wara, supra note 172, at 1801.
337. See Amanda C. Leiter, Fracking, Federalism, and Private Governance, 39 HARV. ENV’T L. REV.
107, 141 (2015) (“[P]rivate entities may have better access to high quality information about
the workings of the industry.”).
338. Scope 2 emissions are those associated with energy consumption. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
339. For example, thirty states have “renewable portfolio standards” that specify that an increasing
percentage of their energy each year must come from renewable energy sources. See Renewable
Portfolio Standards & Clean Energy Standards Summary Map, DSIRE (Sept. 2020), https://
ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/RPS-CES-Sept2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PX6E-S67M].
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phere while not lapsing into an approach that treats all tons of carbon as fungible. 340 Corporations that cannot fully eliminate emissions might still contribute
valuable capital to this goal but should not direct how it is accomplished. A “support” approach facilitates collaborative rather than atomized eﬀorts to achieve a
globally appropriate carbon-removal strategy.
The key challenge here would be convincing corporations to relinquish control over oﬀsetting and instead direct their resources to a global fund. I suggested
above that they contribute at a level “commensurate” with their remaining emissions, but what counts as “commensurate” is likely to create considerable debate.
However, such a ﬁgure need not be predetermined. Instead, corporations could
choose the level at which they wish to contribute to “oﬀset” their unabated emissions, be it $3, or $30, or $300 per ton. This information would be easily accessible and understandable for naming-and-shaming or praising purposes.
The fund that these contributions would support could then use this capital
to coordinate socially, politically, and ecologically sound carbon-removal strategies across the planet. 341 Such investments might include putting money into
promising private initiatives to remove carbon—just not in the uncoordinated,
atomized way that the current net-zero oﬀsets market does. 342 The fund could
also use a portion of its capital to invest in critical research, development, and
commercialization activities necessary to create the next generation of carbonremoval technologies. Ideally, this fund might be under some sort of public,
democratic oversight—perhaps functioning as an arm or extension of existing
global funding mechanisms. But a second-best solution, in which a fund—or
even several funds—remained under private control but coordinated eﬀorts to
fund global carbon removal, would be an improvement over uncoordinated
company-by-company netting eﬀorts. 343
340.

Cf. Jamieson & Di Paola, supra note 205, at 277 (“Governance in the Anthropocene is cooperation-hungry at every level. Never has there been less of a role for ‘rugged individualists,’
whether as individual people or countries.”).
341. See Jamie Rickman, Sumit Kothari, Francesca Larosa & Nadia Ameli, The Unequal Distribution of International Climate Finance Flows and Its Underlying Drivers (Feb. 9, 2022) (unpublished manuscript), https://assets.researchsquare.com/ﬁles/rs-1188981/v1_covered.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BR8X-CLZR] (“Only a small amount of funds are directed by centralised
UN institutions such as the Green Climate Fund, whereby developing countries’ representation ensures that funding is aligned with countries’ priorities and is distributed more equitably. In contrast, developing countries have limited agency over bilateral, multilateral and private ﬁnance ﬂows.” (footnotes omitted)).
342. See, e.g., Carton et al., supra note 24, at 9 (observing that projects such as halting deforestation
require “long-term thinking” that “belies the simpliﬁed understandings of social change embedded in” payments-based schemes (quoting Esteve Corbera & Heike Schroeder, REDD+
Crossroads Post Paris: Politics, Lessons and Interplays, 8 FORESTS 1, 2 (2017))).
343. Cf. Light & Skinner, supra note 113, at 1916 (suggesting that banks have a special need for
public trust that makes them better stewards than other corporations).
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Although not without its challenges, this proposal fares far better than the
current net-zero model in addressing the neutrality mirage and the collectiveachievement challenge. The reduce-and-support model embeds recognition that
not all tons of carbon are equal and channels private investment toward those
deemed most veriﬁable and sustainable by an entity with global public legitimacy—rather than funneling money into the cheapest oﬀset projects available. 344 Because companies’ support to such a fund would not correspond to a
speciﬁc “netting” number for purposes of meeting an internal net-zero pledge,
there would be no need for complex accounting rules detailing whether the corporation was allowed to “count” the reduction. Correspondingly, this strategy
would eliminate concerns over countries potentially manipulating their baselines
or NDCs to attract private mitigation funding. 345 Instead, the fund could target
countries based on both climate need and climate eﬀort. This last point is particularly important, given ﬁndings that climate ﬁnance is currently maldistributed from an equity perspective. 346
Would corporations accept and participate in this “public option” for netting
global emissions? 347 Probably not at the same rate that they have net zero, but
only because there is less room for obfuscation in it. Corporations with robust
emissions-reduction commitments and a desire to aﬀect meaningful progress on
climate change would stand to gain from participation; corporations milking net
zero for all its greenwashing potential or its bargain-basement price tag would
hesitate. In this way, a pledge-and-support model could help separate highquality pledges from dubious ones, which would be a net gain for the planet even
if it resulted in fewer companies rushing to join.
There are many details to be worked out about a pledge-and-support
model—most glaringly, details about how the fund’s governance might function
344.

See Seddon et al., supra note 220, at 8 (ﬁnding that collaborative public-private “consortia”
have been the most successful drivers of “large scale, long-term investments in ecosystems”);
Healey et al., supra note 168, at 4 (insisting that any net-zero strategy must “ensure that those
countries whose natural and social resources are targeted by others for large-scale CDR possess the capacities required to make them equal partners in their scientiﬁc assessment and
governance of all options”); cf. About GCF, GREEN CLIMATE FUND, https://www.greenclimate
.fund/about [https://perma.cc/BR5Q-9CMN] (describing a major United Nations climate
fund and its embrace of a “country-driven approach”).
345. See Day et al., supra note 61, at 48 (“[I]f the ﬁnancial support from voluntary action results in
emission reductions that are owned by the host country, this action will not conﬂict with the
host country’s GHG emission reduction target, but rather provide support for reaching and
ratcheting up those targets.”). On these concerns, see supra notes 306-309 and accompanying
text.
346. See Rickman et al., supra note 341, tbl.1 (ﬁnding that around 80% of international private
clean-energy ﬁnance goes to upper-middle-income and lower-middle-income countries, with
only 20% ﬂowing to low-income countries).
347. McNish, supra note 33, at 433.
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and how it might collaborate with country-level partners in funding carbon-removal strategies. Such a fund might, for example, be structured as a component
of the United Nations’s existing Green Climate Fund, which has not yet drawn
in private-sector ﬁnancing. 348 Or, as others have suggested, it might be modeled
oﬀ of the Montreal Protocol’s Global Environment Facility. 349 Ironing out these
details will be important to advancing the model politically but will have to involve discussion among key relevant players. Ultimately, if adequate buy-in can
be achieved, the model holds considerable potential to both improve the global
collaborative eﬀort at mitigating climate change and enhance consideration and
support for communities who suﬀer the collateral damage from these eﬀorts.
The model would not, however, serve those private interests that are using net
zero as a cover for delay or inaction. It thus remains uncertain whether it would
ﬂourish in the same way that net zero has. But even if this particular model does
not stick, the challenges this Feature highlights counsel for injecting more collaboration, public guidance, and holistic thinking into the netting of carbon
emissions wherever possible. 350
B. The Public Net-Zero Project
Governments clearly and appropriately have a lead role to play in the netzero project. Under the Paris Agreement’s structure, the success of international
climate change mitigation through global-emissions netting depends upon their
actions and choices. 351 So too does the political legitimacy of this endeavor, given
that governments (at various levels) are the democratic arbiters of the many contested issues raised by net zero. 352
Like many corporate pledges, country-level net-zero pledges o�en leave
much to be desired. Recent analysis by the Climate Action Tracker ﬁnds that
“with current actions global emissions will be at roughly today’s level in 2030,”
348.

349.

350.

351.
352.
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See Megan Bowman & Stephen Minas, Resilience Through Interlinkage: The Green Climate Fund
and Climate Finance Governance, 19 CLIMATE POL’Y 342, 343, 347-48 (2019) (celebrating the
Green Climate Fund’s equitable governance structure).
See McNish, supra note 33, at 433-34; Wara, supra note 172, at 1765. But see Kristina Daugirdas,
Funding Global Governance, 29 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 639, 642-43 (2021) (observing that voluntary
funds can come with problematic attached conditions and power dynamics).
See, e.g., Operationalising Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, supra note 318, at 24 (suggesting that
countries could, “on a voluntary basis,” engage more thoroughly with the carbon-oﬀset marketplace “to guide and promote the selection of activities on its territory in accordance with
it[s] sustainable development priorities”).
See supra notes 303-304 and accompanying text.
Litigation, too, might be a tool to help enforce government net-zero pledges—although the
plausibility and viability of this strategy diﬀers among jurisdictions. See Lin, supra note 20, at
730-34.
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which amounts to “twice as much as required for the 1.5°C limit.” 353 Yet the news
is not entirely grim. The same report found that
global warming by 2100 could be limited to 2.0°C if all 131 net zero targets announced or under consideration (but not yet submitted to the
UNFCCC) were to be achieved. While this is still far from 1.5°C, it stands
in stark contrast to the expected global warming levels under submitted
Paris Agreement targets and pledges (2.4°C) and currently implemented
policies (2.9°C) . . . . [However], there is a risk that poorly backed up net
zero claims could render these targets meaningless. 354
This quote hammers home both the potential and the challenges of a countrydriven net-zero program: so much depends upon successful governance and administration. 355 And yet, in the literature to date, there has been strikingly little
attention paid to the bureaucracy of net zero. Within this mundane topic lies the
heart of the program, which faces a fundamental tension.
Administering a net-zero target requires two distinct approaches and skill
sets, and few institutional actors excel at both. Certain aspects of administering
net-zero laws require considerable technical expertise to understand the technologies, strategies, and scientiﬁc assurances needed to reduce maximum amounts
of GHGs and permanently remove them from the atmosphere. At the same time,
as this Feature has demonstrated, net zero also implicates a range of social and
ecological concerns, bound up inextricably with legacies of racism, colonialism,

353.

Climate Action Tracker Global Update: Climate Target Updates Slow as Science Ramps up Need for
Action, CLIMATE ANALYTICS & NEWCLIMATE INST., at iii (Sept. 2021), https://climateactiontracker.org/documents/871/CAT_2021-09_Brieﬁng_GlobalUpdate.pdf [https://perma.cc
/58GZ-ZHKH].
354. Id. at 4.
355. See Alina Averchenkova, Sam Fankhauser & Jared J. Finnegan, The Inﬂuence of Climate Change
Advisory Bodies on Political Debates: Evidence from the UK Committee on Climate Change, 21 CLIMATE POL’Y 1218, 1218 (2021) (“Climate change action needs better governance.”); Thomas
Hale, Governing Net Zero: The Conveyor Belt, BLAVATNIK SCH. GOV’T 1 (Nov. 2021), https://
www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/ﬁles/2021-11/2021-11%20Hale%20Net%20Zero%20Policy
%20Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZPH7-QLMP] (“The next phase of net zero therefore requires building political power to shi� rules and institutions that drive change; it requires
governance.”).
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and inequality that have accompanied the fossil-fuel era. 356 Net-zero administration thus also requires capacious thinking, sensitivity, openness to public input,
and responsiveness. 357
One possible answer to these tensions is for lawmakers to cra� deeply prescriptive net-zero laws to provide guardrails for administering agencies. However, given that net zero is a thirty-year project unfolding in a rapidly evolving
technological and political space, overly prescriptive delegations seem ill advised. 358 Yet delegations without guardrails leave program administrators in the
challenging position of balancing these social and technological tradeoﬀs without guiding legal parameters, under what is likely to be considerable pressure
from powerful groups and industries. Given these inherent tensions, more energy and creativity need to be applied to the design of net-zero delegations and
administering institutions to equip them to address the range of sociotechnical
challenges these pledges present.
Early adopters of net-zero legal regimes oﬀer a window into the structural
and practical decisions that net zero presents. Many countries and states are
structuring their net-zero laws through a combination of broad targets and timetables coupled with the creation of an expert advisory panel to direct further decision-making. 359 In the United States, several states couple this panel with additional, goal-speciﬁc groups that are given a consultancy role—such as New

356.

See Shelley Welton, The Bounds of Energy Law, 62 B.C. L. REV. 2339, 2373-82 (2021); Lennon,
supra note 198, at 18, 24.
357. See Accelerating Decarbonization of the U.S. Energy System, supra note 12, at 10-11 (“Net zero
policy must include regular opportunities for, and responses to, community input, as well as
ensure fair access to beneﬁts and fair sharing of costs, for the pragmatic reason that public
support must be maintained for decades to complete a successful net-zero transition.”); cf. K.
SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 98 (2017) (highlighting the importance
of democratic institutional design in rebalancing political power).
358. See Jonas Meckling & Jonas Nahm, The Power of Process: State Capacity and Climate Policy, 31
GOVERNANCE 741, 742 (2018) (arguing that bureaucratic climate-policy design is preferable to
legislative climate-policy design because “bureaucracies are more insulated from interest
group pressure . . . [and] less vulnerable to regulatory capture when addressing the distributional questions of policy design”).
359. See supra notes 92-106 and accompanying text (discussing Sweden’s and New York’s net-zero
structures); see also Averchenkova et al., supra note 355, at 1219 (noting that advisory bodies
now exist in over forty countries, comprised mostly of experts “with some degree of independence from electoral politics”).
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York’s Climate Justice Working Group. 360 There is an emerging trend of dedicating some percentage of public spending—o�en 35-40%—to clean-energy investments in disadvantaged communities. 361
This legal structure oﬀers a compromise between the need for clear and
binding short- and long-term targets and the ﬂexibility to implement such targets in an evolving political and technological landscape. And it creates opportunities for ongoing democratic engagement with the advisory panel and additional working groups—though the devil will be in the details of how public
consultation actually plays out. Both features could, if well-implemented, lend
democratic legitimacy to public net-zero eﬀorts in ways that counteract the neutrality mirage. That said, there remains a balance to be struck. Many are frustrated with instances in which laws designed to facilitate democratic engagement
have at times blocked rapid progress on clean energy. 362 Net-zero institutions
will have to balance the need for rapid action with that for meaningful consultation—and will need help in understanding the best ways to do so.
Dedicated funding streams for disadvantaged communities also have promise as part of an equitable path to net zero. It remains too soon, however, to know
whether they will prove a successful and politically popular strategy, even among
those they are intended to beneﬁt. The idea has its skeptics—for example, the
Climate Justice Alliance argues that “[t]oken revenues distributed to environmental justice communities from carbon trading or carbon pricing can never
compensate for the destruction wrought by the extraction and pollution that is
the source of that revenue.” 363

360.

See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., N.Y. ENV’T CONSERV. LAW § 75-0107(1) (Consol. 2019); Justice40, WHITE HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/environmentaljustice/justice40
[https://perma.cc/PJ5X6GHL] (describing the Biden Administration’s commitment to ensuring that 40% of environmental and energy investments “ﬂow to disadvantaged communities that are marginalized, underserved, and overburdened by pollution”). See generally Collen Callahan, Daniel
Coﬀee, J.R. DeShazo & Silvia R. González, Making Justice40 a Reality for Frontline Communities: Lessons from State Approaches to Climate and Clean Energy Investments, UCLA LUSKIN CTR.
FOR INNOVATION (Sept. 2021), https://innovation.luskin.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021
/10/luskin-justice40-ﬁnal-web-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G4M-9Q2E] (distilling lessons
from many states’ eﬀorts to tackle climate justice through distributing beneﬁts or limiting
disparate impacts).
362. See generally Michael B. Gerrard, Legal Pathways for a Massive Increase in Utility-Scale Renewable
Generation Capacity, 47 ENV’T L. REP. 10591 (2017) (suggesting reforms to the National Environmental Policy Act to accelerate clean-energy development); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman,
What Happens When the Green New Deal Meets the Old Green Laws?, 44 VT. L. REV. 693, 697
(2020) (tracing how existing environmental laws stand as an impediment to rapid infrastructure transformation).
363. Gilbertson, supra note 222, at 4.
361.
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A ﬁnal important feature of a successful public net-zero commitment will be
the ability of citizens to hold their state’s feet to the ﬁre and ensure targets are
actually achieved. 364 On this point, the advisory-committee model ﬂounders. 365
Others have suggested that a more powerful institutional structure, with the
ability to control ﬁnancing ﬂows and not merely make recommendations, may
be superior. 366 Still others have suggested shi�ing toward more direct public
provisioning and ownership of key transformational infrastructure. 367 These are
interesting suggestions for a more robust net-zero governance model, but
whether they can gain adequate political traction remains to be seen. In the
meantime, a scholarly focus on what works and falters within emerging net-zero
governance praxis might strengthen the case for more creative and capacious reforms.
It also will be important for scholars to pay attention to the ways in which
net-zero commitments may develop in more accretive and less directive terms.
The United States’s current climate trajectory is a case in point: its President
supports net zero and its Congress has adopted legislation that puts the country
on a potential pathway to achieve it, but the country still lacks a fulsome netzero legal framework. 368 The implementation of the IRA—who wins and who
loses, what works and what fails, who gains power and who is sidelined—may
determine the next stage of climate progress or retrenchment in the country.
Questions of administration will thus also be key in this type of less fully formed
net-zero regime.
A full evaluation of these issues will have to be saved for later work. My aim
here has been to make the case that we should think of net zero as a collective
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See Simon Matti, Christer Petersson & Charlotta Söderberg, The Swedish Climate Policy Framework as a Means for Climate Policy Integration: An Assessment, 21 CLIMATE POL’Y 1146, 1148
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See Averchenkova et al., supra note 355, at 1219, 1225-27 (conducting “the ﬁrst assessment of
any climate advisory body” and ﬁnding that the United Kingdom’s version is “an eﬀective
knowledge broker” but “has also had diﬃculty getting its broader advice accepted”); see also
supra text accompanying notes 92-106 (explaining Sweden’s and New York’s early struggles).
See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, The Climate Case for a National Investment Authority, DATA FOR
PROGRESS 2 (Aug. 2020), https://www.ﬁlesforprogress.org/memos/white-paper-nia.pdf
[https://perma.cc/834A-GLYF] (proposing the creation of a federal National Investment Authority that would “use innovative ﬁnancing tools to mobilize and boost the ﬂow of public
and private capital into socially beneﬁcial ‘green’ infrastructures”).
See, e.g., Matt Huber & Fred Staﬀord, In Defense of the Tennessee Valley Authority, JACOBIN (Apr.
4, 2022), https://jacobinmag.com/2022/04/new-deal-tennessee-valley-authority-electricitypublic-utilities-renewables-green-power [https://perma.cc/A69D-M4HE] (making the case
for “big public power” in the clean-energy transition).
See supra notes 246-249 and accompanying text.
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project. Strong, public institutions, which are responsive to collective needs and
values, will be critical to the success and legitimacy of the project. 369 Countries,
states, and cities pursuing net zero need tools and models that allow them to
institutionalize the net-zero eﬀort in ways that balance economic, social, and
ecological considerations. Thus, I conclude here with a collective invitation to a
new research agenda around net zero. Both researchers that celebrate the project
in its current form and those that doubt it might usefully look beyond the substance of pledges to more mechanistic concerns: How are net-zero pledges institutionalized? To whom are design and implementation delegated, and under
what terms and conditions? What mechanisms are included for public participation? For public ownership and control? What’s working about these structures, and what needs to change? Getting the answers to these questions right
may ultimately determine whether the net-zero project can bear the weight that
the world has placed upon it.
conclusion
The net-zero climate paradigm has arrived, but its success in reducing atmospheric concentrations of GHGs is far from certain. As critic Adrienne Buller
has pithily phrased it: “Not all climate policy is good climate policy.” 370 Whether
the wholehearted embrace of net zero will turn out to have been wise depends
on how the program matures. This Feature has highlighted underappreciated
risks of the atomized, market-dependent model that has emerged in net zero’s
early days. And it has charted a path forward, centered on a recognition that
netting global emissions is a collective aim, with collective consequences, that
might save or sink us all.
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